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Summary 
International human rights law asserts that all individuals are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. The principle of universality, read together with the rights to equality 
and non-discrimination, embody this pronouncement and reaffirm that all human rights 
are bestowed unto all humans because they are human. This is accepted and reflected 
in most regional and domestic legal systems worldwide. Nonetheless, on the African 
continent, this pronouncement does not guarantee protection of the human rights of 
African individuals with non-normative gender identities. African transgender women 
in particular are an invisible minority, often misidentified as homosexual men. As a 
result, they frequently become victims of violence, discrimination and stigma. Because 
of their non-normativity and the denial of their gender identities and womanhood, these 
women are deprived of legal recognition and the protection of their rights. Moreover, 
this discrimination and the subsequent violations against them are justified by states 
as part of their cultural beliefs and/or traditions. Accordingly, the argument of the 
‘relativism’ of human rights is presented by many states as defence for the 
prioritisation of ‘religious and cultural’ rights over gender identity rights. However, this 
is a failure of states to recognise that individuals with non-normative gender identities 
are human beings, entitled to their fundamental human rights.  
Treaties are a key mechanism of international law. Accordingly, treaty interpretation 
is an important tool to understand and implement international law. Whilst there are 
three approaches to interpretation typically recognised, the teleological approach to 
treaty interpretation, also known as the purposive approach, is argued to be the most 
effective in the interaction with human rights treaties. The Maputo Protocol is a 
regional African treaty which codifies the rights of African women. In the Maputo 
Protocol ‘women’ are defined by their female gender. Therefore, this thesis assesses 
whether African transgender women are recognised and protected through a 
teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol, in consideration of the definition for 
women set out in the Protocol. This assessment is done through an application of 
post-modern intersectional feminist legal theory, queer legal theory, the principle of 
universality as well as the rights to equality, non-discrimination and dignity.  
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Opsomming  
Die internasionale menseregte regsraamwerk bevestig dat alle individue gelyk en vry 
in waardigheid en regte gebore word. Die beginsel van universaliteit, wat saam met 
die regte tot gelykheid en nie-diskriminasie gelees word, beliggaam hierdie uitspraak 
en bevestig dat alle menseregte aan alle mense toegeken word omdat hulle menslik 
is. Dit word in die meeste plaaslike- en binnelandse regstelsels wêreldwyd aanvaar 
en weerspieël. Nietemin, op die vasteland van Afrika, is dit vir Afrika-individue met nie-
normatiewe seksuele oriëntasies en gender-identiteite nie ‘n waarborg nie. As ‘n 
onsigbare minderheid is dit veral transgender-vroue in Afrika wat dikwels as 
homoseksuele mans verkeerd geïdentifiseer en verstaan word. Hierdie miskenning 
het die gevolg dat hulle gereeld slagoffers van geweld, diskriminasie en stigma is. 
Vanweë hul nie-normatiewe identiteit en die ontkenning van hul gender-identiteite en 
vroulikheid, word hierdie vroue van formele regserkenning en die beskerming van hul 
fundamentele regte ontneem. Boonop word hierdie diskriminasie en die 
daaropvolgende menseregte skendings deur state geregverdig as deel van hul 
kulturele oortuigings en/of tradisies. Gevolglik word die argument van die 'relativisme' 
van menseregte deur baie state voorgehou as regverdiging vir die prioritisering van 
'godsdienstige en kulturele' regte bo gender-identiteit regte. Dit is egter 'n mislukking 
van state om te erken dat individue met nie-normatiewe gender-identiteite mense is 
wat die reg op hul fundamentele menseregte het nie.  
Die werking van internasionale reg geskied deur die kodifisering van verdrae. 
Daarom is verdragsinterpretasie 'n belangrike hulpmiddel om die internasionale reg te 
verstaan en te implementeer. Alhoewel daar drie benaderings tot interpretasie wat 
tipies erken word, is, word die teleologiese benadering tot verdragsinterpretasie, ook 
bekend as die doelgerigte benadering, as die doeltreffendste in die wisselwerking met 
menseregte verdrae aangevoer. Die Maputo-protokol is 'n plaaslike verdrag in Afrika 
wat die regte van vroue kodifiseer. 'Vroue', soos in die verdrag omskryf, word 
gedefinieer deur hul vroulike geslag. Daarom evalueer hierdie tesis of transgender-
vroue in Afrika erken en beskerm word deur 'n teleologiese interpretasie van die 
Maputo-protokol, inaggenome van die definisie van vroue wat in die protokol 
uiteengesit word. Hierdie evaluering word deur middel van 'n post-moderne 
intersectional feministiese regsteorie, queer regsteorie, die beginsel van universaliteit, 
sowel as die regte op gelykheid, nie-diskriminasie en waardigheid gedoen. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION   
1 1 Problem statement and motivation 
Within much of the African continent the prevailing culture of religious and traditional 
conservatism poses a major threat to the human rights of individuals with non-
normative gender identities. As will be argued and substantiated throughout this 
thesis, African transgender women in particular are stigmatised and marginalised due 
to discrimination as a result of their non-normative gender identities, as well as the 
denial of their womanhood. Violence against African transgender women is, as van 
der Merwe suggests: 
“[P]ervasive, particularly against trans women of colour. Violence against trans women is 
institutionalised – from the family to the medical establishment to incarceration. A trans 
woman in Zimbabwe was arrested for using the female bathroom. A trans woman from 
Uganda was attacked and severely beaten for being seen as the “face of homosexuality” 
in Uganda. A trans woman in Cape Town was killed for being herself. Sadly, these women’s 
experiences will not make it into country reports submitted to United Nations agencies 
because they are not seen as ‘women’s issues’”.1 
This thesis departs from the principle of universality, which is inherently coupled with 
the rights to equality and non-discrimination. Together, they act as the foundation of 
international human rights law substantiating that all human rights are indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated.2 Accordingly, the persecution and discrimination of 
African transgender women, which implicates their ability to have their fundamental 
human rights realised and protected, requires analysis.  
Treaties are crucial to the operation of international human rights law as they codify 
rights and obligations in order to hold states accountable. The Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Maputo 
Protocol” or “Protocol”)3 is a regional human rights treaty developed in accordance 
with article 66 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (“African 
Charter”).4 It was created to codify the human rights of African women and to ensure 
that these are “promoted, realised and protected”.5 It is important to acknowledge that 
 
1 L van der Merwe “Trans women and feminism” the struggle is real” (02-08-2016) openDemocracy 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/trans-women-and-feminism-struggle-is-real/> (accessed 
24-07-2019). 
2 R Wallace & O Martin-Ortega International Law 7 ed (2013) 244. 
3 (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005).  
4 (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986). 
5 Preamble of the Maputo Protocol.  
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both the principle of universality as well as the rights to equality and non-discrimination 
are enshrined in the Maputo Protocol. Furthermore, it is noteworthy, as will be further 
explored in this research, that the Maputo Protocol defines women as persons of 
female gender and not of female sex.6  
This thesis was motivated by the fact that currently, there is no instrument within 
international law nor under the African human rights system which specifically 
recognises and protects transgender women and their rights. In the majority of States 
Parties to the Maputo Protocol, the existence of transgender women is often 
overlooked because transgender issues do not fit in within the dominant religious 
and/or heteronormative cultures. Even in consideration of ‘queer activism’ in Africa, 
attention to transgender rights is negligible in comparison to the focus on the rights of 
gay and lesbian Africans.7 Moreover, the suffering of transgender women often occurs 
unnoticed whilst they continue to operate as invisible in legal and social realms. 
Within international human rights law it is a well-established notion that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.8 Furthermore, it is well-accepted 
that all individuals are entitled to their human rights without distinction of any kind and 
that these rights, as mentioned, are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated.9 Notwithstanding this conceptualisation, African transgender women are 
frequently excluded from legal recognition and protection because of their non-
normative gender identities and are subsequently denied their womanhood.    
1 2 Research questions and hypotheses  
This thesis is based on the primary research question whether African transgender 
women can be recognised and protected through a teleological interpretation of the 
Maputo Protocol. As the main hypothesis, this thesis proposes that the 
heteronormative lens through which the Maputo Protocol is currently, and generally, 
read and applied, endorses an interpretation which excludes transgender women 
based on discrimination against their non-normative gender identities. This is argued 
to be contrary to the object and purpose of international human rights law in general 
and the Maputo Protocol specifically. Furthermore, it is theorised that a teleological 
 
6 Article 1(k) of the Maputo Protocol.  
7 J Oloka-Onyango “Debating love, human rights and identity politics in East Africa: The case of 
Uganda and Kenya” (2015) 15 AHRLJ 49. 
8 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) art 1. 
9 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 para 5. 
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interpretation of the Maputo Protocol and its definition of ‘women’ in article 1(k) (using 
the wider concept of gender, rather than sex, to define women) supports the notion 
that transgender women can be subsumed under this definition to protect their 
fundamental human rights.  
Considering the primary research question, each chapter of this thesis presents and 
assesses related, secondary, research questions:  
1. What is the function of gender, legally speaking, when ascertaining who is 
regarded as a woman?  
2. Can gender recognition be considered as an aspect of the right to dignity?  
3. What encompasses full and effective protection of the right to life of African 
transgender women?  
4. What is incorporated in the highest attainable standard of health of African 
transgender women?  
In view of these questions, it is assumed that articles 3, 4 and 14 can be 
purposefully interpreted to ensure adequate protection of African transgender 
women’s rights as requisite within international human rights law. Moreover, it is 
supposed that State Parties have a clear obligation to uphold these women’s 
inalienable human rights because of their ratification of the Maputo Protocol, and that 
in failing to recognise and protect them and their respective human rights, the State 
Parties are in violation of international human rights law, in general, and the Maputo 
Protocol specifically. 
1 3 Research aim and objectives  
In consideration of the research questions and hypotheses set out, the primary 
research aim of this thesis is to assess whether African transgender women can be 
recognised and protected through a teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol, 
considering the definition provided for ‘women’ in article 1(k) and the object and 
purpose of the Maputo Protocol.  
The related four research objectives are as follows:  
1. To distinguish applicable theories and methodologies to contextualise the legal 
position of African transgender women under regional human rights law.  
2. To provide a teleological interpretation of the right to dignity contained in article 
3 of the Maputo Protocol to assess gender recognition as an inherent aspect of 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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the right and the inclusion of African transgender women as protected legal 
subjects.  
3. To offer a teleological interpretation of the rights to life, integrity and security of 
the person contained in article 4 of the Maputo Protocol to assess subsequent 
State Party obligations.  
4. To postulate a teleological interpretation of the right to health contained in article 
14 of the Maputo Protocol to assess subsequent State Party obligations.  
1 4 Theory and methodology   
Chapter 2 provides a full assessment of the theory and methodology used to achieve 
the main research aims described above. It presents the two theoretical perspectives 
which inform this research: post-modern intersectional feminist legal theory and queer 
legal theory. These theories are crucial for the assessment of the terms ‘women’ and 
‘gender’ as used in the Maputo Protocol. Chapter 2 further presents the principle of 
universality in conjuncture with the rights to equality and non-discrimination as they 
are foundational to international human rights law and guide the subsequent 
interpretation process.  
Methodologically, this research centres on interpreting the Maputo Protocol through 
a teleological approach to treaty interpretation. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)10 sets out the general rules of treaty interpretation. The 
teleological approach is found in article 31(1) and requires interpretation to be carried 
out in consideration of a treaty’s “object and purpose”. Although chapter 2 briefly 
illustrates all three approaches presented in article 31(1), the teleological approach is 
the only method applied throughout the research. Furthermore, as reiterated above, 
‘women’ are defined in article 1(k) of the Maputo Protocol as “persons of female 
gender” [emphasis added]. Accordingly, this thesis implements a teleological 
interpretation of the Maputo Protocol to assess the relationship between African 
transgender women and the Maputo Protocol, in consideration of its underlying object 
and purpose and the definition of ‘women’. Moreover, other relevant articles in the 
Protocol are read together throughout the analysis to ensure that the Protocol is 
interpreted in consideration of all the relevant, interlinked, rights contained within it.11 
 
10 (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980).  
11 Notwithstanding the focus on interpreting articles 1(k), 3, 4 and 14 – articles 1(f), 1(g), 1(j), 2 and 5 
are subsequently used to inform the interpretation process.  
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1 5 Scope and limitations 
This thesis is limited to the study of African transgender women i.e. individuals on the 
African continent who identify as women but were born male.12 Moreover, only State 
Parties to the Maputo Protocol are considered in the evaluation which follows, as the 
findings of this research will only be relevant to the states that have ratified the 
Protocol.13 Whilst this research acknowledges the state reporting procedure as a key 
mechanism to ensure compliance with the Protocol, it does not provide an in-depth 
analysis of this procedure nor does it present an assessment of the domestication of 
the Maputo Protocol. The focus is rather on the results of a teleological interpretation 
of the treaty.  
Because this thesis is a desktop study, no field work was included and the 
discussion and analysis are based solely on secondary sources. Under 4 4 1 the lack 
of relevant data which accounts for human rights violations of African transgender 
women is highlighted. This is noteworthy as it reinforces the hypothesis that African 
transgender women are an invisible and vulnerable minority on the continent.  
As mentioned under 1 1, the Maputo Protocol is a supplement to the African 
Charter. Both instruments operate within the African regional human rights system 
under the auspices of the African Union.14 The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”)15 and the African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights (“African Court”)16 are the main human rights bodies under this 
system. The African Court and African Commission complement and reinforce each 
other’s functions.17 Accordingly, as it is within the mandate of both the African 
 
12 There is a full discussion of transgender women under 2 2. Moreover - there is not a focus on 
transgender men, gender fluid individuals and/or intersex individuals even though it is acknowledged 
that they all also have non-normative gender identities. 
13 Currently there are 41 State Parties to the Maputo Protocol; see African Union “List of countries which 
have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa” African Union (28-06-2019) <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-
protocol/ratification/> (accessed 15-02-2019).  
14 The African Union is the successor to the Organisation for African Unity. It was established in 
accordance with article 2 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and has been in operation since 
2002. 
15 The African Commission was established in accordance with article 30 of the African Charter and 
has been in operation since 1987.  
16 The African Court was established in accordance with article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights 
(“Court Protocol”) and has been in operation since 2006.  
17 As set out in the preamble of the Court Protocol: “the attainment of the objectives of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights requires the establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights to complement and reinforce the functions of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights”. 
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Commission and African Court to interpret and apply the African Charter and the 
Maputo Protocol, pronouncements on the African Charter are relevant to the 
interpretation and application of the Maputo Protocol and are therefore considered in 
this thesis.18   
Key international instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”),19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”),20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)21 and 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(“CEDAW”)22 are also taken into account as the majority of State Parties to the Maputo 
Protocol are also State Parties to these instruments. Furthermore, due to an overlap 
of the rights set out in these instruments and the Maputo Protocol, their respective 
application and interpretation informs the ensuing interpretation. This includes a 
consideration of the General Comments and General Recommendations of the 
respective treaty bodies including the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), Committee 
on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), as well as the CEDAW 
Committee. In this regard, the preamble of the Maputo Protocol importantly confirms 
the relevance of:  
“[R]elated Resolutions, Declarations, Recommendations, Decisions, Conventions and 
other Regional and Sub-Regional Instruments aimed at eliminating all forms of 
discrimination and at promoting equality between men and women”.  
Because this thesis focuses on the interaction between international human rights law 
and the African human rights system specifically, it does not engage with the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American nor the European human rights systems. It is 
acknowledged that these systems, and the findings of their respective adjudicative 
bodies, provide relevant insights regarding the protection of transgender women in 
light of their respective human rights instruments and contexts.23 However, 
 
18 The other key instrument in the African human rights system is the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. This charter has its own respective committee (African Committee of Experts on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child) which oversees its implementation. This charter and the work of 
this committee are excluded from this research because the focus is on adult transgender women and 
not girls.  
19 (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III). 
20 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.  
21 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.  
22 (adopted 18 December 1976, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
23 The European system’s adjudicative body is the European Court of Human Rights which was 
established through the European Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American system is more 
similar to the African system and has both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as well as the 
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considering the limited scope of this thesis and the specific research aim, a focused 
consideration of the specific challenges presented within the African human rights 
system was preferable.  
In terms of the Maputo Protocol, three articles serve as the focus of this analysis 
namely: article 3 (“the right to dignity”), article 4 (“the right to life, integrity and security 
of the person”) and article 14 (“health and reproductive rights”). These articles were 
chosen because, as argued throughout, they contain fundamental rights with specific 
importance to African transgender women which, if violated, affect the realisation of 
all their human rights. This is not to indicate that the other rights in the Maputo Protocol 
are not important or less important.  
The analysis of article 4 in chapter 4 focuses on the interpretation of articles 4(1), 
4(2)(c) and 4(2)(d). These articles focus on “identify[ing] the causes and 
consequences of violence against women” as well as “eradicate[ing] elements in 
traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which legitimise and 
exacerbate the persistence and tolerance of violence against women”. They were 
chosen because harmful traditional and/or cultural beliefs, practices and/or 
stereotypes, together with violence, continuously threaten African transgender 
women’s’ lives. Therefore, these articles are argued to be particularly relevant in 
mitigating specific violations against African transgender women.  
In chapter 5, articles 14(2)(a), 14(1)(d) and 14(1)(e) are the focus of the discussion. 
Notwithstanding that article 14 is entitled “Health and Reproductive Rights”, chapter 5 
does not present an analysis of the related reproductive rights. This is as a result of 
the limited scope of this research where such complex subject matter would not be 
adequately dealt with. Thereafter, although articles 14(1)(d) and 14(1)(e) both refer to 
self-protection and information with regard to sexually transmitted infections (“STIs”) 
as well as to HIV/AIDS, the discussion presented focuses exclusively on HIV/AIDS 
infections. 24  
 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; both established through the American Convention on 
Human Rights.  
24 The human immunodeficiency syndrome (“HIV”) is a virus that attacks and weakens an individual’s 
immune system whereas the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (“AIDS”) is a series of symptoms 
and illnesses that develop if HIV is not properly treated. Whilst HIV is treatable and patients can live a 
long life with it, AIDS is not and it is known that once an individual has AIDS their life-span is expected 
to drastically shorten. HIV/AIDS is a sexually transmitted infection and is transferred through bodily 
fluids such as blood, pre-ejaculate, vaginal fluids and semen. 
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1 6 Chapter outline  
As mentioned under 1 4, chapter 2 sets out the relevant theories and methodology 
used throughout this research. Under 2 2, key terms such as ‘gender’, ‘sex, ‘women’, 
‘gender identity’, ‘transgender’, ‘cisgender’, ‘queer’ and ‘non-normative’ are defined 
and discussed. Additionally, the important acronyms ‘SOGI’ and ‘LGBTQI’ are 
explained and compared.  
Post-modern intersectional feminist legal theory is introduced under 2 3. The 
discussion begins with an outline of feminism and is followed by an analysis of the 
integration of post-modernism and intersectionality into feminist legal theory. There is 
also a specific discussion on if, and how, transgender women fit within feminism as 
well as a consideration of the operation of African feminism. Queer legal theory is 
discussed under 2 4, focusing on the interaction between transgender women and the 
law as well as intersectionality through quare theory. The position of queer legal theory 
in Africa is illustrated as a key tool for the protection of the human rights of African 
transgender women.  
Under 2 5, the principle of universality is reaffirmed as the key principle of 
international human rights law. The rights to equality and non-discrimination, which 
are linked to the principle of universality and confirm its application, are outlined to 
reflect their relevance for ensuring the protection of transgender women. Thereafter, 
the inverse of the principle of universality, relativism, is discussed. Lastly, as set out 
under 1 4, the teleological approach to treaty interpretation is explored. Under 2 6, this 
approach, as well as the objective and subjective approaches, are compared and 
discussed to evaluate their value to this research.  
Chapter 3 illustrates the significance of dignity as contained in international human 
rights law in general as well as in article 3 of the Maputo Protocol specifically. The 
assessment begins under 3 2 with an illustration of dignity as presented in the UDHR, 
ICCPR, ICESCR as well as CEDAW. Under 3 2 2, the argument that the right to gender 
recognition is an inherent aspect of the right to dignity is presented alongside the 
acknowledgement that gender recognition is only denied to transgender individuals. 
This acknowledgement is further discussed in chapter 5. Under 3 2 3, the right to 
dignity in article 3 of the Maputo Protocol is discussed.  
Under 3 3, the object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol is assessed to inform the 
teleological interpretation. The conflation of the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ in the Protocol 
is discussed as well as what the right to non-discrimination entails and whether gender 
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identity is a prohibited ground. Finally, under 3 4 the position of transgender women 
in the African human rights system is presented. The African Commission’s Resolution 
275 is analysed as a point of reference for the evolving views of the African 
Commission. This is followed by an illustration of violations against African 
transgender women’s right to dignity.  
Chapter 4 begins, under 4 2, with an evaluation of the generic rights to life, integrity 
and security within international human rights law. 4 2 1 presents an analysis of the 
right to life under international human rights law. 4 2 2 discusses the rights to integrity 
and security under international human rights law as intertwined and interdependent 
with the right to life. Under 4 3 the specific rights, as contained in article 4 of the Maputo 
Protocol, are evaluated.  
4 4 presents an illustration of violations of the rights to life, integrity and security of 
African transgender women. 4 4 1 begins with a discussion regarding the lack of 
available data pertaining to violations against African transgender women which make 
it difficult to analyse these violations. 4 4 2 presents some of the principle justifications 
used to defend violations of the rights to life, integrity and security of African 
transgender women. These include cultural and traditional beliefs and/or practices. 
Finally, under 4 4 3, illustrations of these violations of the rights to life, integrity and 
security are set out to show the extent to which African transgender women’s lives are 
threatened.  
Chapter 5 is the last substantive chapter and begins, under 5 2 1, with setting out 
the content of the right to health within international human rights law. Thereafter under 
5 2 2, an assessment of whether, and to what extent, gender affirming hormones and 
procedures are included within this right is presented. Under 5 3 the relevant rights 
contained in article 14 of the Maputo Protocol are analysed. 5 3 1 presents a 
discussion of article 14(2)(a), highlighting the issue of access to healthcare and 
assessing the entitlements of transgender women. Whilst 5 3 2 focuses on the 
prevention of the spread of HIV, 5 3 3 analyses African transgender women’s access 
to information and services as well as the right to be informed of their HIV status.  
Under 5 4 1, the discrimination African transgender women experience within the 
broader sphere of healthcare and how this affects their ability to realise their right to 
health is explored. Thereafter, under 5 4 2, a discussion about the pathologisation of 
African transgender women is presented. This includes an assessment of the 
difficulties they face in accessing health care services and how this negatively affects 
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their ability to resolve their more specific health concerns. The last substantial concern 
of this chapter, as set out under 5 4 3, is the consideration that African transgender 
women are a high-risk population for the contraction of HIV, which is a further 
contributing factor to the overall poor realisation of their right to health.  
Chapter 6 summarises the findings of this research and presents recommendations 
based on these findings. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY UNDERLINING AFRICAN TRANSGENDER 
WOMEN  
2 1 Introduction  
As set out under 1 3, the primary aim of this research is to assess whether African 
transgender women are recognised and protected under the definition of women in 
article 1(k) of the Maputo Protocol. This assessment aims to challenge the 
predisposition of State Parties to read and apply the Maputo Protocol through a 
heteronormative lens, which endorses an exclusive application of the Maputo Protocol 
to cisgender women. This is argued to be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Protocol itself. In order to understand how African transgender women navigate the 
gender binary and the ‘woman’ question, this chapter presents theories and methods 
relevant to the terms ‘gender’ and ‘women’, as stipulated in the Maputo Protocol.  
2 2 Constructions of ‘women’ and ‘gender’  
As a point of departure, transgender women are individuals who experience 
themselves as female but whose assigned sex is male at birth.25 Accordingly, 
transgender individuals are individuals whose gender identity and biological sex differ. 
Individuals whose gender identity and biological sex correlate are therefore described 
as cisgender.26 Gender is a “historically and culturally bound”27 social construction, 
which has often been dominated by western conceptions. Oyèrónke illustrates the 
dominance of the ‘West’ in the commonly accepted terminology of ‘women’ and 
‘gender’28 as follows: 
“[In order to] analyse how and why gender is constructed (…) the role and impact of the 
West are of utmost importance, not only because most African societies came under 
European rule by the end of the nineteenth century but also because of the continued 
dominance of the West in the production of knowledge”.29  
This argument is further discussed under 2 3 2 but is relevant to acknowledge when 
considering what has been influential in the conception of ‘gender’ within the 
 
25 S Prager Queer, There and Everywhere (2017) 225. 
26 Prager Queer, There 218. 
27 O Oyèrónke The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses 
(1997) 32.  
28 As this research is written in English, it is noted that there is an implicit English bias on the terms. 
29 Oyèrónke The Invention of Women x. 
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international legal community and informs why and how certain individuals get to be 
unequivocally recognised and protected as ‘women’.  
However, to provide a holistic understanding of the globally accepted perception of 
‘gender’, it is firstly necessary to define ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ and distinguish the two. The 
term ‘sex’ refers to the biological categorisation of an individual as male, female or 
intersex.30 It distinguishes individuals by accounting for the presence of chromosomes, 
sex hormones, internal reproductive structures and external genitalia.31 
Comparatively, ‘gender’ refers to the cultural and social construction within which an 
individual comprehends their identity, which is usually accompanied by the experience 
of feeling male or female. Thus, the experience of ‘gender’ is noted as the “mental 
representation of the self” to identify either as masculine or feminine.32 Ball argues 
that: 
“Identities are not predetermined categories that exist independently of the social forces 
that constitute them. Individuals do not “discover” their identities so much as adopt them 
as mechanisms and strategies for making sense of the social world around them”.33 
Stryker explains that after birth, an individual is assigned a sex and a corresponding 
gender. Whether or not they form an association with that gender is part of 
constructing their respective gender identity; she describes this as a “complex process 
of socialization”.34 Consequently, an individual’s gender is not determined by their 
biological sex, but rather relates to their gender identity.35 Gender identity, as defined 
in the Yogyakarta Principles,36 makes reference to: 
“[A] person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may 
not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of body (which 
may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, 
surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and 
mannerisms”.37  
 
30 ‘Intersex’ refers to variances in sexual development, where bodies are not typically male nor typically 
female but have a combination of both male and female chromosomes, hormones and sexual 
characteristics.   
31 K Govind “Basic Issues of Transgender” in C Subramanian & M Sugirtha (eds) Transgender 
Wellbeing an Emerging Issue (2015) 295. 
32 CA MacKinnon “Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues” in S Wiessner (ed) General 
Theory of International Law (2017) 514. 
33 CA Ball “A New Stage for the LGBT Movement Protecting Gender and Sexual Multiplicities” in CA 
Ball (ed) After Marriage Equality The Future of LGBT Rights (2016) 164. 
34 S Stryker Transgender History The Roots of Today’s Revolution 2 ed (2018) 14. 
35 Prager Queer, There 219, see also P Currah “The Transgender Rights Imaginary” in M Fineman, J 
Jackson & A Romero (eds) Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable 
Conversations (2009) 255. 
36 The Yogyakarta Principles are non-binding but persuasive international guidelines for the 
implementation of human rights law with regard to LGBTQI persons.  
37 “Yogyakarta Principles” (2007) 1 <http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm> 
(accessed 04-05-2018). 
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Accordingly, because sex and gender are not the same, their conflation impacts how 
societies commonly understand ‘gender’, gender expression as well as gender roles. 
This can negatively affect the perception and treatment of transgender individuals.38 
The construction of both terms has to be evaluated as part of society which is 
strongly influenced by the concept of heteronormativity. Based on the assumption that 
heterosexual identity and behaviour is the implicit normal in society, heteronormativity 
prioritises social standards in which all individuals are assumed to be heterosexual, 
cisgender and compliant within the binary conceptualisation of gender and sex, 
conflating the terms.39 Such suppositions result in stereotypical expectations of what 
a ‘real’ man or a ‘real’ woman is. Heteronormativity affects non-conforming individuals 
throughout society, often resulting in their victimisation as a consequence of negative 
reactions to their non-conforming gender identity.40 Queer legal theory is crucial for 
dismantling this and is fundamental in challenging heteronormativity, as further 
discussed under 2 4.  
In order to conceptualise whether transgender women are ‘women’; understanding 
the term is essential. The term ‘women’ generally refers to the social classification of 
female individuals. The use of biological sex to entrench this category substantiates 
the 19th century western notion of biological determinism: the belief that biological 
features are reasonable justifications for the hierarchical organisation of society.41 This 
notion however, has been widely criticised within post-modern intersectional feminist 
legal theory which is further discussed under 2 3. The concept of biological 
determinism is intertwined with the principle of gender essentialism: the idea that there 
are common underlying attributes and experiences which are shared by all women 
and which bind them together.42 Those who subscribe to the ideas of gender 
essentialism emphasise that these shared attributes and experiences are prioritised 
over any other grounds within the conceptualisation of identity; including race, 
ethnicity, class, religion, language, disability, sexual orientation and/or gender identity. 
As defined by Gelman, essentialism can be summarised as:  
 
38 M Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 3 ed (2013) 217. 
39 DT Vollmer Queer Families: An analysis of non-heteronormative family rights under the African 
human rights system LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2017) 40. 
40 S Kara Gender is not an illness: How pathologizing trans people violations international human rights 
law (2017) 7 13. 
41 D Gonzalez-Salzberg “The accepted transsexual and the absent transgender: A queer reading of the 
regulation of sex/gender by the European Court of Human Rights” (2014) 29 American University 
International Law Review 807. 
42 Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 93. 
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“The view that certain categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot 
observe directly, but that gives an object [or individual] its identity, and is responsible for 
other similarities that category members share”.43  
Appiah argues that essentialism infers generics about individuals based on certain 
groups they may fall into and assumes their group membership as a fundamental 
aspect of their identity, even if it is not important for the construction of their own 
identity.44 Similarly, gender essentialism declares certain aspects associated with 
being either male or female as indisputable, disregarding that these traits are often 
prejudicial and rooted in stereotypical gender norms. Feminists often criticise gender 
essentialism for creating a false sense of universalisation, which undermines the 
individual nature of discrimination experienced by different women. This includes the 
tendency to overlook the experiences of transgender women.45 
In order to construct an alternative perception of women, it is useful to engage with 
the enquiry put forward by De Beauvoir: “What is a woman? “Tota mulier in utero: she 
is a womb.”46 This statement epitomises how, for many, a woman is only deemed to 
be a woman if she can bear children. From this perspective, certain biological 
elements are deemed essential in order to be identified as a woman which endorses 
the notion of biological determinism as discussed earlier. Butler criticises the emphasis 
on this biological ability as heteronormative because it requires women to function and 
subsist within a “heterosexual matrix”; assuming that all women are straight, cisgender 
and have a desire to become mothers.47 Furthermore, this assumption overlooks the 
reality that many cisgender women who have the ability to bear children may choose 
not to do so. The ability to bear children as a fundamental criterion to be regarded as 
a woman is therefore argued to be outdated and exclusionary against transgender 
women.48  
‘Transgender’ is an umbrella term which describes individuals whose gender 
identities differ from their biological sex.49 Stryker argues that the term has only come 
into widespread use in the last few decades and that global consensus of its meaning 
is still “under construction”. However, she uses it to describe individuals who have 
moved away from their gender assigned at birth, transcending culturally constructed 
 
43 S Gelman quoted in KA Appiah The Lies That Bind (2018) 26.  
44 KA Appiah The Lies that Bind (2018) 27.  
45 Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 93. 
46 S De Beauvoir The Second Sex (1989, c1952) 3. 
47 J Butler Gender Trouble (1999) 45.  
48 Vollmer Queer Families 54.  
49 Govind “Basic Issues of Transgender” in Transgender Wellbeing 294. 
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boundaries to be able to define their own gender.50 Except for a brief discussion under 
5 2 2 regarding gender affirming surgery, in this research ‘transgender’ is used to 
describe individuals regardless of whether they have, are yet to have, or never plan to 
have, gender affirming surgery.51  
Although the term ‘transgender’ is a recent descriptive concept; individuals with 
non-normative gender identities have been present throughout history.52 Feinberg 
states that transgender as a category “only emerged in a collective, institutionalized 
way in the early 1990s”.53 Stryker argues that although the 1990s saw the term enter 
widespread use, its history and development is intricate.54 Historically, an individual 
whose gender identity did not correlate with their biological sex and who wished to 
alter their sexual characteristics so to reflect their gender identity was often labelled a 
‘transsexual’. This term implies that an individual has or wants to have gender affirming 
surgery. Similarly, individuals who dressed up as the opposite sex were labelled as 
‘transvestites’.55 A dominant perspective of transvestites is that they cross-dress for 
erotic pleasure. In this research ‘transgender’ is given preference over the term 
‘transsexual’, as the term offers the ability to incorporate a variation of experiences 
and expressions present. Furthermore, due to its stigmatised and pejorative nature, 
the term ‘transvestite’ is disregarded in this research.56 
When discussing individuals with non-normative gender identities, another relevant 
term is ‘queer’. As an adjective, queer refers to anything which is oppositional to what 
is normative, often in the context of conservative and conventional norms regarding 
sexual orientation, sexual activities, gender identities and/or expressions.57 African 
transgender women are included within the category of queer individuals but the 
intricacies of ‘queer’ and queer legal theory as well as their linkages to transgender 
women are further discussed under 2 4. The description of a ‘non-normative’ gender 
identity is used interchangeably with queer to refer to non-conformance within the 
 
50 Stryker Transgender History 1. 
51 Gonzalez-Salzberg (2014) American University International Law Review 817.  
52 Kara Gender is not an illness (2017) 18. 
53 L Feinberg Trans Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue (1998) 30. 
54 Stryker Transgender History 36. 
55 BL Hausman Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender (1995) 8. 
56 Prager Queer, There 225.  
57 AP Romero “Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal Theories” in M Fineman, J 
Jackson & A Romero (eds) Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable 
Conversations (2009) 190. 
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context of gendered social norms. African transgender women are described to have 
non-normative gender identities because they do not conform to the gender binary.  
Lastly this research makes reference to SOGI rights as opposed to LGBTQI 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex) rights, due to the fact that 
the SOGI categorisation is comparatively culturally neutral.58 In contrast, the LGBTQI 
acronym is deeply rooted in the gay rights activism of the United States of America 
and even though it has expanded to ensure a wider range of inclusion, it still requires 
individuals to identify within a specific category i.e. ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, bisexual’ and/or 
‘transgender’.59 This identification can make the task of being accepted and 
understood burdensome on queer individuals, as many express themselves contrary 
to typically accepted LGBTQI identities.60 It has to be further noted that the terms used 
within the narrative of the global north are often unrelatable for many queer African 
individuals, including transgender women. Clarke argues that ‘western’ queer 
philosophies “ultimately fail because they do not take into account the cultural 
differences that exist in multicultural/cross-cultural countries”.61 It is important for 
queer (which is also a borrowed term) Africans, including African transgender women, 
to be able to create and use neutral and unbiased terms in order to understand their 
lived challenges without having to subscribe to foreign cultural representations. As 
summarised by Nyanzi: 
“It is important to constantly interrogate, debunk, dismantle and queer the culturalist or 
reified traditional logic when it is appropriated to consolidate oppression, especially when 
embedding that oppression in legislative processes”.62 
Thus, SOGI is used in this research to allow for greater inclusion when referring to 
individuals in Africa who are marginalised as a result of their non-normative gender 
identity - in whatever form that may be. Forcing individuals to conform to one of the 
categories within the LGBTQI acronym in order to be legally recognised and have their 
human rights protected is problematic as it can stifle and restrict an individual’s self-
development. It is also contrary to the principle of universality as well as the rights to 
 
58 JM Voss “Contesting Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity at the UN Human Rights Council” (2018) 
19 Human Rights Review 3. 
59 Prager Queer, There 161-168. 
60 P Califia “Gay Men, Lesbians, and Sex: Doing It Together” in I Morland & A Willox (eds) Queer Theory 
(2005) 22-27. 
61 D Clarke “Twice removed: African invisibility in Western queer theory” in E Ekine & H Abbas (eds) 
Queer African Reader (2013) 182. 
62 S Nyanzi “Afterword: Sexing the Law and Legislating Gendered Sexualities” in D Higginbotham & V 
Collis-Buthelezi (eds) Contested Intimacies: Sexuality, Gender and the Law in Africa (2015) 75. 
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equality and non-discrimination which are discussed under 2 5 1. SOGI can be used 
as a point of departure to establishing a general context for non-normative and queer 
individuals in Africa and discuss the protection of their human rights. It has to be noted, 
however, that it is not used in this research to generalise nor subsume the experiences 
of African transgender women to other African individuals with non-normative SOGI.  
2 3 Post-modern intersectional feminist legal theory  
As noted, gender and sex are not interchangeable terms. Relevant to this is the fact 
that feminist theory emphasises that sex is biological and gender is psycho-social.63 
This psycho-social aspect of an individual’s identity is defined as their gender identity, 
which is decided based on the internal experience of self and how this is displayed 
and communicated externally, rather than as a reflection of their biological sex.64 
Consequently, post-modern intersectional feminist legal theory contributes to this 
research with its ability to deconstruct the notion of ‘gender’ and examine what 
encompasses the identity of ‘women’. The application of the theory is especially useful 
when establishing whether transgender women can be seen to exist, legally speaking, 
within the regularly applied interpretation of the term ‘women’. This is especially 
relevant to the fact that instead of the term ‘sex’, the wider descriptive term ‘gender’ is 
used as the distinguishing criteria for ‘women’ in the Maputo Protocol.65 Thus, a related 
analysis is especially useful in establishing the protection of the particular rights of 
African transgender women, as discussed in the following chapters, from a legal 
narrative pertaining to ‘women’ and ‘gender’.66 This is in consideration of the fact as 
discussed: that gender identity, rather than sex, is decisive when determining an 
individual’s gender.  
Feminism as a movement is grounded in establishing equality between men and 
women in all social, political and economic spheres of life.67 It aims to analyse the 
unequal distribution of power and privilege incurred by gender roles in society and 
through exposing it, provide a developmental directive towards increased equality.68 
The role of feminism has been expanded by the general perspective of post-modernist 
 
63 Butler Gender Trouble 8. 
64 “Yogyakarta Principles” (2007) 2 <http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm> 
(accessed 04-05-2018). 
65 Butler Gender Trouble 9.  
66 Currah “The Transgender Rights Imaginary” in Feminist and Queer Legal Theory 246.   
67 Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 1.  
68 2. 
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thought, rejecting dominant narratives and ideologies.69 Post-modernism, integrated 
with feminism as well as feminist legal theory, allows for the inclusion of an 
intersectional epistemology offering the potential to transcend the dominant 
understanding of what a woman is (white, straight, cisgender and middle class as 
reflected in the earliest phases of feminism), what encompasses her oppression and 
how gender affects her lived experiences.70 Post-modern feminist legal theory 
effectively provides the tools to deconstruct the social identities and legal assumptions 
that affect the broader grouping of all women, irrespective of their race, class, sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity. 
The origins of feminism stem from the acknowledgment of the biological differences 
between men and women and the respective rejection of the notion that such 
differences justify men’s power and privilege alongside women’s subordination.71 The 
concept of biological determinism, as mentioned under 2 2, is criticised by feminists 
as restrictive to women’s potential, placing artificial boundaries on the roles they may 
pursue whilst allowing men greater freedom of self-determination. Partial to such a 
‘biologically determined’ narrative fuelled by stereotypes, a woman is largely expected 
to assume the role of a stay at home mother whilst a man is expected to take on the 
responsibility of being the sole the bread-winner of the family. Such expectations are 
as burdensome on men as they are on women.72  
The integration of feminism within the legal framework is established in feminist 
legal theory, focusing on recognising the role of the law in governing women and the 
inherent manifestations of their implied inferiority to men. At its core, feminist legal 
theory recognises that an individual’s gender influences how they are treated as a 
legal subject. Advocates of feminist legal theory emphasise that being a man or a 
woman has a significant impact in the majority of people’s lives.73 Feminist legal theory 
is especially valuable in exposing gender biases in the law and establishing ways in 
which stereotypical legal predispositions can be challenged.74 
 
69 F Valdes “Queering Sexual Orientation: A Call for Theory as Praxis” in M Fineman, J Jackson & A 
Romero (eds) Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations 
(2009) 98. 
70 Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 7. 
71 MA Fineman “Introduction: Feminist and Queer Legal Theory” in M Fineman, J Jackson & A Romero 
(eds) Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations (2009) 2. 
72 Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 5. 
73 1. 
74 Romero “Methodological Descriptions” in Feminist and Queer Legal Theory 197. 
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The principle of intersectionality was first introduced by Crenshaw, designed as a 
responsive tool within black legal feminist thought.75 It analyses how multiple systems 
of oppression intertwine, disproportionality affecting marginalised social groups. 
Initially, the principle focused on how African American women simultaneously 
experience discrimination based on both their gender and race. However, more 
recently it is considered applicable for varying intersecting discriminatory grounds. As 
described by Stoljar:  
“[The] basic idea is that disadvantage does not [occur] exclusively along a single axis of 
social identity or group membership, but rather as multiple bases; further disadvantage is 
often compounded due to individuals’ multiple, intersecting group identifications”.76 
Intersectionality is a particularly useful tool within the African regional context. Banda 
argues that the application of intersectionality in Africa can be “particularly helpful 
when considering the lives of African women, not least because more often than not, 
they suffer multiple and intersecting discrimination”.77 Intersectionality emphasises the 
interplay of identity politics where an individual is simultaneously member to more than 
one minority group. As an example, whereas an individual may be discriminated 
against in society based on their race, their lived experience of social oppression will 
be exacerbated if that same individual is transgender and/or poor. In this way, the 
disadvantage an individual may experience becomes further compounded as a result 
of the respective social groups they are positioned in.78 Fineman argues that 
intersectionality acts as a reminder that the unique lived experiences specifically 
related to an individual’s position in life can result in “cumulative, hybrid, and 
extraordinary oppression”.79  
2 3 1 Transgender women in the feminist matrix  
One of the most fundamental and simultaneously contradictory aspects of 
understanding the concept of gender is how it must first be acknowledged in order to 
be undermined. Lorber emphasises that “the prime paradox of gender is that in order 
 
75 K Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) 8 University of Chicago 
Legal Forum 145.  
76 N Stoljar “Discrimination and Intersectionality” in K Lippert-Rasmussen (ed) The Routledge Handbook 
of the Ethics of Discrimination (2018) 70. 
77 F Banda Women, Law and Human Rights an African Perspective (2005) 7. 
78 Stoljar “Discrimination and Intersectionality” in The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of 
Discrimination 68. 
79 Fineman “Introduction: Feminist and Queer Legal Theory” in Feminist and Queer Legal Theory 4.  
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to dismantle the institution, you must first make it very visible”.80 Accordingly, there is 
a conflict between some feminist theorists regarding the role and emphasis of 
gender.81 As a point of departure, it is worth noting how some theorists argue that the 
gender distinction and establishment of a solidary group-identity for women is crucial 
to achieve feminist goals. These theorists often align themselves with the notion of 
gender essentialism as discussed beforehand under 2 2.82 Opposing feminist theorists 
challenge gender essentialism and argue that focusing on a binary gender distinction 
leads to an over-emphasis of gendered differences. This in turn, further isolates the 
genders and undermines the pursuit of equality.83  
This particular conflict is exacerbated with regard to transgender women. A 
selection of feminist legal theorists, including Raymond, Morgan and Jeffreys, 
challenge the notion that transgender women are in fact women.84 They contest 
transgender women’s ability to associate themselves with feminism if they choose to 
identify as women as such identification “reinscribe[s] gender as a binary category”.85 
These theorists further criticise the subscription of transgender women to the female 
gender as opposed to their biological sex based on the opinion that gender is a social 
construction.86 This, however, represents a gross oversimplification of the issue as 
these beliefs often serve as the foundation of transphobic human rights violations.87 
This is further discussed under 4 4 2. 
Transgender individual’s gender identities and expressions form a central aspect of 
their identity and personality. Undermining their lived experiences as transgender is 
counterproductive in the pursuit of gender equality and adds to a growing dissonance 
within the feminist community.88 Stryker argues that “transfeminism” is required 
moving forward: allowing for a feminist perspective rooted in intersectionality which is 
“explicitly trans-affirming”.89 Using the term created by Koyama, Stryker argues that: 
 
80 J Lorber “Paradoxes of Gender” 10 quoted in Oyèrónke The Invention of Women xv. 
81 Currah “The Transgender Rights Imaginary” in Feminist and Queer Legal Theory 245. 
82 Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 94. 
83 Currah “The Transgender Rights Imaginary” in Feminist and Queer Legal Theory 245. 
84 M Goldberg “What is a woman? The dispute between radical feminism and transgenderism” (28-06-
2014) The New Yorker < https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2> (accessed 10-
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“It is neither radical nor reactionary to embrace a trans identity. Non-transgender people, 
after all, think of themselves as being women or men, and nobody asks them to defend the 
political correctness of their “choice” or thinks that their having a sense of being gendered 
somehow compromises or invalidates their other values and commitments”.90 
Consolidating the theoretical perspective discussed, post-modern intersectional legal 
feminism has the potential to strike a balance by supporting the notion of an 
intersectional group identity for women which could specifically aid in protecting and 
uniting women in their pursuit of equality. It would enable a needed differentiation of 
the current pretence that all women experience the same level of oppression and/or 
persecution for their identities and lifestyles.91 This is explicitly useful for transgender 
women as they are often the most vulnerable to discrimination for their non-normative 
gender identities.   
2 3 2 African legal feminism  
As this thesis centres on the interpretation of the Maputo Protocol, which specially 
focuses on the rights of women in Africa, it is necessary to outline the cultural and 
legal context of African feminism and its connection with general and/or ’international’ 
feminism. Banda discusses the inherent conundrum in which African women are 
asked to accept international norms in human rights discourses which are not relevant 
nor appropriate for their respective cultural, socio-economic and legal contexts. 
According to her, African women have continuously been advised that the law is 
neutral and treats all subjects the same, which she argues is a fallacy.92 Generally, 
African feminism provides a narrow lens focusing on the socio-economic and historical 
context of the development of the rights on the continent and the position of African 
women specifically. This focus is especially valuable in the context of this research as 
it would be inadequate to discuss feminism in a global context without a discussion of 
the specific experiences encountered within the continent when attempting to interact 
with the provisions of the Maputo Protocol.    
African feminism is particularly important in refuting the implied universal 
experience of feminist rights and responsibilities as outlined under 2 3. Furthermore, 
African feminism contradicts the philosophies underlying gender essentialism; which 
effectively treat the experiences of women from the global north as the norm of 
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women’s experiences worldwide.93 It is necessary for African women to have the 
ability to forge their own paths of understanding and context of what it means to be a 
woman in Africa. As suggested by Nyanzi: 
“Feminist and queer knowledge in Africa must use innovative stylistics to capture  the 
imagination and thinking of its consumers in order to undo normative and often oppressive 
modes of thought and knowing”.94  
The diverse approaches of African feminism focus on resisting, not only patriarchal 
values, but also western hegemonic structures which in combination with racism on 
the continent, have resulted in an enduring legacy that has become embodied within 
African culture.95 Historically, Africa’s political make up was distinct from that of other 
regions as it included a significant amount of high-status female positions. This 
included female chiefs, matriarchs as well as priestesses.96 As described by Mikell, 
the onset of colonialism brought with it a new ‘gender bias’ and encouraged a 
reduction of women’s position in society to include only their “productive and 
reproductive abilities”.97 This prompted the shift to a ‘western’ organisational culture 
aligned to a biologically determined modus operandi. Even with the end of colonialism 
and the emergence of new independent and democratic African states, a dominant 
issue emerged where African women were encouraged to prioritise nationalism over 
feminism.98 In order to create ‘national unity’ (or at least the appearance thereof) 
women in positions of power were encouraged to highlight the issues and progress of 
all Africans rather than specifically focus on the experiences and hardships of being 
an African woman in these new states. Mikell describes the dilemma African women 
found themselves in as they were forced to support the creation of new policy 
structures and processes with encouraged legitimacy whilst abandoning women’s 
rights to substantial participation in important matters.99 She further suggests that: 
“Since gender ideologies are actualised within the context of social interaction, African 
women must draw threads of continuity within African culture while reinterpreting them as 
they see fit”.100 
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The principle of intersectionality features in this context as a relevant methodological 
tool for African feminists. Although a design of African-American legal thought, it’s 
scrutiny of interacting systems of oppression is reflective of the experience of African 
women and can help in constructing a productive and contextually sensitive 
epistemology.101  Moreover, post-modernism is useful as a confirmation that African 
women can conceptualise their own identities as well as what it means to be an African 
woman. 
2 4 Queer legal theory  
2 4 1 The general operation of queer legal theory  
Whereas feminist theory acknowledges and operates within gendered and sexual 
categories to overcome their confines, queer theory as an epistemology works to 
challenge the validity of such categories.102 Queer theorists argue that the binary 
categories of gender and sexuality are neither natural nor pre-determined, but instead 
social constructions which place limitations on an individual’s identity and personal 
development.103 As defined under 2 2, queer is a descriptive term. In its rejection of 
dominant narratives and ideologies, it is inherently post-modern.104 Morland and Willox 
argue that “queerness calls at once for a celebration of a diversity of identities but also 
for a cultural diversity that surpasses the notion of identity”.105  
Queer theorists acknowledge that identities are complex and envision freeing 
individuals from societal constraints to shift the focus away from what they ‘are’ to the 
various ways they ‘perform’ their respective identities.106 As encapsulated by Keprose, 
the core of queer theory is to expose: 
“[T]he manner in which heterosexuality has, silently but saliently, maintained itself as a 
hidden yet powerfully privileged norm; and an implicit, if not explicit, questioning of the goals 
of formal equality that, on their face simply reify the very categories that have generated 
heterosexual privilege and queer oppression”.107  
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Through these fundamental notions, queer legal theory is useful in recognising the 
fluidity of identities and assists in exploring whether transgender women can be 
included under the term ‘women’. In this research, this supports the assumption that 
African transgender women can be interpreted as legally protected subjects under the 
Maputo Protocol.  
As noted under 2 3 1, some feminist legal theorists struggle to recognise the link 
between transgender women and the ‘woman question’. This can be attributed to the 
fact that often transgender women actively live and subscribe to certain feminine 
gender norms, which manifests in them physically presenting themselves in particular, 
and arguably stereotypical, ways.108 Marcus advocates that the existence of queer 
theory is confirmation that the concept of women is mobile and thus undoubtedly 
includes transgender women.109 Currah suggests that in adopting a ‘gender pluralism’, 
all individuals, in their respective embodiments of gender (whether confirmed in the 
binary, completely rejected or somewhere in between) will be able to be regarded and 
protected as legal subjects.110  
Nonetheless, some queer theorists are suspicious of the role of the law and have 
doubts about its value to queer individuals as many experience the law to “regulate, 
rather than liberate, them”.111 Nonetheless, it is argued that queer legal theory can 
contribute to an inclusive application of the law which treats all individuals as equal 
legal subjects, irrespective of their gender identity. Currah argues that individuals 
should not be required to comply with heteronormative standards of gender 
expression in order to be regarded as protected legal subjects.112 Greater inclusion is 
further in line with the principle of universality as discussed under 2 5 1 as it is argued 
that no aspect of an individual should affect their ability to be recognised and protected 
by the law. The role and function of dignity as discussed under 3 2, expands on this 
argument.  
As with feminist legal theory, intersectionality is similarly applicable to queer legal 
theory. An example of an intersectional analysis of queer theory is presented in ‘quare 
theory’. As conceptualised by Johnson, quare theory is a re-articulation of queer 
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knowledge through a racially sensitive lense.113 It specifically highlights the effort 
required in achieving all-encompassing equality in the face of intersectional 
oppression.114 Quare theory stipulates that queer theory is not immune to racial 
prioritisation and substantiates that the lived experiences of many black queer 
individuals are not represented in the dominant queer narratives, which are often 
based on a perspective of white individuals.115 This expression of intersectionality is 
especially pertinent when attempting to destabilise dominant narratives which have 
the potential to shed light on the often invisible experiences of marginalised individuals 
such as African transgender women. 
2 4 2 Queer legal theory in the African human rights system  
Within the realm of a generally religious and culturally conservative continent, African 
transgender individuals, whose identities do not align within the heteronormative 
binary, are frequently deemed to be ‘un-African’.116 Many communities view them as 
a threat to the notion of the traditional nuclear family and the proper functioning of 
African society.117 On the African continent masculinity is often prioritised and thus 
transgender women are habitually seen as threats to ‘African values’.118 As described 
by Boswell, the presence of “deviant femininity” is charged as “un-African” because it 
challenges African hegemonic masculinity, patriarchy and heteronormativity which 
“prescribes, upholds and naturalises traditional, static gender roles”.119 One of the 
most significant, yet false, impressions which affects the perception of African 
transgender women is the common belief that they are not women, but rather 
homosexual men. This perception relates to when an individual who was born as a 
biological male does not present typically masculine and is automatically assumed to 
be homosexual. This view is especially problematic as it often results in the 
persecution and prosecution of transgender women based on the criminalisation of 
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homosexuality.120 Currently, homosexuality is still criminalised in many African 
states.121 Mukasa, commenting on the misplacement of homophobia towards 
transgender individuals, sets out how:   
“Any person that expresses [themselves] as the opposite sex is a homosexual and so this 
exposes transgender people to all the mistreatment. All transgender people are seen as 
the obvious homosexuals. Therefore, on top of all the transphobia, there is homophobia, 
even if you are not gay”.122 
This conviction is poignant when analysing why transgender women experience such 
intense stigma and are often not provided suitable and adequate legal protection of 
their identities, bodies and lives. The invisibility of African transgender women is 
further discussed under 3 4 1.   
Currently, out of the 41 State Parties to the Maputo Protocol, transgender 
individuals are only explicitly legally recognised and provided for in South Africa 
through the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003 (“The 
Alteration of Sex Description Act”).123 This absence of regulatory and/or protective 
legislation for transgender individuals within the State Parties is alarming. Its absence 
has a detrimental effect on the enjoyment of their human rights, as their 
marginalisation and stigmatisation is continuously overlooked. 
The process of transitioning to reflect an individual’s gender identity (with or without 
surgery) often only occurs during adulthood. Especially in the case of transgender 
women, a late transition results in increased visibility as non-normative in their adult 
life because they go through puberty as biologically male. In contrast, transgender 
men often have an easier time ‘passing’ in their gender identity.124 Being more 
conspicuous than transgender men, transgender women are more likely to become 
targets of harassment, discrimination and violence causing them to be an inherently 
vulnerable social group.125 Oloka-Onyanga, focusing on the position of individuals with 
non-normative gender identities in Uganda and Kenya, elaborates that transgender 
women are subjected to:  
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“[A]ll forms of harassment, including hate crimes, especially on account of the charge 
against transgender women that they are masquerading in order to dupe and extort money 
from the public, or the alternative claim that they are homosexual, confusing the issue of 
gender identity and sexual orientation. Others have faced lynch mobs and have been 
beaten, aside from being ostracized, barred from housing and suffering all manners of 
discrimination in their places of employment, as well as with immigration officers who 
accuse them of impersonation”.126 
Queer legal theory and its deconstruction of the binary concept of gender can aid in 
dismantling the colonial heritage of heteronormative boundaries within African 
communities. In turn, this could increase the general acceptance of African 
transgender women among the diverse societies and help augment their legal 
protection. Such a development, however, requires African people to work 
autonomously rather than to duplicate established forms of activism created in the 
global north in an attempt to affect change.127 As echoed by Nyanzi, queer legal theory 
is insightful in its enquiry: 
“What are the implications of legislating non-heteronormative gender identities and sexual 
practices in society? Apart from statutory laws, what alternative frameworks for managing 
the national standards of being appropriately gendered and sexualised citizens exist, if 
such standards should exist at all?”128 
Higginbotham and Collis-Buthelezi argue that the vulnerable position of African 
transgender women is attributable to politically motivated stances; often with life 
threatening implications.129 This is taken as far as government officials using non-
normative individuals as scapegoats, arguing that the ‘moral decay of society’ is a 
result of them destroying ‘African culture’ in an attempt to distract from incompetence 
and/or corruption within their own systems.130 Henceforth, it is crucial to destabilise 
the legal heteronormativity and hegemony in order to ensure the legal protection and 
safety of African transgender women. Applying queer legal theory in an African context 
has the potential to promote an empowered methodology in which queer individuals 
are treated equally. For African transgender women specifically, its application, as 
argued in this research, can help in the production and promotion of knowledge which 
encourages the understanding that they are both human and women. This, in turn, 
would undoubtedly entitle them to the legal protection of their fundamental human 
rights.  
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2 5 Fundamental principles of international human rights law  
As mentioned under 1 1, the principle of universality as well as the rights to equality 
and non-discrimination are the focus of this thesis, particularly in application to 
transgender women. Accordingly, the analysis in this subsection initially sets out the 
general principle and rights and thereafter highlights their relevance for the State 
Parties to the Maputo Protocol.  
2 5 1 Universality, equality and non-discrimination  
The principle of universality in international human rights law centres on the notion 
that there is an “essential and fundamental sameness of humankind”.131 Accordingly, 
human rights are afforded to all individuals on the basis that they are human. The 
principle of dignity, which is an inherent characteristic in all individuals, affirms this 
understanding and substantiates the protection of their human rights. The principle of 
dignity is discussed in detail in chapter 3. Furthermore, the rights to equality and non-
discrimination ensure that entrenched human rights are afforded to all individuals 
regardless of any grounds, including their demographic and/or cultural background.132  
Historically international law only engaged with states, rather than individuals, as 
the subjects of the law.133 However, after the repercussions of the Second World War, 
the international community pursued a focus on individual accountability and 
protection which resulted in the establishment of international human rights law.134 
Soon thereafter, the UDHR was concluded, which would later shape the content of the 
Charter of the United Nations (“UN Charter”). As illustrated in Article 55: 
“[T]he United Nations shall promote: (…) universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all”.135  
The UDHR stipulates that all human beings are born free and equal and that all human 
rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.136 Although the 
UDHR is a non-binding declaration, the rights and principles it contains function as the 
foundational values of the international community.137 As described by Rudman: 
“"[U]niversal" signifies that all human rights are attached to all human beings, accepted by 
all states at all times. The definition of "universal" in the UDHR means it is not conditional 
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on a widespread acceptance – it is a pre-condition upon which the human rights law regime 
rests”.138 
The process through which the status of being ‘human’ is bestowed on to individuals 
is a contentious issue, especially when considering the subject of gender. To illustrate 
this point, Gonzalez-Salsberg contends that gender has become such an important 
social signifier that an individual is only recognised as human once gendered; this can 
be seen in the priority of identifying a baby as a boy or girl immediately after birth.139 
Concerning the recognition of the inherent humanity of all individuals; neither their sex 
nor gender identity should be a decisive factor. Whittle argues that “the human is first, 
the gender is an addition”.140  
Furthermore, the focus on the birth sex itself often creates enduring stereotypical 
expectations on the child and undermines the complex manner in which identity 
develops. Feinberg argues that transgender lives are an example of how sex and 
gender are more intricate and complicated than “a delivery room doctor’s glance at 
genitals can determine, more variegated than pink or blue birth caps”.141 As suggested 
by Baisley, being human is sufficient criteria in order to be afforded basic human rights. 
Any distinction in their application between individuals based on any ground, is 
erroneous.142 As argued throughout this research, this includes the ground of gender 
identity. The Yogyakarta Principles emphasise that:  
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. All human rights are 
universal, interdependent, indivisible and interrelated. Sexual orientation and gender 
identity are integral to every person’s dignity and humanity and must not be the basis for 
discrimination or abuse”. [emphasis added]143 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of equality and non-discrimination as paramount to 
universality, the scope of universality, as a principle, has developed over time, and 
seems to continuously be developing.144 Similarly, as held by Lau, even though “states 
readily agree that human rights should be protected by international law, the definition 
and scope of human rights remains contested”.145 From a historical perspective, the 
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natural law arguments of the 17th century determined that universal human rights were 
afforded to ‘man’. Shivji criticises this distinction to exclude both women and slaves; 
marking a formal differentiation between beneficiaries of human rights.146 Nowadays, 
it is clear than any distinction between individuals based on their race or sex, or any 
other grounds which would deprive them of enjoying their human rights, is clearly 
contradictory to international human rights law and the rights to equality and non-
discrimination.  
The preamble to the Maputo Protocol confirms article 2 of the African Charter which 
lists the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of “race, ethnic group, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or any other status”. The African Court in African 
Commission v. the Republic of Kenya (“Kenya”)147 stated that:  
“The expression of ‘any other status’ under Article 2 encompasses those cases of 
discrimination, which could not have been foreseen during the adoption of the African 
Charter. In determining whether a ground falls under this category, the Court shall take into 
account the general spirit of the Charter” [emphasis added].148 
Therefore, it is put forward that a teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol 
confirms that gender identity is a ground which warrants assurance of non-
discrimination. Brown argues that the principle establishing all human rights to be 
‘universal’ is “as old as international human rights law itself”.149 However, it is important 
to acknowledge that social, political and legal beliefs affect this understanding and 
application. Nonetheless, the universal protection of human rights is inherently 
connected to the notion that all human beings are fundamentally equal (as embodied 
in the principle of equality) and that non-normativity is not justification for the 
deprivation or violation of human rights (as embodied in the principle of non-
discrimination). This is just as true for African transgender women as for any individual, 
notwithstanding the arguments presented below.  
2 5 2 Relativism  
As discussed under 2 5 1, the principle of universality determines that human rights 
are bestowed on, and shared by, all human beings.150 In contrast, the principle of 
relativism presents a pluralistic approach, which argues for the interpretation of rights 
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in consideration of specific cultural contexts rather than presupposing their universal 
application.151 It effectively provides a platform for subjective views on morality and 
ethics, which infers that human rights only exist within the specific cultural context in 
which they fall. The principle of relativism exhibits a clear antithesis to the principle of 
universality in reasoning that the respective context should alter the way that human 
rights are understood and applied. Relativism is particularly important to consider 
when reflecting on the justifications presented by State Parties used to persecute 
individuals with non-normative gender identities.  
At present, the international legal community is divided on whether the principle of 
universality is applicable to transgender rights (as part of the wider consideration for 
SOGI rights), or whether it forms part of an attempt to create new normative claims 
which currently do not have an existing foundation in international law.152 Colonialism, 
imperialism, racism and religious beliefs have been acknowledged as pertinent 
historical justifications of human rights violations in the past. Today, the culture of 
heteronormativity can be equated as a principal basis of discrimination. This culture of 
heteronormativity is particularly significant in the African human rights system.153  
An example of this contention can be found in the debate which took place at the 
UN Human Rights Council in 2016. During a Council sitting, Resolution 32/2, with the 
objective to set up a mandate to establish an Independent Expert on SOGI Rights, 
was presented.154 A clear division emerged between states advocating for protection 
of SOGI rights versus states who implied that the Resolution was an imposition to 
create ‘new’ international law. During the debate, both factions argued their positions 
as ‘universal’ and their opponents’ positions as ‘relativist’.155 The states opposing 
SOGI rights insisted that the protection of SOGI rights would “corrupt the morals of the 
international community”.156 They further justified their argument by contending that 
the states advocating for SOGI protection were actively encouraging people to 
become homosexual or transgender. The essence of this argument is reflected in the 
statement made by the Nigerian Ambassador:  
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“My government, indeed many governments, seriously object to [SOGI rights] as human 
rights and have legislated against those rights because it offends their culture, religion and 
natural laws (…) The opposition to this resolution is to ensure the sanctity of other rights, 
such as rights to religious beliefs, and culture, and the supremacy of natural laws”.157 
The grounds of equality and non-discrimination, as mentioned under 2 5 1, advocate 
that all individuals deserve equal protection of their human rights. The argument 
presented by relativists that their national religion or cultural norms are a valid 
justification to withhold the rights of certain individuals as well as to undermine their 
dignity based on their gender identity, fundamentally contradicts the values of 
international human rights law. This is further explored under 4 3 2. Moreover, the 
states who advocated for SOGI rights at the Council sitting expressed that they were 
not trying to promote the lifestyles of individuals with non-normative SOGI but rather 
that they were concerned about these individuals’ ability to have their fundamental 
human rights protected.158  
As is clear from the discussion surrounding Resolution 32/2, establishing 
consensus on the universal protection for SOGI minorities is a highly complex issue, 
especially considering that many states continue to support the viewpoint that these 
non-normative individuals are “the antithesis of morality”.159  Despite this contention, 
SOGI rights are increasingly being normalised and, on the premise of equality and 
non-discrimination as equal grounds, are becoming more included in discussions of 
human rights protection within the international legal community. They find 
representation in policies of many UN member states and are adopted by a large 
number of UN committees and bodies. Resolution 32/2 was successful with 23 states 
voting yes, 18 states voting no and 6 states abstaining.160 Accordingly, since 2016, 
the Independent Expert on SOGI has been operational. The statement made by the 
Ghanaian representative illustrated a positive shift for states prioritising universal 
human rights protection even in light of “very sensitive” cultural issues, due to an 
“evolution of thinking”, specifically acknowledging Resolution 275.161 On the 12th of 
July of 2019, the mandate was renewed with 27 states voting yes, 12 states voting no 
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and 7 states abstaining.162 The OHCHR summarised the shifting international position 
in the following way:  
“Protecting [SOGI] people from violence and discrimination does not require the creation 
of a new set of [SOGI]-specific rights, nor does it require the establishment of new 
international human rights standards. The legal obligations of States to safeguard the 
human rights of [SOGI] people are well established in international human rights law on the 
basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequently agreed international 
human rights treaties. All people, irrespective of sex, sexual orientation or gender identity, 
are entitled to enjoy the protections provided for by international human rights law, including 
in respect of rights to life, security of person and privacy, the right to be free from torture, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to be free from discrimination and the right to 
freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly”.163 
Specifically within religious states, developing nations and previously colonised 
territories, a pushback against ‘global morals’ is understandable considering 
historically unjust and biased laws which prioritised archaic European, Christian and/or 
‘western’ values. However, as argued in this research, a clear balance must be drawn 
between respecting state sovereignty, which includes the respect for different religions 
and cultural beliefs, and acknowledging that human rights are inalienable, bestowed 
on all individuals and cannot be derogated from within the realm of international human 
rights law.  
2 6 Treaty interpretation    
In relation to the general discussion on the protection of SOGI rights under 
international human rights law, it is important to acknowledge the function of 
international treaties. Treaties guide states in establishing consensus and standards 
of human rights protection that prevail regardless of any contradictory national law.164 
As mentioned under 1 1, treaties are crucial instruments as they codify rights and 
obligations to keep states accountable. As this research focuses on an analysis of the 
ability of international human rights law to recognise and protect African transgender 
women and their human rights through the Maputo Protocol, this can only be 
 
162 M Chirinos “U.N. Human Rights Council Votes in Favor of Independent Expert to Protect LGBTQ 
People Worldwide” Human Rights Campaign (12-07-2019) <https://www.hrc.org/blog/u.n.-human-
rights-council-votes-in-favor-of-LGBTQ-independent-expert> (accessed 23-07-2019); HRC ‘Mandate 
of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity’ 41st session (10 July 2019) A/HRC/41/L.10/Rev/1. It is noteworthy that of the 
African states who are also State Parties to the Maputo Protocol, only Rwanda and South Africa voted 
to renew the mandate.  
163 United Nations “Combatting Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” 
Bureau Regional pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest (07-03-2012) <http://www.westafrica.ohchr.org/Combatting-
discrimination-based-on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity.html> (accessed 01-12-2018). 
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established by comparing potential interpretations of the Maputo Protocol. Treaty 
interpretation is an important tool in the development and implementation of 
international law. As argued by Kammerhofer and D’Aspremont: 
“Interpretation has a normative effect on the development of international law, given that 
legal systems are essentially rooted in the power of linguistic constructions, the possibility 
of semantic indeterminacy remains a reality”.165 
As set out under 1 4, the formal procedures for the interpretation of treaties are found 
in the VCLT.166 Wallace and Martin-Ortega explain that the term ‘treaty’ indicates a 
multitude of instruments including, but not limited to, conventions, agreements and 
protocols. It is therefore evident that the Maputo Protocol is a treaty and thus open to 
interpretation.167 Article 31 of the VCLT refers to the general rule of interpretation and 
article 31(1) sets out the basis for treaty interpretation:  
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. 
This article presents the three main approaches to treaty interpretation: the objective, 
subjective and teleological approaches.168  
2 6 1 The objective and subjective approaches  
As a point of departure, the objective approach, which is also known as the ‘textual 
approach’, refers to reading the ordinary meaning of the terms as found in the text of 
a treaty. As stated in article 31(1), this reading is done “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms”. The subjective approach in comparison, which is 
also known as the ‘intentions of the parties’ approach’ refers to a circumstantial 
reading of the terms found in a treaty where the focus is on establishing what the 
intentions of the drafters were at the time of drafting.169 As stated in article 31(1), this 
reading of the terms is done “in their context”.  
Prior to the enactment of the VCLT, the International Law Commission introduced 
the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Draft Convention”).170 Article 19 of the 
Draft Convention dealt with the interpretation of treaties and can be seen as the 
 
165 J Kammerhoffer & J D’Aspremont International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (2014) 317. 
166 (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1115 UNTS 331. 
167 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 268.  
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169 GG Fitzmaurice “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation 
and Certain Other Treaty Points” (1951) 28 British Year Book of International Law 1. 
170 “Report of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth session and on 
its eighteenth session” (UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.l) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, 
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precursor to articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. It established that interpretation focuses 
on realising the general purpose that a treaty is intended to serve. Furthermore, the 
drafters emphasised that: 
“The historical background of the treaty, trauvaux preparatoires, the circumstance of the 
parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in these circumstances sought 
to be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, 
and the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made, are to be considered 
in connection with the general purpose which the treaty is intended to serve”.171  
A defining attribute of the objective approach is that the meaning of the treaty is able 
to be derived plainly from the text of the treaty itself. This approach assumes that the 
words of the treaty are commonly understood terms that are unambiguous and which 
can also be read in plain context of the treaty by itself.172 The legal scholars who 
endorse the objective approach usually do so with regard to the goal of legal certainty. 
However, if it is always assumed that treaties are self-sufficient and can withstand 
further scrutiny, there is a risk of unacknowledged bias being enforced.173 The 
‘objectiveness’ of an interpretation is often in actuality more attributable to the 
frequency of the use of a term than to the actual objectivity of said term. As suggested 
by Amin:  
“[T]he stance of the textual approach, namely that the words of the text are clear and 
contain only one true meaning is a theoretical flaw due to the fact that such an assumption 
[can] not apply to [all] human rights treaties, which are mainly formed in general terms”.174 
One possible risk of an objective interpretation of a treaty is that the results are 
restrictive and exclusionary. Upon application to the Maputo Protocol, such an 
interpretation might, for example, conflate the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’. The specific 
implications of this in application to this research is discussed under 3 3 1. 
Comparably, the underlying assumption of the subjective approach is that there is 
a common intention shared by all the parties to the treaty. Legal scholars in favour of 
this approach argue that the primary goal of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the 
intention of the ratified parties at the time of ratification and what the parties aimed to 
achieve with their codification at the time.175 Thus, this approach creates complications 
when treaties are multilateral, as most current international human rights treaties are. 
 
171 Cambridge University Press “Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties” (1935) 29 The American 
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172 IM Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1973) 75. 
173 A Amin A teleological approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter 
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The subjective approach applied to a multilateral human rights treaty makes it difficult 
to establish any single common intention.176 To interpret the Maputo Protocol through 
a subjective approach would be a multidimensional task, requiring consideration of the 
different State Parties and their respective subjective intentions.177  
Although it is established that the Maputo Protocol was created to supplement the 
African Charter and recognise and provide for the specific rights of women in Africa 
by confirming the underlying principles of international human rights law within the 
African region, as seen by way of reservations entered into, some State Parties have 
already undermined the indisputable application of all articles in the Maputo 
Protocol.178 Thus, full consensus between all State Parties regarding the treaty cannot 
be assumed.  
2 6 2 The teleological approach  
The third and final approach to treaty interpretation, the teleological approach, is also 
known as the ‘purposive approach’. According to article 31(1), the reading of the 
treaty’s terms is done in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Thus, this approach 
concentrates on providing a reading of the terms that best fulfil it’s object and 
purpose.179 As discussed by Fitzmaurice, the teleological approach initially gained 
popularity in application to multilateral conventions, particularly those of the “social, 
humanitarian and law-making type”.180 Accordingly, as noted under 1 4, this approach 
is arguably the most efficient in interpreting human rights treaties, such as the Maputo 
Protocol, as it considers the lived conditions of those affected.181  
Compared to that of the objective and subjective approaches, the teleological 
approach doesn’t only encourage that a treaty is to be interpreted through continuous 
reference to its object and purpose, but also that it can be supplemented and 
appended through such reference. Fitzmaurice argues that this allows for, at the risk 
 
176 Amin A teleological approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights 24. 
177 African Union “List of Countries which have signed, ratified, acceded to the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” Location (07-09-2017) 
<https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7783-sl-protocol_to_the_african_charter_on_human_and_ 
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purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to 
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of uncertainty, “gaps [to] be filled, corrections made, texts expanded [and] or 
supplemented”.182 Some legal scholars argue that this creates a risk for the “spilling 
over” of the treaty, where the object and purpose is manipulated to align to what the 
interpreters deem and/or desire it to mean. Although it is acknowledged to pose a 
potential risk of altering the treaty, Fitzmaurice elaborates that any alterations are only 
done when it is guaranteed that the relevant supplementation or appending is 
consistent and ensures total compliance and furtherance of the object and purpose.  
Moreover, the teleological approach is essential to the application of the principles 
of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) and integration. As described by 
Fitzmaurice, the text of the treaty is:  
“[P]resumed to have been intended to have a definite force and effect, and should be 
interpreted so as to have such force and effect rather than so as not to have it, and so as 
to have the fullest value and effect consistent with their wording (so long as the meaning 
be not strained) and with the other parts of the text”.183 
Accordingly, a key benefit of a teleological interpretation is that it ensures that a treaty 
is applied with the object and purpose considered at all times and this ensures the 
most effective application and realisation of the treaty as designed. In the context of 
human rights protection this is clearly of significant value. The subsequent chapters 
will apply this method of interpretation to the Maputo Protocol in light of the fact that it 
was designed to ensure that “the rights of women are promoted, realised and 
protected in order to enable them to enjoy fully all their human rights”.184   
2 7 Conclusion 
As established throughout this chapter, the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are not 
interchangeable. It can thus be concluded that although transgender women are not 
defined as women based on their biological sex, they can be considered women, 
based on their gender and gender identity. The application of post-modern 
intersectional feminist legal theory and queer legal theory furthermore confirm that 
transgender women are considered women from a legal perspective due to their 
gender identities being female.  
Moreover, the Maputo Protocol explicitly describes women as persons of female 
gender, not of the female sex. Thus, as transgender women fall within this definition, 
they fall under the protection of the treaty. This assertion reflects an important 
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consideration for the subsequent discussions concerning the denial of these women’s 
gender recognition and the violations of their human rights.  
It was furthermore confirmed that the principle of universality is the foundational 
principle of international human rights law and that the rights to equality and non-
discrimination are core in the application of international human rights law. A denial of 
legal recognition and human rights protection based on a heteronormative approach 
to human rights contradicts the principle of universality. As this thesis is focused on 
an application of international human rights law, these principles and rights are applied 
throughout the subsequent analysis. In the ensuing chapters, a teleological approach 
to treaty interpretation is used as the most effective method of interpretation to ensure 
that the Maputo Protocol fulfils its key object and purpose: protecting and providing for 
the human rights of African women.     
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CHAPTER 3  
THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY OF AFRICAN TRANSGENDER WOMEN 
3 1 Introduction  
It would be insufficient to present a discussion on individual human rights protection 
without a consideration of the scope and function of the right to dignity. Within 
international human rights law it is considered both an underlying principle as well as 
a right. This is an important consideration in light of the main research aim to assess 
the recognition and protection of African transgender women through a teleological 
interpretation of the Maputo Protocol.   
3 2 The right to dignity  
3 2 1 Dignity as an underlying value of international human rights law  
The notion of dignity is regarded to be a key organising principle of international human 
rights law.185 Derived from the Latin term dignitas (which translates into ‘worthiness’), 
dignity refers to the recognition of the inherent worth and value of all human beings.186 
This recognition, as an organising principle of international human rights law, confirms 
its existence as an inalienable and universal right bestowed to all persons. Rudman 
argues that the principle of universality, as discussed under 2 5 1, is a “prerequisite to 
dignity” and accordingly incorporates all fundamental human rights.187 This concept is 
reflected in a multitude of national constitutions and international instruments. As set 
out in article 1 of the UDHR:  
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.188  
Correspondingly, the preamble of the UN Charter declares its aim to: 
“[R]eaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”.189  
Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR begin with a confirmation of this principle as set out 
within the UN Charter, proclaiming that:  
 
185 T Lowenthal “The role of dignity in human rights theory: constituent or teleological?” (2015) 18 Trinity 
College Law Review 56. 
186 R Steinmann “The Core Meaning of Human Dignity” (2016) 19 PER/PELJ 4. 
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“[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.190  
CEDAW reiterates these statements and sets out in its preamble that “discrimination 
against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human 
dignity”.191 Finally in the African human rights system, article 5 of the African Charter 
provides the point of departure that:   
“Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition of his legal status”. 
Furthermore, the African Commission in Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia 
(“Purohit”),192 explained that:  
“Human dignity is an inherent basic right to which all human beings (…) are entitled to 
without discrimination. It is therefore an inherent right which every human being is obliged 
to respect by all means possible and on the other hand it confers a duty on every human 
being to respect this right”.193 
The modern understanding of dignity was established by the German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant.194 As part of his moral philosophy, he concluded that all individuals 
have an inherent dignity which must be respected and protected universally. He 
argued that all human beings bear an essential duality of dignity which includes the 
ability to reason and make decisions as well as a simultaneous burden to not infringe 
on the ability of others to do so.195 This confirms the notion that dignity is bestowed to 
all individuals on the basis of them being human. It simultaneously creates an 
assurance of the equal respect of the dignity of others by those same individuals. The 
rights to equality and non-discrimination confirm this as both are bestowed on all 
individuals and create obligations for those individuals to simultaneously fulfil towards 
others.196 Lowenthal argues that respecting the dignity of individuals prohibits states 
from treating them as objects.197 Moreover, he argues that states have a duty to 
recognise that individuals are not a means to an end but are entitled to have their 
dignity respected and protected. This operates as a simultaneous acknowledgement 
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of their inherent humanity.198 These ideas are reflected throughout international 
human rights law and is confirmed in the conceptualisation that human rights are 
fundamentally universal, inalienable and grounded in equality as well as non-
discrimination, on all grounds.199  
The right to dignity developed into a core notion following the Second World War, 
as part of the international focus on the preservation and extension of the rights of 
individuals. Steinmann argues that: 
“As a moral view, dignity represents the essence of what it means to be a human being; as 
a recognition of a human right, it legalises the notion that the essence of humanity must be 
recognised and respected in equal quantum”.200 
However, notwithstanding its frequent use as an underlying value of international 
human rights law, the term ‘dignity’ is not clearly defined in any international 
instrument. This makes the task of protecting it complex. Accordingly, examples of 
violations of the right to dignity are presented in this research to enable a better 
understanding of the subject matter of the respective violations. This in turn allows for 
an illustration of what requires protection which helps to demarcate what is 
incorporated when referring to the right to dignity.  
Dignity as a concept has a broad scope. Vollmer argues that the right doesn’t only 
refer to narrow violations of dignity but also includes “circumstances that result in the 
exploitation and the degradation of human beings”.201 Examples of such violations 
encompass a range of actions, from humiliation and defamation to physical 
harassment, rape, torture and murder. The definitive feature of a violation to the right, 
is stripping the ‘inherent dignity’ of the individual: the essence that entitles them to their 
basic respect as a human being.  
The most extreme manifestation of this stripping of dignity occurs during the 
dehumanisation of individuals. Genocide, ethnic cleansings as well as crimes against 
humanity are all extreme consequences of such violations.202 As an example, leading 
up to and during the Rwandan genocide, the Hutu led government described the Tutsi 
people as “cockroaches” instead of human beings.203 Another example occurred 
 
198 Lowenthal (2015) Trinity College Law Review 65. 
199 (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III). 
200 Steinmann (2016) PER/PELJ 2. 
201 Vollmer Queer Families 241. 
202 The international crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity are respectively defined in articles 
6 and 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
203 K Nhadiro “Dehumanisation:  How Tutsis were reduced to cockroaches, snakes to be killed” (13-04-
2014) The New Times <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/73836> (accessed 08-12-2018).  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  42 
during the Holocaust when the National Socialist German Workers’ Party 
dehumanised Jewish people and perpetually referred to them as rats. The protection 
of the dignity of all individuals undoubtedly opposes any perception in which 
individuals are dehumanised and/or seen as ‘non-human’.  
Denial of gender recognition is a particular instance where the right to dignity is 
violated and is elaborated on under 3 2 2. This violation specifically targets 
transgender individuals as cisgender individuals are never denied their gender 
recognition. This is argued to be as a result of the fact that cisgender fall within the 
accepted gender binary and accordingly never have to justify their gender identity. 
States have a minimum core obligation to fulfil in order to ensure the right to dignity.204 
This is acknowledged in the aforementioned mentioned instruments, as part of the 
protection against the interference in an individual’s enjoyment of a “dignified 
existence”.205 The African Commission describes a dignified existence to include the 
“progressive realisation of various of economic, social and cultural rights”.206 This 
description emphasises how the right to dignity is interlinked with other core human 
rights. Accordingly, the protection of the right to dignity preserves and upholds the 
enjoyment of other fundamental rights, including the rights to life and health, which are 
further discussed in chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  
The acknowledgement of an individual’s innate ‘personhood’ realises their right to 
dignity and recognises them as a protected legal subject.207 Furthermore, such 
acknowledgement confirms the right to a dignified existence. It is argued in this 
research that in order to sufficiently protect an individual’s dignified existence, 
particularly for marginalised groups such as African transgender women, a shift is 
required. This indicates less emphasis on negative state obligations (where the state 
must not infringe on an individual’s dignity) to a greater focus on positive state 
obligations (in which the state is required to actively protect an individual’s dignity). 
Such a shift is critical in the instances of violations to the dignity of individuals such as 
African transgender women, particularly as these violations exacerbate their 
vulnerability and often occur as a result of their non-normativity.  
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3 2 2 The right to gender recognition as an aspect of the right to dignity  
As established, the recognition of human beings’ inherent humanity and dignity, and 
as such their confirmation as legal subjects, is based on the acknowledgement of their 
innate personhood. Griffin argues that the recognition of this innate personhood is 
derived from a distinction between humans and animals. Because humans are able to 
form conceptions of a worthwhile life, have agency, autonomy and choice, he argues 
that they are entitled to their human rights and simultaneously have responsibilities 
bestowed on them to respect the human rights of others.208 As mentioned previously, 
transgender individuals are often denied this inert recognition due to a rejection of their 
gender identities. As argued by Divan et al:  
“For trans[gender] people, their very recognition as human beings requires a guarantee of 
a composite of entitlements that others take for granted – core rights that recognize their 
legal personhood. As the Global Commission on HIV and the Law pointed out, ‘In many 
countries from Mexico to Malaysia, by law or by practice, transgender persons are denied 
acknowledgement as legal persons. A basic part of the identity – gender - is unrecognized’. 
This recognition of their gender is core to having their inherent dignity respected”.209  
As discussed under 2 2, gender identity is an integral part of an individual’s personality 
and understanding of self and is crucial in the protection of their inherent dignity. 
Stryker argues that transgender individuals are often perceived as “not-quite-human” 
because of their non-normative gender identities.210 However, as pointed out by 
Currah, the key difference between transgender and cisgender (or non-transgender) 
individuals is that “non-transgender people have already achieved the legal 
recognition that many transgender people seek”.211 Because of this lack of recognition, 
in many states worldwide transgender individuals and their experiences remain 
invisible. A key contributing factor to this was seen under 2 6 2 where it was illustrated 
how some states argue that the inclusion of trans-specific legal recognition and 
protection would deviate from existing law to create a new set of human rights norms. 
These states further argue that these ‘new’ norms would undermine the religious and 
cultural beliefs of these states.212 However, the provision of human rights is not 
dependant on an individual’s gender identity. As clear in the universal rights of equality 
and non-discrimination: all human rights are bestowed on all human beings 
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notwithstanding differences in aspects that make up their identities. Discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity is mostly justified through notions of relativism which, as 
was argued under 2 6 2, is a distorted application of international human rights law 
and a violation of these respective rights.  
The use of the incorrect pronoun and/or dead naming transgender individuals when 
addressed is a common example of a violation of the right to gender recognition. This 
undermines their autonomy as well as their individuality and ultimately rejects their 
identity. Using the incorrect pronoun means that the transgender individual is 
addressed with the pronoun of their birth sex rather than the pronoun which correlates 
to their gender identity. Moreover, dead naming occurs when a transgender individual 
is addressed with the name they were given at birth instead of the name they have 
chosen for themselves.  
On a national level, when the gender recognition of a transgender individual is 
denied, their appearance and the description in their identification documents will not 
correspond. This can create various barriers for them in terms of attaining formal 
employment, accessing health care and other basic social services as well as enjoying 
the protection of their basic human rights. As elaborated by Stryker: 
“Within modern bureaucratic society, many kinds of routine administrative procedures 
make life very difficult for people who cross the social boundaries of their birth-assigned 
genders. Birth certificates, school and medical records, professional credentials, passports, 
driver’s licenses, and other such documents provide a composite portrait of each of us as 
a person with a particular gender, and when these records have noticeable discrepancies 
or omissions, all kinds of problems can result: inability to cross national borders, qualify for 
jobs, gain access to needed social services, and secure legal custody of one’s children”.213 
It is a supposition of this research that when transgender individuals do not have 
access to basic services as well as the ability to participate in civil society, they are 
effectively dehumanised, and as long as these challenges are not recognised as valid 
human rights concerns, it is a violation of their right to dignity.214 Legally speaking, the 
denial of recognition of an individual’s gender, challenges their ability to be regarded 
as a legal subject. As discussed under 2 4, gender pluralism (the acceptance of all 
individuals as legal subjects regardless of their gender identity) confirms the inherent 
dignity and universal entitlements of human rights on the basis of non-discrimination.  
As mentioned under 2 4 1, South Africa is the only State Party to the Maputo 
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Protocol that has specific legislation which provides for transgender individuals.215 
Although other State Parties, such as Botswana and Kenya, have both recently made 
progress in allowing transgender individuals to have their gender identity recognised 
within their identity documents, these results only occurred through litigation which 
challenged the application of existing legislation.216 In recent years, global attention 
has increased regarding gender recognition and the rights of transgender individuals. 
This has resulted in an increase in adoption of express gender identity recognition 
laws worldwide.217 Whilst specific legislation is an improvement on a national level, it 
is not a guarantee, as is evident in South Africa, to stop victimisation and violence from 
occurring.218 However, the operation and authority of treaties are of consequential 
value to guide international standards and to ensure accountability for state obligations 
to be fulfilled on a national level. This is why a teleological interpretation of the Maputo 
Protocol is argued to be so important for the progressive realisation and protection of 
African transgender women’s human rights as it can directly inform the national 
obligations of the relevant State Parties.  
3 2 3 The right to dignity in the Maputo Protocol  
The right to dignity is set out in article 3 of the Maputo Protocol. However, article 1, 
the definitional article, does not provide a definition of what ‘dignity’ entails. 
Notwithstanding, article 3(1) begins with a provision for the general content of the right 
stating that:  
“Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the 
recognition and protection of her human and legal rights”.  
This article confirms two key principles. Firstly, the equality of the right to dignity, 
inferring that the intrinsic nature of this ‘inherent dignity’ is present in all women, by 
mere virtue of them being human. This is also confirmation for the universality of the 
right. Secondly, article 3 provides for the other rights of women to be recognised and 
protected as a result of their dignity. The use of the term ‘recognition’ is relevant to the 
argument as presented that transgender women are unable to enjoy their right to 
dignity as long as their gender identity is not recognised and that the exclusion of this 
 
215 Alteration of Sexual Description and Sex Status Act. 
216 Republic v Kenya National Examinations Council & another Ex-Parte Audrey Mbugua Ithibu (2014); 
ND v Attorney General of Botswana & Another (2017). 
217 ILGA: Z Chiam, S Duffy & GM González Trans Legal Mapping Report 2017: Recognition before the 
law (2017) 4. 
218 Coalition for African Lesbians & African Men for Sexual Health and Rights Violence based on 
perceived or real sexual orientation and gender identity in Africa (2013) 23-24. 
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recognition only as a result of their non-normative gender identity is discrimination in 
and of itself.  
The realisation of the right to dignity compliments the enjoyment of the right to bodily 
and mental integrity as well as to the overall protection of life; it further compliments 
the general position that all individuals should have the ability to be safe, healthy and 
alive. African transgender women are constantly challenged in their enjoyment of 
these rights. Vollmer argues that violations of the right to dignity prevent the ability of 
individuals to live a dignified existence.219 Following this argument, it is put forward 
that protecting the right to dignity of African transgender women would aid in protecting 
many of their other human rights. 
As noted, the Maputo Protocol defines women as “persons of female gender”. 
Having discussed the relevance of this term (compared to the term sex); the phrasing 
of article 3(2) is also noteworthy as part of a teleological interpretation. It states that:  
“Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free development of 
her personality”.   
Because an individual’s personality is the combination of characteristics and qualities 
that form their distinctive character and the personality and identity of individuals are 
inherently interrelated, it is argued that the gender identity of an individual is a 
fundamental aspect of their respective personality. 
Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Maputo Protocol place a burden on State Parties to 
protect the dignity of African women. These articles emphasise that State Parties have 
a duty to prevent the exploitation and degradation of women as well as to specifically 
ensure their protection from sexual and verbal violence. This prohibition links dignity, 
not with an intangible, abstract concept, but rather a tangible and physical sense of 
being. It focuses on violations of women’s bodies, emphasising their right to bodily 
integrity. Chapter 4 further illustrates this link in relation to the right to life, integrity and 
security of the person as contained in article 4 of the Maputo Protocol. The term 
‘exploitation’ refers to the unfair treatment of an individual, where someone else 
benefits from their work and/or gains an unfair advantage from them. Often, 
exploitation is associated with economic gain through exploitative labour practices 
including slavery and human trafficking.220 Other examples of exploitation are found 
 
219 Vollmer Queer Families 244. 
220 OHCHR Integrating A Gender Perspective into Human Rights Investigations: Guidance and Practice 
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in instances of forced marriages and/or sexual exploitation. The core feature of 
exploitation is the coercive nature of the actions. The term ‘degradation’ refers to 
instances where an individual is undermined or demeaned, making them feel as if they 
have little or no value. It is an umbrella term which incorporates all manners of 
humiliation, as both degradation and humiliation undermine the self-worth, self-respect 
and self-esteem of an individual.221 
Article 3(4) read alongside the definition of “violence against women” in article 1(j) 
of the Maputo Protocol result in a duty on State Parties to unequivocally promote the 
safety of African women. Although article 3(4) emphasises prevention of physical and 
sexual violence, article 1(j) has a wider protective scope. It defines “violence against 
women” as:  
“All acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, 
psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake 
the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private 
or public life in peace time and during situations of armed conflicts or of war”.  
A teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol where these articles are read 
together in light of the object and purpose informs the discussion under 4 3 1. 
Accordingly, this definition together with article 4(2)(c) challenges the 
heteronormative, cultural and religious justifications for violence against African 
transgender women; in consideration of the fact that as human beings they have 
inherent dignity. The African Commission in their General Comment No 2 set out that: 
“The right to dignity enshrines the freedom to make personal decisions without interference 
from the State or non-State actors. The woman’s right to make personal decisions involves 
taking into account or not the beliefs, traditions, values and cultural or religious practices, 
and the right to question or ignore them”.222 
Vollmer interprets this statement in the context of SOGI rights and argues that it 
provides three main ideas. Firstly, that as enjoyment of the right to dignity means that 
State Parties have an obligation to not interfere in the personal decisions of women, 
this could include that of gender identity expression. Secondly, that beliefs, traditions, 
values and/or cultural practices cannot be used as justification for the infringement of 
the right to dignity, as there are clear implications for violations to SOGI rights and the 
defences offered by states. Lastly, that if gender identity is confirmed as an integral 
part of an individual’s personality, article 3 of the Maputo Protocol would specifically 
 
221 Steinmann (2016) PER/PELJ 19. 
222 African Commission ‘General Comment No 2 on Article 14.1(a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14.2(a) 
and (c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa’ para 24.  
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be able to advance the rights of women with non-normative SOGI, which includes 
transgender women.223    
Accordingly, articles 1(k), 1(j), 3(1), 3(2) and 3(4) interpreted and read together in 
light of the object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol prevents the exclusion of 
transgender women from protection on the basis of their gender identity. Such a 
teleological interpretation promotes the protection of dignity of African transgender 
women.  
3 3 The object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol  
As mentioned under 1 1, the object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol is to ensure 
that African women are able to fully enjoy their human rights.224 As contextualised by 
Muriithi: 
“[The] lack of clarity of human rights vis-à-vis the preservation of traditions, coupled with 
mass violations against African women, led to the women’s movement demanding an 
African legal framework deriving from the African Charter that would spell out clearly the 
rights of women in Africa via-à-vis culture and religion and once and for all end the debate 
on whether African women were entitled to the protections guaranteed within the African 
Charter and other human rights instruments that African countries had ratified.”225                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Moreover, it is expressed in the preamble that the Maputo Protocol aims to promote 
the principle of gender equality as well as to eliminate all forms of discrimination and 
gender-based violence against women. This is noteworthy when undertaking a 
purposeful interpretation of the Maputo Protocol. However, even though all State 
Parties to the Maputo Protocol have ratified the African Charter as well as a host of 
other human rights instruments, “women in Africa still continue to be victims of 
discrimination and harmful practices”.226  
3 3 1 A conceptual confusion   
The interchangeable use of the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ within the Maputo Protocol is 
an example of a conflation of these significant terms. As discussed under 2 2, ‘sex’ 
and ‘gender’ are fundamentally distinct concepts. However, this discrepancy within the 
Maputo Protocol is not an isolated instance. It is reflective of the practice by some 
African governments to use the terms interchangeably, and thus conflate them. De 
 
223 Vollmer Queer Families 244. 
224 Equality Now Journey to Equality: 10 Years of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (2013) 
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Vos criticises the Ugandan Anti Homosexuality Act227 as an example of this conflation. 
De Vos explains how in the Act it defines:  
“[A] ‘homosexual’ [as] a person who engages or attempts to engage in same gender sexual 
activity and ‘homosexuality’ as same gender or same-sex sexual acts (section 1). Given 
the obviously construed nature of gender (as opposed to sex which is supposedly based 
on biological characteristics) it is unclear how a judge will be able to decide what the 
‘gender’ of an accused person or their sexual partner is. The conceptual confusion – if one 
accepts that generally accepted categories of sex and gender are distinction (…) suggest 
an investment in the idea that sex and gender are both biologically determined and thus 
interchangeable”. 228 
This is indicative of an ideological struggle occurring on the continent with regard to 
individuals with non-normative SOGI, which disproportionately affects African 
transgender women. Under 2 4 1 it was noted that homosexuality is still criminalised 
in many State Parties to the Maputo Protocol and that African transgender women are 
often persecuted on this basis when they are misidentified as homosexual men. 
Because such laws used ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ interchangeably, the distinction between 
homosexual men and transgender women is overlooked and the emphasis is placed 
on persecuting individuals who were born male and who do not comply with the 
heteronormative expectation of what a ‘real’ man is. This is representative of the 
harmful heteronormative culture present in a majority of these States Parties which 
operates as justification for human rights violations.229  
In light of its object and purpose, a key article of the Maputo Protocol is article 1(f), 
which sets out that “discrimination against women” includes:  
“Any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and 
whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the 
exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in all spheres of life”.  
Thus, whilst the term ‘gender’ is the distinctive characteristic used to define a woman 
in article 1(k), discrimination against women in the Maputo Protocol is prohibited on 
the ground on ‘sex’. This implies that the State Parties view the terms as 
interchangeable, which, as was explained in chapter 2, they are not.  
 
227 On the 20th of December 2013, the Ugandan Constitutional Court found that there wasn’t quorum in 
Parliament to enact the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 and as it was in contravention with Constitution 
of the Republic of Uganda 1995 and Rule 23 of the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, it 
was made null and void on the technicalities; Oloka-Onyango & 9 Others v Attorney-General (2014) 
UGCC 14 20. 
228 P De Vos “The Limit(s) of the Law: Human rights and the emancipation of sexual minorities on the 
African continent” in D Higginbotham & V Collis-Buthelezi (eds) Contested Intimacies: Sexuality, 
Gender and the Law in Africa (2015) 8.  
229 Oloka-Onyango (2015) AHJR 50.   
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The theories introduced in the previous chapter are useful in illustrating how the 
terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ affect the ability of transgender women to be recognised as 
‘women’. Post-modern intersectional feminist legal theory reveals that although it 
cannot be said that there is a universal nor essential experience of being a woman 
and that the presence of other factors of identity affect how a woman is treated in 
society and by the law, there is nonetheless validity in solidarity of an inclusive identity 
label for them. Through this there are no valid grounds for exclusion, including that of 
gender identity.  
Moreover, queer legal theory illustrates that markers of identity are socially 
constructed and fluid.230 It undermines the heteronormative and binary legal 
constraints expected of individuals in order to attain citizenship, recognition as legal 
subjects and the acknowledgment of their inherent dignity. This intersection of sex and 
gender within article 1 of the Maputo Protocol, is reflective of cultural constraints and 
argued to be culturally relativist. If read teleologically and together, in order to uphold 
the object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol, this would require the narrow reference 
to discrimination on the basis of sex to extend to that of gender (including gender 
identity) discrimination.  
As argued under 2 6 2, it is crucial to consider the overall scope and spirit when 
interpreting a human rights treaty. To best give effect to the treaty, the conduct of the 
State Parties must align to the object and purpose. On this basis, in light of the scope 
and spirit of the Maputo Protocol to protect women, and in considering the basic 
notions of human rights such as dignity, equality and non-discrimination, these terms 
must be read to best give effect to an interpretation which would protect African 
transgender women.  
3 3 2 The right to non-discrimination  
The right to non-discrimination as discussed under 2 5 1 is a core right within 
international human rights law. It is expressed in two articles of the Maputo Protocol. 
Firstly, in article 1(j) as discussed previously and secondly in article 2 (“the elimination 
of discrimination against women”), which is the first substantive article of the Maputo 
Protocol. Accordingly, its significance cannot be overlooked as it acts as a precursor 
for the rest of the Maputo Protocol. Further, it is complementary to the fundamental 
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concepts underlying international human rights law as evident in its general prohibition 
in article 2(1) that:  
“States Parties shall combat all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate 
legislative, institutional and other measures”.  
This prohibition is followed by five subsections that specify courses of action through 
which State Parties must prevent discrimination against women. The phrasing of 
article 2(2) is noteworthy as it effectively acknowledges the contradictory nature of the 
violent persecution and discriminatory culture of national governments in contrast to 
the values and obligations enshrined in the Maputo Protocol. Article 2(2) stipulates 
that:  
“States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of women and men through public education, information, education and 
communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and 
traditional practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men”. 
This article implicates the culture of heteronormativity which, as discussed under 2 2, 
has a detrimental effect on the rights and lives of individuals with non-normative 
gender identities. Article 2(2) can be used to justify the eradication of heteronormative 
practices, including those which persecute African transgender women. Article 2(2) is 
comparable to article 5(a) of CEDAW as they are almost identically phrased. This is 
useful in consideration of the argument made by Holtmaat and Post that article 5(a) 
could be used as justification for a trans-inclusive application of CEDAW.231 Article 
5(a) reads that:  
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: to modify the social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of 
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women”. 
Holtmaat and Post assess the value of CEDAW in relation to SOGI minorities with a 
focus on the function of article 5(a). They argue that even though discrimination 
against women is emphasised to be on the basis of ‘sex’ (identical to that in the Maputo 
Protocol), a teleological interpretation of CEDAW could potentially:  
“[R]elate to women’s sex, sexuality, gender roles and gender identity [which] can further be 
underscored when the overall objectives of the Convention are taken into account”.232  
 
231 R Holtmaat & P Post “Enhancing LGBTI Rights by Changing the Interpretation of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women?” (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights 319. 
232 Holtmaat & Post (2015) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 324.  
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In their argument, they refer to the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 
No 28 which advocates for an intersectional and more inclusive interpretation of 
CEDAW. Moreover, they recognise the CEDAW Committee’s acknowledgement 
within their Concluding Observations on Venezuela, Albania and Georgia of the 
violence against women with non-normative SOGI.233 However, Holtmaat and Post 
argue that the CEDAW Committee should investigate further and progressively 
develop the link between gender stereotyping and discrimination against individuals 
with non-normative SOGI. They suggest that the CEDAW Committee create a General 
Recommendation on article 5(a) which focuses on the relationship between gender 
stereotypes, traditional gender roles and the oppression of individuals with non-
normative SOGI, explicitly including transgender individuals.234 They conclude their 
argument by contextualising that non-discrimination can operate to create a “prism” to 
protect the human rights of individuals with non-normative SOGI.  
The right to non-discrimination protects individuals based on all characteristics and 
operates from a non-exhaustive list. As per the discussion under 2 5 1, because an 
individual’s gender identity is an “innate or immutable aspect of personal identity” 
fundamentally linked to their dignity, it is confirmed that discrimination based on 
gender identity is a violation of the fundamental international law principle of non-
discrimination.235 
Holtmaat and Post’s analysis of article 5(a) of CEDAW is valuable for a comparative 
analysis of article 2(2) of the Maputo Protocol as it promotes a teleological 
interpretation of the right to non-discrimination for African transgender women. The 
recommendations made by them are relevant in the African human rights system as it 
is apparent that a substantial share of the discrimination and violence perpetuated 
against these women is based on gender stereotypes which are influenced by religious 
and cultural convictions of communities and governments. Thus, article 2(2) of the 
Maputo Protocol, if read teleologically and inclusively, could protect African 
transgender women. It can further illustrate how the exclusion of human rights 
protection on the basis of gender identity is a direct violation of the fundamental values 
embodied in the Maputo Protocol.  
 
233 Holtmaat & Post (2015) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 327-328. 
234 330-331. 
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Accordingly, this thesis argues that it is arbitrary to differentiate between a 
transgender and a cisgender woman in order to grant human rights protection and that 
such a differentiation discriminates against them on the basis of their gender identity. 
Furthermore, such a distinction is arbitrary as some transgender women are more 
successfully able to ‘pass’ as women in their gender expression and are therefore 
more readily accepted in society as women. Often, these women are only ‘outed’ due 
to inconsistencies within their documentation as discussed under 3 2 2. In realising 
the right to non-discrimination linked with the right to dignity, the explicit references 
made in article 2(2) to harmful cultural and traditional practices, superiority of either 
sexes as well as stereotyped roles for either genders are worth acknowledging and 
assessing, specifically in the African human rights system. The Maputo Protocol 
acknowledges the negative impacts of the heteronormative cultures present in many 
State Parties, which if unchallenged, are detrimental to the protection of human rights.  
This is further discussed under 4 3 2.  
3 4 The right to dignity of African transgender women  
3 4 1 Transgender experiences in the African human rights system  
As briefly mentioned in chapter 2, the position of African transgender women in African 
society is precarious and sparsely documented.236 However, with regard to the 
recognition of gender identity rights in the African human rights system, the work of 
the African Commission is significant. In 2014, the African Commission, at its 55th 
Ordinary Session in Luanda, Angola, concluded Resolution 275 entitled “Protection 
against Violence and other Human Rights Violations against Persons on the basis of 
their real or imputed Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity”. This Resolution states 
that the African Commission is aware and alarmed at the fact that violence, 
discrimination and harassment continue to be committed against individuals in many 
parts of Africa because of their actual or implied SOGI.237 Further, the African 
Commission acknowledged that such violence includes ‘corrective’ rape, assaults, 
torture, murder, arbitrary arrests, detention, executions, forced disappearances, 
extortion as well as blackmail. Even though it is not a binding instrument per se, 
 
236 GA Jobson, LB Theron, JK Kaggwa & HJ Kim “Transgender in Africa: Invisible, inaccessible, or 
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Resolution 275 is noteworthy as an explicit recognition of violations of SOGI rights 
within the African regional human rights system. It is useful in light of the preamble of 
the Maputo Protocol which states that any other related “Resolutions, Declarations, 
Recommendations, Decisions, Conventions (…) aimed at eliminating all forms of 
discrimination and at promoting equality between women and men” must be 
considered. Accordingly, reading Resolution 275 together with the Maputo Protocol 
gives content and context to the rights and provides a basis for the condemnation of 
the violence committed against transgender women by State Parties. This is relevant 
for the discussion which ensues under 4 3 2. 
In 2018, the Centre for Human Rights published ‘Implementation Guidelines’ for 
Resolution 275.238 Whilst praising the progress of the African Commission, the Centre 
noted that regardless of Resolution 275, individuals with non-normative SOGI in Africa 
continue to be victims of violence and harassment.239 Within the guidelines, the Centre 
argued that “the fight to curb violence against persons based on their real or imputed 
sexual orientation or gender identity is strengthened by two binding treaties that apply 
at the regional level”.240 Referring to the African Charter and Maputo Protocol, they 
argued that the measures within both documents which grant the protection of “the 
rights to life, dignity and physical integrity”, as well as “the guarantee against cruel, 
degrading of inhuman treatment (…) requires state parties to take specific measures 
to combat violence against women regardless of their (…) gender identity”.241 This 
argument supports a teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol and is relevant 
to consider in light of the discussion below, highlighting the ongoing violations against 
the dignity of African transgender women.  
 
238 University of Pretoria, Centre for Human Rights & AMSHeR Resolution 275: What it means for State 
and Non-state actors in Africa (2018). 
239 S Khumalo “The Centre for Human Rights Launches Resolution 275 Guidelines at the 63rd Session 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (31-10-2018) University of Pretoria News 
<https://www.up.ac.za/en/faculty-of-law/news/post_2730847-the-centre-for-human-rights-launches-
resolution-275-guidelines-at-the-63rd-session-of-the-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-
rights online publication> (accessed 14-11-2018). 
240 University of Pretoria et al Resolution 275: What it means for State and Non-state actors in Africa 
(2018) 1.  
241 University of Pretoria et al Resolution 275: What it means for State and Non-state actors in Africa 
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3 4 2 Violations of the dignity of African transgender women  
The vulnerability of African transgender women is exacerbated when they are victims 
of violence, rape and harassment.242 Their experiences are multifaceted when 
considering the range of marginalisation these women frequently face, from overt 
victimisation and violence to more nuanced stigma, harassment and humiliation. A 
report released in late 2018 by the NGO Sexual Minorities Uganda (“SMUG”) 
illustrates treatment of transgender women in Uganda. The report detailed:  
“[R]ecently, Ariana, a transgender woman, was arrested (…) and taken to Katwe police 
station, where she was forced to strip naked. Photographers and media came to the station 
and subsequently published her photo, reminiscent of past outing campaigns in Uganda. 
Three other women, Sweet Love, Samali, and Shani were attacked by mobs between June 
and August, with no repercussions to the perpetrators”.243 
This excerpt illustrates several violations of the dignity of these women. The forced 
stripping, degrading treatment, publication of humiliating photos as well as the lack of 
response to the violent attacks all exemplify a disregard to the inherent human value 
and dignity of these women and the basic respect they are entitled to as human 
beings, but are subsequently denied because they are transgender. The fact that 
these instances occurred and were exacerbated by police officers who are state 
officials, is noteworthy when assessing the due diligence of State Parties. Although 
states cannot always be held accountable for the actions of individual officials, due 
diligence, as described by the Independent Expert on SOGI “requires states to protect 
those at particular risk of violence and discrimination and to take measures to 
understand and eliminate cultural stigmatization and other social causes of violence 
and discrimination”.244 
Another recent example of undignified treatment of transgender women, albeit 
different in its extent and location, can be found in a news article published in the Mail 
& Guardian in 2018.245 The article detailed two young South African transgender 
women and their experiences attending college. After being explicitly told that they 
 
242 E Ngigi & P Mwarangu “My life as a transgender in Kenya — Letoya Johnstone” (24-11-2018) The 
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_c1851304> (accessed 19-01-2019). 
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2019).  
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had to use the male bathroom, both suffered continuous harassment and humiliation 
which included being filmed whilst using the toilet and having male students taunt them 
and show them their genitals. A report referenced in the article referred to similar 
experiences of young adult transgender students throughout South Africa and 
particularly how the treatment of them has made using the bathroom a traumatic 
event.246 The ability to use a public bathroom without interference and/or harassment 
is a logical application of having one’s dignity respected.247 This simple action 
incorporates having one’s right to privacy and bodily integrity respected and yet it is a 
frequent violation against transgender individuals. In 2014 a Zimbabwean transgender 
woman, Ricky Nathanson, was arrested for using the female bathroom. She later filed 
an application at the High Court demanding compensation for the unlawful arrest and 
in her summons detailed how she was “publically arrested by six police officers in riot 
gear”.248  
As mentioned under 3 2 2, a majority of African transgender women encounter 
barriers in having their identification documents match their gender identity instead of 
their biological sex. This creates an unavoidable burden that affects these women in 
areas of their every daily life, including access to employment, healthcare and a range 
of other social services.249 Access to healthcare is further discussed in detail in chapter 
5. Moreover, as a result of these administrative hurdles, many African transgender 
women are unable to retain formal employment.250 Due to this, a considerable number 
of transgender women end up earning an income through sex work; an activity that is 
still criminalised in a majority of State Parties to the Maputo Protocol. Even in states 
that do not criminalise sex work, social stigma against sex workers remains high; the 
consequences of which are discussed in chapter 4 and 5 respectively.251 In addition 
to the criminalisation, the inherent unequal power dynamic between a client and sex 
worker combined with the urgency for these women to make a living, increases the 
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number of transgender women that engage in high-risk sexual behaviour.252 This in 
turn increases their vulnerability to contracting HIV/AIDS, as well as being victims to 
physical violence with no means of recourse.253 The intersection of their victimisation 
by police officers is dealt with under 4 4 3 whereas their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS is 
examined under 5 4 3.  
3 5 Conclusion  
The notion of dignity within the Maputo Protocol is an inherent human value and an 
established right within international human rights law. Gender recognition forms an 
inherent aspect of the right to dignity due to the fact that it represents an essential part 
of an individual’s personality. Recognition of an individual’s gender fundamentally 
supports and justifies respect for an individual’s innate personhood and upholds their 
right to dignity. A denial of gender recognition is one of the innate forces furthering the 
discrimination and persecution against African transgender women. The analysis in 
this chapter uncovered and assessed the prevalence as well as the causes of a 
conceptual confusion of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ in the Maputo Protocol as well as within the 
African human rights system. The right to non-discrimination, as introduced in chapter 
2, was also expanded on considering the link between protecting the dignity of 
individuals and discrimination based on gender identity which unfairly affects 
transgender women. Finally, the experience of being an African transgender woman 
and having their dignity protected was considered in light of Resolution 275. Violations 
against their dignity was illustrated to show the gap between the protection provided 
in the Maputo Protocol compared to the undignified lived experiences of African 
transgender women. 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE RIGHT TO LIFE, INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF AFRICAN TRANSGENDER 
WOMEN  
4 1 Introduction  
The right to life is arguably the most fundamental human right as when it is violated, 
there can be no enjoyment of any other human rights.254 Moreover, the right to life is 
imperative and comprehensive as many other human rights can be read into it.255 As 
the primary aim of this research is to analyse whether African transgender women are 
recognised and protected as ‘women’ under the Maputo Protocol, this chapter seeks 
to assess what such protection would entail under article 4 of the Maputo Protocol; 
protecting the rights to life, integrity and security. The discussion proceeds from the 
conclusion, as reached in chapter 2, that all human rights are universal and equally 
provided for based on the prohibition of discrimination. Furthermore, as argued in 
chapter 3, discrimination based on gender identity is prohibited under international 
human rights law. Thus, this chapter considers violations of the rights to life, integrity 
and security of African transgender women, i.e. persecution based on gender identity, 
in light of their rights to dignity, equality and non-discrimination.  
4 2 Life, integrity and security as interwoven concepts with dignity  
The enjoyment of ‘life’ has different implications depending on the context. However, 
for the purposes of this research, references to ‘life’ indicate the physical existence of 
human beings. Accordingly, an individual’s life is the time they spend alive after their 
birth and before their death. The right to life, as provided for in a multitude of 
international instruments is, as mentioned, arguably the most fundamental human 
right.256 As described by Herndll: 
“Of all the norms of international law, the right to life must surely rank as the most basic 
and fundamental, a primordial right which inspires and informs all other rights, from which 
the latter obtain their raison d’etre and must take their lead”.257 
 
254 BG Ramcharan “The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life” in BG Ramcharan (ed) The Right 
to Life in International Law (1985) 7. 
255 Ramcharan “The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life” in The Right to Life 6.  
256 J Rehman International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (2003) 303. 
257 K Herndll “Foreword” in BG Ramcharan (ed) The Right to Life in International Law (1985) xi.  
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The right to life is based on the moral principle that all individuals have the right to live 
and not be deprived of their life by another human being.258 This imposes a 
corresponding duty on every individual to respect the lives of others.259 
Notwithstanding that this description provides a framework in which to conceptualise 
the right, it fails to encapsulate that threats to human life are not always solely by other 
individuals. Often the actions of states as well as environmental factors can equally 
end an individual’s life.260 Furthermore, a guarantee to be alive and the notion that the 
absence of death equates the enjoyment of life are insufficient realisations of this right 
to life.261 This claim is discussed further under 4 2 1.  
Similar to ‘life’, the notions of ‘integrity’ and ‘security’ have multiple implications 
depending on the context in which they are understood and applied. The right to 
integrity for an individual indicates that they have a right to a sense of stability and 
autonomy in their physical, emotional and mental state of being. As is further 
discussed under 5 2 1, the protection of bodily integrity is an inherent aspect of the 
realisation of the right to health and is an example of how dignity interlinks with the 
realisation of a multitude of human rights, such as the right to integrity.262 Within 
international human rights law, the notion of ‘security’ is pertinent to the guarantee that 
all individuals are free from danger, threats and/or violence to their bodies and 
minds.263 In General Comment No 35 the HRC state that this security is guaranteed 
to all individuals and they explicitly include transgender individuals in their comment.264  
The principle of universality read with the rights to dignity, equality and non-
discrimination guarantee the protection of the basic human rights of all individuals on 
the basis that they are human; this theoretical foundation is at the heart of every 
human rights instrument.265 Moreover, the concepts of life, integrity and security of an 
individual as reconciled with the notion of human dignity are foundational to the 
 
258 Ramcharan “The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life” in The Right to Life 4. 
259 DD Nsereko “Arbitrary deprivation of life: controls on permissible deprivations” in BG Ramcharan 
(ed) The Right to Life in International Law (1985) 245. 
260 African Commission ‘General Comment No 3’ on ‘the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: the right to life (art 4)’ 57th Ordinary Session (November 2015) para 41. 
261 Wicks (2012) HRLR 218. 
262 S Heidari “Sexual rights and bodily integrity as human rights” (2015) 23 Reproductive Health Matters 
2. 
263 HRC ‘General Comment No 35’ on ‘Article 9 (Liberty and security of the person)’ 112th Session (7-
31 October 2014) para 3.  
264 Para 3.  
265 Coalition for African Lesbians & African Men for Sexual Health and Rights Violence based on 
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conceptualisation of these human rights. Accordingly, as argued throughout this 
thesis, in order to most effectively interpret a human right instrument such as the 
Maputo Protocol, the teleological approach to treaty interpretation is used; and this 
framework as discussed is considered throughout the interpretation process.  
4 2 1 The right to life 
As the protection of human life is a key concern of the international community, the 
right to life is contained in most human rights treaties.266 This right is inalienable and 
cannot be withdrawn, surrendered or transferred to another individual.267 As described 
by Kabaalioglu:  
“[I]t is an essential right and all the other rights derive from it; if a person is deprived of his 
right to life, all other human rights will be meaningless (…) indeed, if there is no right to life, 
there would be no meaning in having other human rights”.268 
The right to life is furthermore a jus cogens norm: an imperative norm within 
international law which is recognised by the entire international community and which 
cannot be derogated from.269 Consequently, all states have an inherent obligation to 
protect the right to life of all individuals regardless of whether they are bound by a 
specific treaty or not.270 As argued under 2 6, notwithstanding this broad obligation, 
the codification of the right within human rights treaties is beneficial in order to 
guarantee it’s protection; as codified rights and obligations are more effective in 
holding states accountable due to the fact that treaties are binding in force.271  
As a point of departure for the codification of the right to life, article 3 of the UDHR 
states that:  
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person”.  
In confirmation of this, article 6 of the ICCPR stipulates that:  
“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.  
The HRC in General Comment No 36 emphasise its significance and argue that:   
“The right to life has crucial importance both for individuals and for society as a whole. It is 
most precious for its own sake as a right that inheres in every human being, but it also 
constitutes a fundamental right whose effective protection is the prerequisite for the 
 
266 Article 3 of the UDHR, article 2 of the European Covenant on Human Rights, article 6 of the ICCPR 
as well as article 4 of the African Charter.   
267 Nsereko “Arbitrary deprivation of life” in The Right to Life 245. 
268 Kabaalioglu “The obligations to ‘respect’ and to ‘ensure’ the right to life” in The Right to Life 160. 
269 Rehman International Human Rights Law 22-23. 
270 African Commission ‘General Comment No 3’ on ‘the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: the right to life (art 4)’ 57th Ordinary Session (November 2015) para 5. 
271 Article 26 of the VCLT.   
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enjoyment of all other human rights and whose content can be informed by other human 
rights”.272 
Within the African human rights system, article 4 of the African Charter states that: 
“Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life 
and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right”.  
The description of being ‘inviolable’ infers incontestable respect for all individuals. 
Accordingly, this description of human beings as ‘inviolable’ confirms the notion of 
dignity as discussed under 3 2 1. Because of the worthiness and value of all human 
beings (i.e. their inherent dignity), their fundamental human rights are protected, which 
includes their right to life. As stated in General Comment No 36, the right to life must 
not be interpreted narrowly but rather ensure that individuals “enjoy a life with 
dignity”.273 Taking note of this together with the ‘inviolability’ of all individuals also 
advocates for the protection of their security and integrity. 
Although the right to life is the most fundamental human right, it is not absolute.274 
The prohibition against the deprivation of life is also not absolute but rather outlaws 
“arbitrary deprivations”.275 Nsereko argues that this is in recognition of a set of 
circumstances in which it may be legitimate to sacrifice an individual’s life in the pursuit 
of protecting “other compelling state interests”.276 The conflict between the stipulation 
of the term “arbitrary” and the inalienable nature of the right to life, however, is 
inconclusive. Boyle argues that the concept invokes a general standard, which can 
function simultaneously as a limitation of the right as well as a pledge opposing 
“unjustified killing”.277 The HRC sets out that the deprivation of life is arbitrary if it is 
inconsistent with international law and/or domestic law, and that arbitrariness as a 
notion includes “elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability, and 
due process of the law”.278 
 
272 HRC ‘General Comment No 36’ on ‘article 6 of the ICCPR, on the right to life’ 124th Session (8 
October to 2 November 2018) para 2.  
273 HRC ‘General Comment No 36’ on ‘article 6 of the ICCPR, on the right to life’ 124th Session (8 
October to 2 November 2018) para 3. 
274 Para 10. 
275 Article 6(1) ICCPR; African Commission ‘General Comment No 3’ on ‘the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: the right to life (art 4)’ 57th Ordinary Session (November 2015) para 12.  
276 Nsereko “Arbitrary deprivation of life” in The Right to Life 247. 
277 CK Boyle “The concept of arbitrary deprivation of life” in BG Ramcharan (ed) The Right to Life in 
International Law (1985) 221.  
278 HRC ‘General Comment No 36’ on ‘article 6 of the ICCPR, on the right to life’ 124th Session (8 
October to 2 November 2018) para 12. 
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Whilst currently included in many human rights instruments, the term “arbitrarily 
deprived” was first used in the ICCPR.279 Boyle argues that this was done as an 
acknowledgement that even though killings might occur, an established numerus 
clausus of exceptions could help reduce the frequency of such occurrences. It is 
noteworthy that the ICCPR was drafted in a time when the death penalty was still 
common in many state’s national legislation. However, this threshold has changed 
with the evolving values of the international community. As set out in General 
Comment No 36: 
“States parties must respect the right to life and have the duty to refrain from engaging in 
conduct resulting in arbitrary deprivations of life. States parties must also ensure the right 
to life and exercise due diligence to protect the lives of individuals against deprivations 
caused by persons or entities, whose conduct is not attributable to the State. The obligation 
of States parties to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable 
threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life”.280 
The right to life incorporates the protection of an individual to be able to live and not 
be subjected to death. However, as noted under 4 2, this is complicated in international 
human rights law as threats to the lives of individuals are not limited to the threat or 
result of violence by other individuals only. Moreover, the absence of death is 
contended to be insufficient in the encompassment of ‘life’ and thus a full realisation 
of the right to life.281 Wicks argues that in order to define ‘life’ within the right to life, the 
incorporation of dignity, as discussed under 3 2 1, is mandatory. She furthermore 
argues that such incorporation enables the integration of “basic economic and social 
needs into the ambit of a right to life, by extending the conditions necessary for life to 
continue beyond a mere absence of death”.282 
Accordingly, the protection of the right to life incorporates more than just protection 
against death which is an important consideration for the discussion which takes place 
later under 4 4 3. As set out, states have both positive and negative obligations to 
protect the rights of all individuals.283 As described under 3 2 1, negative obligations 
require non-interference of states in the enjoyment of individuals’ rights. Positive 
obligations, however, require states to actively provide for the protection and 
enjoyment of individuals’ rights. In consideration of the right to life Wicks argues that 
 
279 Boyle “The concept of arbitrary deprivation of life” in The Right to Life 222. 
280 HRC ‘General Comment No 36’ on ‘article 6 of the ICCPR, on the right to life’ 124th Session (8 
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281 Wicks (2012) HRLR 204. 
282 216.  
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states must “not only refrain from killing but also (…) govern in a manner that seeks to 
preserve human life whenever reasonably possible”.284 The HRC, in General 
Comment No 36, mandate that the duty on states to protect the right to life includes 
an obligation to adopt appropriate laws and/or other measures that ensure the 
protection of life from all “reasonably foreseeable threats”, including those which 
emanate from private persons and/or private entities.285 This confirms their due 
diligence, as discussed under 3 4 2.  
In all the respective articles of international instruments where the right to life is set 
out, positive state obligations are identifiable. This includes article 4(1) of the Maputo 
Protocol which is discussed under 4 3 1. In terms of achieving a balance between 
positive and negative state obligations, Wicks concludes that: 
“A state cannot always save a life but it can be required to always seek to act, and to refrain 
from acting, in a manner that accords the appropriate respect for the dignity inherent in all 
human life”.286  
Accordingly, whilst State Parties cannot be held accountable for every transgender 
woman who is deprived of their right to life, there is an argument based on this that 
they have a duty to not be the cause of the deprivation. General Comment No 36 sets 
out that:  
“The duty to protect the right to life requires States parties to take special measure of 
protection towards persons in situation of vulnerability whose lives have been placed at 
particular risks because of specific threats or pre-existing patterns of violence. These 
include (…) lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons”.287  
Furthermore, this comment is noteworthy for the discussion which ensues under 4 3 
2 and 4 4 2 with regard to the patterns and causes of violence which particularly affect 
African transgender women.  
4 2 2 The right to integrity and security of the person  
The rights to integrity and security are intertwined and interdependent with the right to 
life. Rehman argues that these rights form an integral aspect of the human rights 
corpus.288 It was illustrated that the right to life in article 3 of the UDHR includes the 
right to security and moreover, the right to life in article 4 of the African Charter 
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incorporates the right to integrity. However, some human rights treaties include these 
rights in their own separate articles. Article 9 of the ICCPR sets out that: 
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty expect on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law”.  
Article 6 of the African Charter similarly states that:  
“Every individual shall have the right to liberty and security of his person. No one may be 
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained”.  
Accordingly, sometimes the rights to security and integrity are codified as part of the 
right to life and sometimes they are set out as their own separate rights.289 Another 
noteworthy aspect of the phrasing of these rights is that the right to security is often 
attached to the right to liberty. This is a useful consideration when teleologically 
interpreting the right as the right to liberty concerns confinement of individuals, often 
in the case of arrest and detention.290 
The right to security infers both positive and negative obligations on states. The 
negative obligations require states to refrain from persecuting or endangering 
individuals whereas the positive obligations require states to create and implement 
measures that ensure the respect for the rights of these individuals and consequently 
create settings in which they are protected. The HRC has noted that states have a 
general duty to protect all individuals from “foreseeable threats to life or bodily integrity 
proceeding from any governmental or private actors”.291 Considering this notion of 
security, as applicable to individuals with non-normative SOGI worldwide, the OHCHR 
has recognised that: 
“Homophobic and transphobic violence has been reported in all regions of the world [and] 
ranges from aggressive, sustained psychological bullying to physical assault, torture, 
kidnapping and targeted killings. Sexual violence has also been widely reported, including 
so-called “corrective” or “punitive” rape”.292 
This violence directly threatens the enjoyment of African transgender women’s rights 
to life, integrity and security which is further illustrated below under 4 3 2, 4 4 2 and 4 
4 3.  
 
289 Integrity is found separate in article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights as well as article 
5 of the American Convention on Human Rights.  
290 HRC ‘General Comment No 35’ on ‘Article 9 (Liberty and security of the person)’ 112th Session (7-
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Moreover, the link between the realisation of the rights to integrity and security and 
the direct advancement of a dignified existence underlines a standard of living in which 
the basic economic and social rights of all individuals are guaranteed. The 
aforementioned presence of the mental and physical element that forms part of both 
rights is noteworthy when drawing attention to violations against the bodily integrity 
and security of African transgender women. Whilst it is not argued that physical 
violations are more severe than mental ones, they are easier to identity and quantify. 
Furthermore, such violations are noted to overlap as transgressions against the 
protection against violence, torture and inhumane or degrading treatment. In contrast, 
the decay of an individual’s mental wellbeing, and thus their mental integrity and/or 
security, is difficult to assess. The consequences of these violations for African 
transgender women is further discussed under 4 4 2 and also informs the discussion 
that proceeds under 5 4 which includes an illustration of the high rates of depression 
and suicide amongst African transgender women.  
The link between the integrity, security and dignity of an individual confirms that a 
narrow interpretation of the right to life, where the avoidance of death is unduly 
emphasised, neglects to reflect the variety of experiences related to the term ‘life’.293 
This is also contained in the concept of a ‘dignified existence’ as discussed under 3 2 
1. Accordingly, this implies that individuals should be protected from being condemned 
into poverty stricken, abusive and/or violent environments. Because the rights were 
first drafted in the UDHR, their originally narrow scope and application have since 
developed and expanded. Initially, the right to security focused on regulating unlawful 
imprisonment and prohibiting torture. However, current interpretations of the right 
include protecting bodily autonomy.294 The right to integrity likewise prompts protection 
of social and health rights.295 These developments confirm a teleological interpretation 
of these rights, as it ensures the most effective application to best fulfil the object and 
purpose of the treaties in which they are contained, such as the Maputo Protocol.  
Therefore, in light of the object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol, a teleological 
interpretation shows that the persecution, discrimination and stigma experienced by 
African transgender women on the basis of their gender identity is, as argued in this 
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research, a violation of their right to security and integrity as well as to a dignified 
existence.296 As described by the Coalition for African Lesbians:  
“Violence also results in LGBTI individuals losing their jobs, becoming alienated from their 
families and communities and struggling to survive. Rejection by family members and 
society causes isolation, depression and hopelessness”.297  
The aforementioned persecution and stigma violates the universal and equal 
enjoyment of the right to integrity and security for these women, which it is argued, 
occurs because these women are denied their gender recognition and is based on 
discrimination because of their non-normative identities. Moreover, notwithstanding 
their correlation with the right to life, the rights to integrity and security further confirm 
the rights to peace and the protection of individuals against cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment.298 Therefore, the violations as mentioned arguably implicate 
more than just these women’s right to life.  
The analysis which follows in this chapter attempts a brief contextualisation of the 
African legal, cultural and political environment where violations, which occur vis-à-vis 
transgender women, are often justified on the basis of culturally relativist convictions 
notwithstanding the fact that the rights to life, integrity and security are inalienable 
universal rights. These violations are further detailed under 4 4.    
4 3 The Rights to Life, Integrity and Security in the Maputo Protocol 
Article 4(1) of the Maputo Protocol contains the rights to life, integrity and security of 
the person and is phrased in a similar manner to the UDHR and African Charter. Article 
4(2) provides 11 obligations for State Parties to fulfil in order to ensure the full 
realisation of these respective rights.  
4 3 1 The right to life and relevant corresponding rights  
As a point of departure, article 4(1) of the Maputo Protocol confirms that:  
“Every woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity and security of her 
person. All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment 
shall be prohibited”.  
As discussed under 4 2, the notions of life, security and integrity are interrelated. Thus, 
the protection and promotion of one of the rights correspondingly affects the protection 
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and promotion of the others, and a violation of one of these rights can result in a 
violation of one of the others. This indivisibility establishes a framework within which it 
is possible to conceptualise the intertwined nature of the rights provided for in the 
article. The African Commission in its General Comment No 3 describes the right to 
life as the “fulcrum” of all other human rights.299  Furthermore, it declares that it is a 
right which applies to “all persons at all times”.300 This statement, together with the 
acknowledgement that a variety of other human rights can be read into this right, is 
noteworthy when demarcating its scope as well as the State Party obligations in light 
of violations against it.   
Accordingly, the promotion of the right contained in article 4(1) confirms the 
promotion of several other rights provided in the Maputo Protocol. These include 
articles 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 18, 19 and 24(1),301 as all contribute to a holistic and 
comprehensive realisation of the right to a dignified existence; the quintessential focus 
of a full realisation of the right to life. The African Commission has stipulated that the 
responsibility of all states to protect the right to life includes:  
“[P]reventative steps to preserve and protect the natural environment and humanitarian 
responses to natural disasters, famines, outbreaks of infectious diseases, or other 
emergencies. The State also has a responsibility to address more chronic yet pervasive 
threats to life, for example with respect to preventable maternal mortality, by establishing 
functioning health systems. Such an approach reflects the Charter’s ambition to ensure a 
better life for all the people and peoples of Africa through its recognition of a wide range 
of rights, including the right to dignity, economic, social and cultural rights, and peoples’ 
rights such as the right to existence and the right to peace”.302 
It is important to bear this interrelatedness in mind during the teleological interpretation 
of article 4 in the discussion which ensues below.  
4 3 2 Identification of causes and eradication of harmful beliefs   
A key threat to African transgender women’s lives is harmful cultural and traditional 
beliefs which deny their existence as women and put them at risk of violence due to 
stigma and discrimination. Causes of this denial and stigma, as discussed under 3 2 
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2, are largely due to a colonial and heteronormative bias imposed within state cultures 
which are argued in this research to be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Maputo Protocol.  
Under 4 4, it is illustrated that the invisibility of African transgender women and the 
denial of their gender recognition violates their human dignity. Article 4(2)(c) of the 
Maputo Protocol requires an identification of causes of violence against women so 
that State Parties can prevent such violence from occurring. Violence perpetuated 
against African transgender women is often as a result of a heteronormative bias and 
religious persecution. This undermines the identification and existence of transgender 
women as women which in turn is based on discrimination due to their gender identity, 
notwithstanding that gender identity, as argued under 2 5 1, is a prohibitive ground 
against discrimination. Article 4(2)(c) prescribes that:  
“States Parties shall take appropriate and effective measures to: identify the causes and 
consequences of violence against women and take appropriate measures to prevent and 
eliminate such violence”. 
Violence against an individual directly threatens their right to life, integrity and security. 
As the Maputo Protocol focuses on the rights of women, this article emphasises 
violence that specifically affects women, because they are women, which is often 
described within the international legal community as gender-based violence. CEDAW 
defines gender-based violence as “violence which is directed against a woman 
because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately”.303 As noted under 
3 2 3, this term is likewise defined under article 1(j) of the Maputo Protocol.304  
Although the term was initially used to exclusively describe violence against 
women, a revised understanding of gender-based violence transcends incidents only 
against cisgender women and includes violence perpetuated against individuals with 
non-normative gender identities. As mentioned under 3 3 2 and 3 4 1, violence against 
individuals with non-normative gender identity frequently occurs as a reaction to their 
“real or imputed” gender identity. As described by the Independent Expert on SOGI, 
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violence based on gender identity operates as “a means to regain control or as a 
punishment for resisting or transgressing norms or behaviours”.305 
This cause of violence was specifically acknowledged in Resolution 275 as 
discussed under 3 4 1. Consequently, the violence directed against African 
transgender women is an intersectional concern as transphobic violence likewise 
constitutes a form of gender-based violence.306 In General Recommendation No 35, 
CEDAW sets out factors they consider exacerbate the discrimination women face. 
They list being transgender as one of these factors and conclude that: 
“[B]ecause women experience varying and intersecting forms of discrimination, which have 
an aggravating negative impact the Committee acknowledges that gender-based violence 
may affect some women to different degrees, or in different ways”.307 
The transphobic violence and/or gender-based violence experienced by transgender 
women is a heteronormative manifestation as well as human rights violation as it 
targets these women because of their non-normative gender identities, ultimately 
punishing them for defying gender norms.308 Transphobic violence, like other forms of 
gender-based violence, stems from gender norms and stereotypes, enforced by 
unequal power dynamics.309 As discussed under 2 3 and 2 4, both post-modern 
intersectional legal feminist theory and queer legal theory inform that such norms are 
archaic in consideration of human rights protection.  
Accordingly, the State Party obligation, under the Maputo Protocol, to identify the 
causes of violence and to take measures to eradicate such violence require them to 
consider the findings put forward in instruments like the African Commission’s 
Resolution 275, the CCPR’s General Comment No 35, CEDAW’s General Comment 
No 35, as well as the Independent Expert on SOGI’s ‘Report on the protection against 
violence and discrimination based on SOGI’ and to make the required adjustments 
within their national legislation and policy frameworks. As an example, the 
Independent Expert on SOGI argues that legislation and public policy which 
criminalise non-normative gender identities are “contrary to international human rights 
 
305 HRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ 38th Session (18 June-6 July 2018) para 37. 
306 Coalition for African Lesbians & African Men for Sexual Health and Rights Violence (2013) v.  
307 CEDAW ‘General Recommendation No 35’ on ‘gender-based violence against women, updating 
general recommendation No 19’ (26 July 2017) para 12. 
308 HRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ 38th Session (18 June-6 July 2018) para 48. 
309 Para 40.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  70 
law, fuel stigma [and] legitimise prejudice”.310 In light of this, a key action of State 
Parties to fulfil their obligations under article 4(2)(c) is to remove such legislation and 
policy due to the fact that it is recognised to be a direct cause of the violence 
experienced by individuals with non-normative gender identities, including 
transgender women. This would include legislation that criminalises homosexuality.  
Furthermore, article 4(2)(d), stipulates that:  
“States Parties shall take appropriate and effective measures to: actively promote peace 
education through curricula and social communication in order to eradicate elements in 
traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which legitimise and exacerbate 
the persistence and tolerance of violence against women”.  
Peace education is the process of acquiring values and knowledge which promote 
tolerance and non-violence to facilitate the development of skills which promote the 
goals of the international community.311 Disciplines of peace education include 
focusing on democracy, conflict resolution as well as environmental threats. In 
addition, peace education incorporates human rights advocacy.312 Overall, peace 
education can be described as a system which creates skills to critically analyse the 
organisation of society that legitimises injustice and inequality.313  
Notwithstanding the operation of peace education, this research underlines that the 
purpose of the article is to eradicate elements in traditional and cultural beliefs, 
practices and stereotypes which contribute to violence against women. Through a 
teleological interpretation, this purpose is argued to be a mechanism to fulfil the 
purposes of the Maputo Protocol and to fully realise the rights enshrined within, 
specifically articles 2 and 5. The qualification of elements is notable as it requires the 
abandonment of the harmful aspects of traditions and/or customs instead of discarding 
the entire tradition and/or custom itself. This concedes that although certain aspects 
of traditions and/or cultural customs may be out-dated and trigger human rights 
violations, discarding the entire cultural or traditional custom is unwarranted. Respect 
for customs and traditions is a crucial aspect of promoting state sovereignty, 
particularly for previously colonised states.314 However, as noted under 2 5 1, cultural 
convictions are never justification for the denial of universal human rights. In 
 
310 HRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ 38th Session (18 June-6 July 2018) para 20. 
311 S Fountain Peace Education in UNICEF (1999) 1. 
312 Fountain Peace Education (1999) 6. 
313 39. 
314 Preamble of the African Charter.   
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consideration of harmful practices; CEDAW and the CRC in their Joint General 
Recommendation No 31, define them as: 
“Persistent practices and forms of behaviours that are rounded in discrimination on the 
basis of, among other things, sex, gender and age, in addition to multiple and/or 
intersecting forms of discrimination that often involve violence and cause physical and/or 
psychological harm or suffering”.315 
Moreover, article 5 of the Maputo Protocol sets out that:  
“States Parties shall prohibit and condem all forms of harmful practices which negatively 
affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognised international 
standards”.  
Harmful practices are rooted in stigma. As set out under 2 4 1, it is the presence and 
active promulgation of harmful heteronormative beliefs within certain State Parties that 
facilitate stigma and persecution against African transgender women. This 
undermines the assurance that their human rights are upheld and protected 
unequivocally on the basis of universality, alongside their rights to equality and non-
discrimination. As discussed in chapter 2, heteronormativity frequently puts individuals 
with non-normative gender identity at risk. Harmful practices in this context infer 
attempts to ‘fix’ and/or correct non-normative individuals to perform in alignment to the 
binary expectations of how women ‘should be’ as mentioned under 2 3. Moreover, 
Joint General Recommendation No 31 confirms that: 
“Harmful practices are deeply rooted in social attitudes according to which women and girls 
are regarded as inferior to men and boys based on stereotyped roles. They also highlight 
the gender dimension of violence and indicate that sex and gender-based attitudes and 
stereotypes, power imbalances, inequalities and discrimination perpetuate the widespread 
existence of practices that often involve violence or coercion”.316 
Subsequently, the overarching obligation contained in article 4(2)(d) to eradicate 
elements which “legitimise or exacerbate” violence against women requires firstly an 
acknowledgement of the effects of patriarchal, heteronormative, homophobic and/or 
transphobic beliefs and thereafter, an engagement with such beliefs.317 As discussed 
under 3 4 2, the due diligence of states requires them to acknowledge and protect 
those at particular risk of violence and discrimination. The Independent Expert on 
SOGI argues that this includes implementing measures which acknowledge and 
eliminate “cultural stigmatization and other social causes of violence and 
 
315 CEDAW ‘Joint General Recommendation No 31’/ CRC ‘General Comment No 18’ on ‘harmful 
practices’ (14 November 2014) para 15.  
316 CEDAW ‘Joint General Recommendation No 31’/ CRC ‘General Comment No 18’ on ‘harmful 
practices’ (14 November 2014) para 6.  
317 Homophobic beliefs are relevant as set out under 2 4 1: because of a conflation of homosexual men 
and transgender women – transgender women are still sometimes subjected to ‘homophobic’ violence.  
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discrimination”.318 As described by the Coalition for African Lesbians, violence directed 
against queer women in Africa, including transgender women, “is particularly vicious 
and brutal due to the multiple and intersecting layers of discrimination facing women 
in highly patriarchal African families and societies”.319  
4 4 Violations of the rights to life, integrity and security of African transgender 
women  
The international human rights framework, as illustrated under 2 5 1, confirms the 
recognition of transgender women as women and avails them protection under, for 
example, the Maputo Protocol. Within this framework, all human rights are 
interdependent and bestowed on all individuals, regardless of any and all grounds, 
including discrimination based on cultural and/or traditional beliefs. A teleological 
interpretation of article 4 of the Maputo Protocol is valuable in considering how African 
transgender women are discriminated against within the African human rights system 
and how often their rights to life, integrity and security are violated because they are 
transgender. Specifically when they are victims of violence and/or harmful cultural 
practices. This subsection, as noted under 4 1, aims to provide a brief illustration of 
violations of African transgender women’s rights to life, integrity and security to reveal 
the gap in the application of existing human rights protection.  
Within this discussion, causes and justifications of violations are presented and 
evaluated. This discussion does not aim to give a full account of the circumstances of 
all African transgender women as it is acknowledged that race, class, socio-economic 
background, ethnicity and geographical location continuously have an effect – positive 
or negative – on their positioning as African transgender women. However, some 
generalisation allows for certain root causes of the violations that occur within the 
African human rights system to be identified. 
4 4 1 Lack of sufficient data  
A key aspect of human rights protection is the ability to identify and address human 
rights violations. Accurate data is required to create awareness of human rights 
violations and it is essential in order to sufficiently address violence and 
 
318 HRC ‘Data collection and management as a means to create heightened awareness of violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity Report of the Independent Expert on 
protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity’ 45th 
Session (24 June-12 July 2019) para 13. 
319 Coalition for African Lesbians & African Men for Sexual Health and Rights Violence (2013) 39. 
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discrimination.320 Without sufficient and accurate data human rights violations go 
undetected. The lack of data is often as a result of the fact that the most marginalised 
in society are not able to advocate for themselves. Global NGOs like Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch try to fill this gap by advocating for smaller 
vulnerable minorities worldwide. However, notwithstanding this advocacy, compared 
to other parts of the world, incidents of discrimination and violence against individuals 
with non-normative gender identities continue to go underreported, and this is 
particularly so within the African human rights system.321  
A consequence of the lack of adequate data is negation: the denial that violence 
and discrimination based on gender identity occur and/or that individuals with non-
normative gender identities exist.322 This links with the argument presented under 3 4 
1 regarding the invisibility of African transgender women; that violations against them 
continue to go unnoticed whilst their existence is denied. Therefore, in order to 
adequately address violations of African transgender women, their existence firstly 
needs to be acknowledged and then the violations documented. However, as 
encapsulated by the OHCHR, “quantifying (…) transphobic violence is complicated by 
the fact that few states have systems in place for monitoring, recording and reporting 
these incidents”.323 This filters through in the cycle of the denial of existence as well 
as of violations. Human rights violations against individuals with non-normative gender 
identities are denied because they are not recorded, these violations are not recorded 
as these individuals are not recognised and as such there are no systems in place to 
record them. As discussed under 3 2 2, for African transgender women this is 
aggravated as the majority of states which do record violations against them, record 
them as violence and/or discrimination against homosexual men. Accordingly, 
quantification of the specific violence and violations endured is crucial for states to be 
able to adequately address, offer redress and prohibit further violence and violations.  
 
320 HRC ‘Data collection and management as a means to create heightened awareness of violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity Report of the Independent Expert on 
protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity’ 45th 
Session (24 June-12 July 2019) para 12. 
321 Jobson et al (2012) SAHARA-J: Journal of Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS 161. 
322 HRC ‘Data collection and management as a means to create heightened awareness of violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity Report of the Independent Expert on 
protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity’ 45th 
Session (24 June-12 July 2019) para 62. 
323 HRC ‘Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ (17 November 2011) para 23 . 
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As a point of departure, the majority of research detailing violations against 
transgender women worldwide comes from the Inter-American human rights system; 
specifically, from organisations within the United States of America and select South 
American states.324 Often, a bulk of the sources used for a majority of UN reports and 
research published is research and statistics produced in these (American) states. 
The experiences of, and violations against, American transgender women make up a 
majority of the research being done on transgender women in the world. Likewise, in 
the European human rights system, there is significant work being done to document 
violations against European transgender women. As an example, Transgender 
Europe is a NGO which aims “to give trans people a voice and platform in Europe, 
Central Asia and also the rest of the world”.325 They advocate for the human rights of 
transgender individuals, raise awareness of specific issues transgender individuals 
face and encourage collaborative work. Since 2009 they have operated the 
Transgender Murder Monitoring Project which monitors, collects and analyses reports 
of murders of transgender individuals worldwide. Whilst they say that they collect data 
from all regions, it must be noted that South Africa is the only African state appearing 
in their reports.326 Accordingly, their report detailing transgender deaths in the years 
between 2008 and 2018 (incorrectly) reflects that whilst there were hundreds of deaths 
of transgender individuals worldwide, there were only 17 documented in African 
states.327  
Accordingly, the increasing build-up of research done in other parts of the world 
with regard to the lives and violations against transgender women are not conclusive 
with regard to the diversity of discrimination and violence on the African continent. The 
creation of knowledge, publishing of reports and statistics and interpretation of data is 
useful in drawing common links between regions but risks reinforcing stigma and 
erasing the multiplicity of experiences. As motivated in queer legal theory discussed 
under 2 4 1, there is a need for advocacy to represent the experiences of Africans with 
non-normative gender identities.  
 
324 Organisations like the National Center for Transgender Equality and the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health.  
325 Transgender Europe “About Us” (2019) Transgender Europe <https://tgeu.org/about-us/> (accessed 
10-04-2019). 
326 Contributing data was given from Gender Dynamix and the Social, Health and Empowerment 
Feminist Collective of Transgender Women of Africa (“S.H.E”). 
327 Transgender Europe “TvT TMM Update: Trans Day of Remembrance 2018” (2018) Transrepsct 
versus Transphobia Worldwide <https://transrespect.org/wp-content/uploads /2018/11/TvT_TMM_ 
TDoR2018_Tables_EN.pdf> (accessed 12-04-2019).  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  75 
Notwithstanding the gap in formalised data relating to accounts of lives of African 
transgender women, there is an increasing number of grass roots organisations within 
the African regional human rights system who contribute to making African 
transgender women more visible. Even though there is a massive gap in the data 
relating to formalised statistical data capturing violations against African transgender 
women’s lives, integrity and security; it is acknowledged that there is an increasing 
number of individual accounts of violations which are helping to expand the knowledge 
and resources of advocacy groups. Ogwaro argues that: 
“There is no substantive research yet as to how many transgender people are killed in 
Africa but one will not fail to come across news stories of transgender people being 
harassed, discriminated against or jailed on the continent”.328 
A key concern here stands out, namely, that with regard to issues of African individuals 
with non-normative SOGIs, transgender concerns are comparatively overlooked.329 
As argued by Winter, “stigma discourages transgender persons from making their 
transgender status known (…) these and other considerations present challenges to 
the researcher attempting to ascertain the size of the transgender population”.330 In 
May 2018 the Independent Expert on SOGI Rights published a report regarding 
violence and discrimination against individuals based on their SOGI. Within this report 
he noted that because:  
“[T]he murders of trans and gender non-conforming people are not systematically recorded 
and that in most countries a system to produce adequate data is not even in place, the 
actual number is certainly much higher”.331 
This statement highlights the international community’s obliviousness on the 
frequency of murders of transgender women. Moreover, in the African regional human 
rights system, many of the violations documented against transgender women are 
done incorrectly, miscategorising them as homosexual men. In a report submitted to 
the HRC regarding violations against individuals with non-normative identities in 
Ghana, it was noted that:  
 
328 G Ogwaro “All lives matter – the social death ‘penalty’ for transgender persons” (21-11-2018) Centre 
for Human Rights University of Pretoria <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/sogie-news/1103-all-lives-matter-the-
social-death-penalty-for-transgender-persons> (accessed 21-02-2019).  
329 Oloka-Onyango (2015) AHRJ 49.  
330 Winter et al (2016) Lancet 392. 
331 HRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ 38th Session (18 June-6 July 2018) para 41. 
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“Homophobia is very common in Ghana, and transphobia would likely be as well but for the 
fact that the social climate is so bad that transgender individuals keep their gender identity 
hidden”.332 
Notwithstanding the fact that transgender women are not criminalised per se, as 
discussed under 3 3 1 their invisibility combined with the criminalisation of 
homosexuality in a number of African states continuously poses a risk for their 
persecution to continue. It creates an environment where their specific challenges are 
unrecognised and unresolved. This again affirms the fact that the effects of denying 
gender recognition as set out under 3 2 2 impacts these women’s ability to have their 
dignity as well as their status as legal subjects and citizens protected. As an example 
of this, illustrated through the position of transgender individuals in Swaziland, Vilane 
argues that:  
“Swaziland has no statistics on the hate crimes imposed on transgender populations. This 
could be due to systematic erasure, or wariness to report these crimes. Transgender 
people in Swaziland cannot access full citizenship”.333 
To date, the majority of sources, which attest to the experiences and violations of 
African transgender women are predominantly autobiographical in nature or form part 
of news media or NGO reports. Accordingly, there is a gap in academic literature.334 
As noted by the OHCHR: 
“Despite positive developments, most [states] lack comprehensive policies to address 
human rights violations against [SOGI minorities]. Even where these are in place, most 
states do not collect relevant data to measure and evaluate their effectiveness (…) 
Measures to address violence and discrimination faced by trans people lag far behind those 
adopted to address issues related to people who are lesbian, gay or bisexual. Critically, 
most states do not recognize trans people’s gender identity; the majority of those that do 
continue to impose abusive preconditions that violate international human rights standards, 
national and international medical classifications continue to pathologize trans persons and 
identities”. [emphasis added]335 
Comprehensive data which records violations can verify and expose perpetrators and 
keep State Parties accountable in their positive obligations to protect the human rights 
of all individuals and fulfil their due diligence. Moreover, State Parties will only be able 
to fulfil their obligations set out in articles 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(d) when they have accurate 
 
332 Solace Brothers Foundation, The Imitative for Equal Rights, Center for International Human Rights 
of Northwestern University School of Law & Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights 
Global Initiative for Sexuality and Human Rights Human Rights Violations Against Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, And Transgender (LGBT) People in Ghana: A Shadow Report (2015) 5.   
333 V Vilane “Experiences of transgender people in Swaziland” in Z Matebeni, S Monro & V Reddy (eds) 
Queer in Africa: LGBTQI Identities, Citizenship, and Activism (2018) 188.  
334 V Reddy, S Monro & Z Matebeni “African Studies” in Z Matebeni, S Monro & V Reddy (eds) Queer 
in Africa: LGBTQI Identities, Citizenship, and Activism (2018) 17. 
335 OHCHR Living Free & Equal: What States are doing to tackle violence and discrimination against 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex People (2016) 11.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  77 
information regarding the situations of violence and violations against transgender 
women, including the causes and consequences as well as the motivating and 
mitigating factors of violations.  
4 4 2 Cultural justifications for violations  
As reiterated throughout this research, the human rights of African transgender 
women are often violated because they are transgender and these violations are 
justified in light of certain religious and/or cultural convictions, which contradict the 
principle of universality as discussed under 2 5 1. Under 2 4 1, it was noted that due 
to their heightened visibility, African transgender women in particular face 
victimisation. Simultaneously, any kind of persecution which is justified by cultural 
relativism as discussed under 2 5 2, opposes the categorical universal nature of 
human rights protection. Regardless of the variety and intelligibly of arguments for the 
protection of the rights of African transgender women, the conflict in African social and 
legal discourses continue. As summarised by Reddy et al:  
“The tensions between ‘legal’ protection on the one hand and cu ltural beliefs on the other 
hand remain a serious challenge to the ongoing fashioning and mobilisation of African 
queer identities”.336  
In the African human rights system, there is a pronounced interrelation between 
religious traditions and the law.337 This is often identified as a legacy of colonisation 
and the import of Islam and Christianity into the African colonies. Many African states 
have continued to operate with an emphasis on their societies’ religious and traditional 
customary beliefs since they gained independence and established their respective 
democracies. Further complicating the issue is the fact that the balance of integrating 
traditional practices with modern legal systems requires care. On the one hand, 
asserting a global agenda, which threatens to undermine traditional values and beliefs 
is contrary to state sovereignty and retaining a national identity. On the other hand, as 
set out under 2 5 1, the maintenance of harmful traditional and cultural practices are 
not justification for human rights violations. However, this view is arguably not shared 
by large parts of the African political and religious elite. As noted under 2 5 2 it is still 
a practice for heads of state and/or influential religious leaders to incite violence 
 
336 Reddy et al “Introduction” in Queer in Africa (2018) 2. 
337 Ibrahim (2015) AHRLJ 267. 
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against individuals with non-normative gender identities and to justify such violence 
as part of a mandate to ensure the protection of African ‘cultural beliefs’.338  
Such violence is merely one aspect of the violations African transgender women 
continue to experience because of harmful heteronormative and transphobic beliefs, 
which are rationalised as traditional and/or cultural beliefs. As an example, in 2011, 
two Cameroonian transgender women were arrested, detained, tried and convicted on 
the basis of homosexuality because they “were wearing women’s clothes” and they 
“looked feminine”.339 Another example occurred in 2015 when a Nigerian man (as 
described in the documents) was arrested and detained, solely on the charges of 
“walking [and] acting like a woman”.340 What is particularly alarmingly with regard to 
the latter example is that the formal reports were not able to specify if that individual 
identified as a transgender woman, a homosexual man or if they were just someone 
who appeared to present as feminine. Nonetheless, their non-normativity was seen by 
officials as sufficient grounds for them to be arrested and detained; a clear violation of 
their rights to liberty and security.  
State Parties have the obligation to ensure the protection of rights as set out in the 
Maputo Protocol, which are aligned to the core principles of international human rights 
law. These include the right to non-discrimination as well as the right to dignity. Overall, 
there are three main aspects of the justifications of violations to the rights of African 
transgender women. Firstly, the persistent cultures of patriarchy, homophobia, 
transphobia and heteronormativity notably contribute to cultural justifications for 
violence. The rights to life, security and integrity are particularly threatened by these 
cultures, as is further explored below under 4 4 3. Secondly, the embodiment of these 
cultures in religious and social hierarchies in certain African states is often used to 
justify sentiments of non-normative individuals not qualifying as African as they choose 
to live their lives in opposition to the religious and cultural values of the continent. 
Olaoluwa argues that this dominant perspective that “gender variance [is] ‘un-African’ 
is related to the purchase of Christianity and Islam, two Abrahamic religions that have 
dominant influence on contemporary Africans”.341 A key aspect of this, the strict 
 
338 Coalition for African Lesbians & African Men for Sexual Health and Rights Violence (2013) 17. 
339 Advocates for Behavioural Change et al Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity in Nigeria (2015) 15. 
340 15. 
341 S Olaoluwa “The human and the non-human: African sexuality debate and symbolisms of 
transgression” in Z Matebeni, S Monro and V Reddy (eds) Queer in Africa: LGBTQI Identities, 
Citizenship, and Activism (2018) 20. 
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application of Sharia law and its implication for the violation of the rights of African 
transgender women, is further discussed below under 4 4 3. A final key contributing 
factor to the justification of discrimination of African transgender women is found in a 
persistent lack of education and exposure to individuals with non-normative gender 
identities. Such unfamiliarity, in a polarised environment, breeds an atmosphere of 
stigma, discrimination and violence. Often, non-normative individuals, including 
transgender women, are ostracised in their communities as it is believed that they are 
“cursed” and/or sick with a disease categorised as deadly and infectious.342 This links 
with the positive obligations contained in both articles 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(d) as education 
and destigmatisation can prevent violence and help to develop traditions and customs 
to be more tolerant of individuals with non-normative gender identities. Related to this, 
the discussion that follows under 5 4 2 which deals with the pathologisation of 
transgender women. This subsection aims to illustrate the consequences of the beliefs 
which regard them as intrinsically disordered as a result of their non-normative gender 
identity and how this is fundamentally a human rights violation.  
All of the aforementioned considerations are relevant in acknowledging the plight 
of the persistent violence against African transgender women which implicate their 
ability to enjoy their rights to life, integrity and security. As referred to throughout this 
research, the misperception of their identities manifests in exacerbated “stigma, 
harassment, and sexual and physical violence at the hands of family members, their 
communities and state actors”.343 Their aggravated vulnerability additionally is a result 
of the fact that these women often have no right of recourse if attacked, beaten and/or 
violated as they are at risk to become victims of further brutality and/or rape when 
seeking help.344 Some of these instances of stigmatisation and violence are further 
presented below, to highlight, rather than attempt to provide an exhaustive discussion, 
on violations against African transgender women. 
 
342 Advocates for Behavioural Change et al Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity in Nigeria (2015) 8. 
343 Legal Resources Centre, Iranti-Org & Gender Dynamix Report on the civil, political and socio-
economic rights of transgender and intersex persons in South Africa under the African Charters on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in response to the second combined report of the Government of South 
Africa and the initial report under the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(2016) 5-7. 
344 OHCHR Living Free & Equal: What States are doing to tackle violence and discrimination against 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex People (2016) 40. 
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4 4 3 Illustrations of violations  
As a point of departure, the deprivation of African transgender women’s ability to live 
a dignified existence, including being safe from threats of sexual and/or physical 
violence, are all violations of their right to life. This includes situations where African 
transgender women are forced into poverty, experience persecution and/or and are 
forced to live as social, economic or legal outcasts. This acknowledgement is 
significant in light of the State Party obligations discussed throughout this research. In 
light of the underlying due diligence of all states, the HRC in its General Comment No 
36 sets out that: 
“The duty to protect the right to life requires States parties to take special measures of 
protection towards persons in situations of vulnerability whose lives have been placed at 
particular risk because of specific threats or pre-existing patterns of violence. These include 
(…) transgender persons”.345 
Moreover, it is a grave cause for concern that worldwide police officers are often key 
perpetrators of violence and life-threatening conduct against transgender women.346 
This is worsened by the consideration that it is a police officer’s duty, as an official of 
the state, to ensure the protection of human rights of all individuals, including that of 
the right to life, integrity and security. As an example, because transgender women 
are frequently denied recognition of their gender identity, when they are arrested and 
detained, they are kept in cells with men. This exacerbates their vulnerability and their 
exposure to general, as well as sexual, violence at the hands of other individuals in 
jail.347 Furthermore, police officers are regularly accused of taking advantage of 
transgender women; forcing them to perform sexual acts, humiliating them or 
subjecting them to other forms of inhumane or degrading treatment. These are clear 
violations to their integrity and security as discussed under 4 2 2. As explained by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on torture with regard to the frequency of violations worldwide:  
“[M]embers of sexual minorities are disproportionately subjected to torture and other forms 
of ill-treatment because they fail to conform to socially constructed gender expectations. 
Indeed, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity may often 
contribute to the process of the dehumanization of the victim, which is often a necessary 
condition for torture and ill-treatment to take place. In 2010, [it was noted] that, in detention 
facilities, there was usually a strict hierarchy, and that those at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
such as gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgender persons, suffered double or triple 
discrimination. [It] has highlighted the susceptibility of male-to-female transgender 
 
345 HRC ‘General Comment No 36’ on ‘article 6 of the ICCPR, on the right to life’ 124th Session (8 
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prisoners to physical and sexual abuse if placed within the general prison population”.348 
As reiterated throughout this thesis, on the African continent, harmful cultural and 
religious persecution as well as the misidentification of transgender women as 
homosexual men and/or assumption as sex workers is often used as a justification for 
such violence and violations. This persecution is a manifestation of “deeply 
entrenched stigma and prejudice, irrational hatred and a form of gender-based 
violence, driven by an intention to punish those seen as defying gender norms”.349 
However, police officers are not the only perpetrators of violence and as mentioned 
under 4 4 2, sexual violence and violations against the bodily integrity of African 
transgender women are often perpetuated by members of their own communities.350 
One of the most severe examples of a violation is the act of “corrective” and/or 
“punitive” rape, as mentioned under 3 4 1. This is a form of sexual violence, which is 
committed against transgender women and warranted as a response ‘necessary’ to 
‘fix’ them.351 In this regard, acts of sexual violence are perpetrated by cisgender 
heterosexual men against individuals who are seen to threaten the heteronormative 
hierarchy, to punish these women based on their own deeply entrenched stigma and 
prejudice.352  
Compared to the physical effects of the violations set out, the consequences for 
African transgender women’s mental health and mental integrity are more challenging 
to assess and are further discussed under 5 2 2. Notably, the variety and severity of 
discrimination and violence experienced by African transgender women arguably links 
to their high rates of depression, suicide and self-harm. Moreover, the violence 
experienced by these women coupled with them being ostracised from family and 
society poses a direct threat to their enjoyment of life.353 As established, African 
transgender women are likely to be shunned by their families and communities, 
 
348 OHCHR Discriminatory laws and practices (2011) 12. 
349 HRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ 38th Session (18 June-6 July 2018) para 48.  
350 Coalition for African Lesbians & African Men for Sexual Health and Rights Violence (2013) 11. 
351 HRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ 38th Session (18 June-6 July 2018) para 69. 
352 Para 245.  
353 KB Jackman, C Dolezal, B Levin, JC Honig & WO Bockting “Stigma, gender dysphoria and 
nonsuicidal self-injury in a community sample of transgender individuals” (2018) 269 Psychiatry 
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struggle to maintain formal employment, often lack access to general social security 
and are deemed a high-risk population for depression and suicide.354  
As discussed under 3 4 2, an additional factor exacerbating the risk and 
undermining African transgender women’s enjoyment of life is the prevalence of them 
engaged in the sex work industry. In this regard, these women often find themselves 
in high-risk situations, which aggravate their vulnerability. Conclusively, violence 
against sex workers is a common occurrence and disproportionately affects 
transgender women as an intersectional concern. This is further aggravated by the 
fact that whilst sex work is increasingly seen as a legitimate form of work in certain 
states, it remains criminalised in a majority of African states.355 Due to their 
proportionally high engagement in sex work, transgender women further experience 
an increased exposure to HIV infections. This issue is discussed under 5 4 3 in the 
context of their right to life and integrity as the discriminatory treatment these women 
face is undoubtedly a human rights violation.  
Moreover, the increasing cases of transgender women who seek asylum from their 
birth state due to persecution of their gender identity frequently threatens their lives, 
integrity and security. Currently on the African continent, gender identity is a rising 
ground for individuals to seek asylum outside of their national state. At the time of the 
writing of this research, South Africa is still the only African state and State Party to 
the Maputo Protocol which has legal provisions for asylum for discrimination, 
persecution and violence based on gender identity.356 Koko et al argue that:  
“There are many places in Africa (including Tanzania, Kenya, and Nigeria) where (…) 
transgender people are at a high risk of death and therefore have no option but to flee. In 
their countries of origin, [individuals with non-normative SOGI] are exposed and subjected 
to discrimination, persecution, exclusion and violence, murder, and rape at the hands of 
state and non-state agents”.357 
Camminga describes transgender individuals who seek asylum as “gender 
refugees”.358 The experiences of gender refugees within South Africa is still relatively 
 
354 A Müller Sexual and Reproductive health for Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming People: 
Guidelines for Health Care Workers in Primary Care (2013) 8. 
355 Mgbako & Smith (2011) Fordham International Law Journal 1181-1185. 
356 M Gevisser “Love in exile” (27-11-2014) The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com 
/news/2014/nov/27/-sp-transgender-relationship-jail-exile-tiwonge-chimbalanga> (accessed 21-02-
2019).  
357 G Koko, S Monro & K Smith “Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQ) forced migrants 
and asylum seekers: Multiple discriminations” in Z Matebeni, S Monro & V Reddy (eds) Queer in Africa: 
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insecure with regard to the full realisation of their human rights. Camminga notes that 
often these individuals are met with either xenophobia from ill-informed and fearful 
South Africans and/or prejudice from their own home state being brought with by other 
asylum seekers and endangering them.359 Furthermore, the issue of incongruent 
documents as mentioned under 3 2 2  implicates the ability of African transgender 
women to safely and legitimately integrate into society whilst their documents state 
male and they present as female; it is harder for these women to access shelters or 
housing, employment and/or healthcare services.360 Camminga argues that: 
“Gender refugees, in coming to South Africa, and applying for asylum, enter a kind of limbo: 
they cannot go but they also struggle to stay. They are allowed in but evidently nothing 
more”.361 
Camminga refers to the fact that this impacts their ability to have a “liveable life”, a 
term which reflects the description similar to what this research earlier set out as a 
dignified existence. This undermines the legal guarantee of these women’s protection 
against discrimination, on the basis of them being both transgender as well as asylum 
seekers.362 The guarantee of the rights of women set out in the Maputo Protocol does 
not attach to citizenship.363 
Lastly, the most severe violation to the right to life as discussed under 4 2 1 is capital 
punishment. For African transgender women, the death penalty on the basis of real 
and/or perceived non-normative gender identity arbitrarily endangers them as they are 
continuously conflated with homosexual men. At the time of writing, homosexuality is 
still punishable by death, as part of the strict application of Sharia law in the northern 
states in Nigeria, certain areas of Somalia, Mauritania as well as Sudan.364 However, 
in their General Comment No 3 the African Commission unequivocally declared that: 
“The African Charter does not include any provision recognising the death penalty, even in 
limited circumstances, and the Commission has on several occasions passed resolutions 
calling on States to abolish the death penalty, or to establish a moratorium in line with the 
continental and global trend”.365 
The Commission continued to argue that international human rights law requires all 
states who have not yet abolished the death penalty to take measured steps towards 
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its abolition in pursuit of ensuring the rights to life and dignity as well as the rights to 
be free from torture, and cruel, inhumane and/or degrading treatment. Accordingly, in 
light of this statement together with the general obligation contained in article 4(1), 
there is no justification for State Parties to still have the death penalty, particularly not 
in the instances of discrimination based on these women’s non-normative gender 
identities. 
4 5 Conclusion  
The right to life is the most fundamental human right and its realisation is coupled with 
the realisation of the rights to dignity, integrity, security, equality as well as non-
discrimination. The right is provided for in a variety of international human rights 
instruments including the Maputo Protocol. In this chapter, cultural justifications were 
identified as a key contributing factor to the persistence of discrimination, persecution 
and violence against African transgender which threatens their right to life. Thereafter, 
it was presented that a teleological interpretation of articles 4(1), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(d) of 
the Protocol illustrates the obligations on State Parties to eliminate harmful cultural 
beliefs and/or practices which instigate violence against African transgender women, 
as such beliefs, practices and violence often result in violations of their right to life. 
Moreover, in consideration of violations against African transgender women’s right to 
life, the lack of data recording and monitoring such violations is noteworthy and 
requires action on behalf of State Parties. The discrimination, persecution and 
violence perpetuated against African transgender women is noted to be contrary to 
international human rights law as well as the specific object and purpose of the Maputo 
Protocol.  
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CHAPTER 5  
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH OF AFRICAN TRANSGENDER WOMEN  
5 1 Introduction  
The right to health is a fundamental human right, which like the right to life as 
discussed in chapter 4, is essential for the enjoyment of other human rights. Whereas 
chapter 4 dealt with African transgender women’s rights to life, integrity and security 
as contained in article 4 of the Maputo Protocol, this chapter aims to similarly assess 
the rights as contained in article 14 of the Maputo Protocol, namely; health and 
reproductive rights. This assessment equally considers the theoretical framework set 
out in chapter 2; as based on the notion that human rights protection is granted to all 
individuals based on equality, non-discrimination and universality. As argued in 
chapter 3, the denial of gender recognition is a fundamental violation of the right to 
dignity. This chapter further expands on this argument and submits that the continuous 
pathologisation of African transgender women, denial of gender affirming services as 
well as access to HIV/AIDS services ultimately violates both their rights to health and 
dignity. 
5 2 The right to health   
5 2 1 The right to health as an inalienable human right   
The right to health is an inclusive right and a core aspect of the human rights 
framework.366 As described by the CESCR:  
“Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights. 
Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health 
conducive to living a life in dignity”.367   
As a point of departure, the right to health was first codified in 1946 as part of the 
Constitution of the World Health Organization (“WHO Constitution”).368 In the 
preamble, it was described as a state of “complete physical, mental and social 
wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.369 The WHO 
 
366 CESCR ‘General Comment No 14’ on ‘the right to the highest attainable standard of health (art 12)’ 
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367 Para 1.  
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Constitution furthermore specified that the right is guaranteed for all individuals, and 
must be provided for “without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or 
social condition”.370 Subsequently in 1948, the right to health was outlined in the UDHR 
where article 25(1) affirms that:  
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control”.371  
Moreover, the right to health is set out in article 12 of the ICESCR. Article 12(1) states 
that all individuals have the right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health” and article 12(2) provides a non-exhaustive description 
of the state obligations with regard to the realisation of this right. The notion of this 
standard is discussed below in order to assess State Party obligations to fully realise 
the right as well as to enable a comprehensive understanding of a teleological 
interpretation of article 14 of the Maputo Protocol.  
It is established that the right to health does not simply equate to the right to be 
healthy. Instead, it is a right which contains both “freedoms and entitlements” which 
comprise of a range of socio-economic considerations necessary for all individuals to 
lead healthy lives.372 These are described as “underlying determinants of health”373 
and include but are not limited to: food and nutrition, access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation, safe and healthy working and environmental conditions, health-related 
education, housing as well as gender equality.374 Furthermore, the right to health is 
made up of four key and interrelated elements, namely: availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality.375 ‘Availability’ includes the sufficient provision of health 
facilities, good and services, as well as programmes, within states. ‘Accessiblity’ is 
intrinsically linked to the principle of non-discrimination and requires all health facilities, 
goods and services to be within reach of all individuals without discrimination. This 
includes being within physical reach, being affordable as well as ensuring access to 
information. ‘Acceptability’ includes all health facilities, goods and services to be in 
 
370 MS Giorgi The human right to equal access to health care (2012) 10.  
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accordance with medical ethics as well as culturally sensitive. As described by the 
CESCR this means that:  
“All health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally 
appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and 
communities, sensitive to gender and life-style requirements, as well as being designed to 
respect confidentiality and improve the health status of those concerned”.376 
Finally, the qualitative aspect of the right requires it to be culturally acceptable and 
scientifically and medically appropriate. 
These standards are important when assessing the realisation of State Party 
obligations, specifically with regard to the provision of these rights for vulnerable 
minorities such as transgender women. Herein, two key points are notable: firstly, that 
all facets of health (mental, physical, sexual and reproductive) deserve equal 
provision. Secondly, that there is an obligation for the non-discriminatory provision for, 
and equal protection of, all individuals and their right to health. Article 2(2) of the 
ICESCR sets out the prohibited grounds of non-discrimination for all the rights set out 
within, including the right to health. The list of grounds is not exhaustive and in the 
CESCR’s General Comment No 20, it sets out that when reading “other status”: 
“[G]ender identity is recognised as among the prohibited grounds of discrimination; for 
example, persons who are transgender (…) often face serious human rights violations”.377 
This confirms the argument set out under 2 5 1 that gender identity is a prohibited 
ground. In addition, the right to health is interlinked with the right to dignity. As 
described by San Giorgi:  
“[B]y virtue of being a human being, all individuals are equally entitled to their corresponding 
inalienable human rights, including the right to health care (…) as discrimination violates 
the principle of equality, the prohibition of discrimination seeks to ensure that all persons 
can enjoy and exercise their right to equal access to healthcare”.378  
This assertion places an emphasis on healthcare as a crucial aspect of the right to 
health. It additionally affirms the universality, equality and non-discrimination 
exemplified in this right.  
A key aspect of the right to health focused on in this thesis is healthcare, which is 
interchangeably referred to as primary and/or essential healthcare. This includes 
access to health facilities, goods and services which, as defined above, are available, 
 
376  CESCR ‘General Comment No 14’ on ‘the right to the highest attainable standard of health (art 12)’ 
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acceptable and of good quality. It also includes the provision of essential drugs.379 As 
described by the CESCR, the core obligations contained within the right to health 
require states to satisfy the minimum levels of healthcare, namely primary 
healthcare.380 
The Alma-Ata Declaration was adopted at the International Conference on Primary 
Healthcare in 1978.381 It was the first international instrument which emphasised the 
importance of primary healthcare within the international community and expressed 
an urgent need for action by governments to prioritise the right. As defined in the 
Declaration, primary healthcare is based on:  
“[P]ractical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and technology made 
universally accessible to individuals and families in the community through their full 
participation and at a cost that the community and country can afford to maintain at every 
stage of their development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination”.382 
This description emphasises the importance of universal accessibility to basic 
healthcare which clearly reflects the principle of universality. San Giorgi argues that 
crucial elements of this include equitable as well as non-discriminatory access to 
healthcare.383 Thus, such an argument is a confirmation of the prevalence of the key 
underlying principle and rights of international human rights law to this right. However, 
as seen with the application of the rights discussed in the preceding chapters, African 
transgender women are often not warranted such protection and provision of their 
rights in practice (due to discrimination) and this is an infringement of their rights.  
The point of departure for the right to health within the African human rights system 
is found in article 16 of the African Charter:  
“Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health [and] States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical 
attention when they are sick”.  
Article 16(1) mentions both physical as well as mental health within the 
conceptualisation of the right and article 16(2) sets out the obligation for State Parties 
to protect the health of all their citizens as well as to ensure that all individuals receive 
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medical attention when sick. In order to grasp the implementation of this right, the case 
law of the African Commission is useful. In Purohit the African Commission confirmed 
the scope of the right to health as contained in article 16.384 It stated that: 
“Enjoyment of the human right to health as it is widely known is vital to all aspects of a 
person’s life and well-being, and is crucial to the realisation of all the other fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. This right includes the right to health facilities, access to goods 
and services to be guaranteed to all without discrimination of any kind”.385 
In Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interrights v Egypt (“Interrights”)386 the 
African Commission further confirmed that the right to health operates as a 
“prerequisite to all other human rights recognised by the African Charter”387 and that: 
“States have a legal obligation to protect the right to health of all its citizens, including inter 
alia taking concrete and targeted steps towards the full realisation of the right, and adopting 
legislation or other measures to ensure equal access to health-related services and health 
care”.388 
A key concern with regard to realisation of the right to health is the impact of adequate 
resources, or rather lack thereof. Often, the respective development of a State Party 
impacts their availability of adequate resources and thus ability to realise the right to 
health. Notwithstanding that this is an important aspect to consider when assessing 
implementation of the right, both the WHO and OHCHR surmise that a state cannot 
justify a failure to fulfil its obligations on these grounds. Additionally, both argue that 
“states must guarantee the right to health to the maximum of their available resources, 
even if they are tight”.389 The African Commission in Purohit made a similar concession 
that: 
“[M]illions of people in Africa are not enjoying the right to health maximally because African 
countries are generally faced with the problem of poverty which renders them incapable to 
provide the necessary amenities, infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full 
enjoyment of this right. Therefore, having due regard to this depressing but real state of 
affairs, the African Commission would like to read into Article 16 the obligation on part of 
States party to the African Charter to take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full 
advantage of its available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in all 
its aspects without discrimination of any kind”.390  
As mentioned under 1 1, because the Maputo Protocol is a complementary instrument 
to the African Charter, these instruments share applicable context. Accordingly, the 
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aforementioned comment relates to an application of the Maputo Protocol as part of 
the African human rights system.  
The right to health of African transgender women incorporates their right to mental, 
physical as well as sexual health and their interlinked entitlements to a dignified 
existence (as set out in chapter 3) and to bodily integrity (as set out in chapter 4). The 
subject of discrimination in healthcare and its effect on the enjoyment of other human 
rights is further discussed under 5 4 1. Unfortunately, the goal of the highest attainable 
standard of health, or even adequate health, is not reflected in the lived reality of many 
individuals with non-normative gender identities worldwide. This is a result of a variety 
of factors, including but not limited to, economic and social exclusion. Particularly on 
the African continent, high rates of poverty are directly linked to reduced access to, 
and enjoyment of, adequate healthcare. This deficiency is further exacerbated for 
individuals with non-normative gender identities such as African transgender women, 
due to discrimination and marginalisation by healthcare workers, as discussed under 
5 3 1 and 5 4 1.   
5 2 2 Gender affirming hormones and procedures as part of the right to health  
Gender recognition is an intrinsic aspect of realising the right to dignity. As argued 
under 3 2 2, gender recognition is an issue which often only affects transgender 
women as cisgender women are rarely required to defend their gender identity.391 This 
subsection aims to explore how gender affirming hormones and procedures are 
aspects of gender recognition, and how through their provision, the right to dignity as 
well as the right to health of transgender women can be realised. For the purposes of 
conceptualising transgender women in this research, it was stated in chapter 2 that it 
is irrelevant whether or not they desire to have gender affirming surgery. However, 
this specific discussion focuses on African transgender women who seek gender 
affirming hormones and procedures but are faced with significant barriers in accessing 
such treatments. Such barriers include discrimination and stigma as well as economic 
and social exclusion.  
For transgender women who want to obtain gender affirming treatment and/or 
surgery, it is an infrequent and expensive undertaking on the African continent. An 
implication of this is that a majority of African transgender women who experience 
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distress with their bodies are unable to affirm their gender identities physically. This 
continuous distress is arguably a violation of their bodily integrity and autonomy which 
can lead to mental as well as physical health problems.392 The statistics of depression 
and suicide for transgender individuals in general are high. As described by Müller, 
“anxiety and depression are widespread amongst trans people and as many as 40 per 
cent have, at one point in their lives, attempted suicide”.393 Müller further argues that 
gender affirming hormones and access to treatment is decisive in being able to 
promote their ultimate mental and physical wellness and health, which he describes 
as “self-actualisation”.394  
As briefly discussed under 2 2, the administration of hormones is the least invasive 
manner in which transgender women can affirm their gender identities. Transgender 
women specifically require the administration of oestrogen as well as anti-
androgens.395 There are several ways in which hormones can be dispensed but 
popular methods include injections, oral pills, cream and/or a patch.396 A key benefit 
identified of hormone therapy is the physical changes which reflect and affirm an 
individual’s gender identity and expression, making them feel validated. The next step 
in gender affirming treatment is gender affirming procedures. For transgender women, 
these include: a chest surgery (an augmentation mammoplasty), a penectomy, 
orchiectomy and vaginoplasty.397 
A key reason why a majority of African transgender women do not obtain gender 
affirming procedures is due to a lack of information and/or funds as well as a lack of 
willing and trained professionals to aid in administering hormones and/or to perform 
the procedures.398 However, if it is established that gender recognition is a 
fundamental aspect of the right to dignity and that gender affirming procedures are 
inherent within the conceptualisation of ‘healthcare’, justifications for their denial are 
in clear contradiction to the realisation of the principles of accessibility and 
acceptability. 5 4 2 focuses on how, in certain states the provision of gender affirming 
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care is administered only once a pathologised diagnosis is issued. Conversely, with 
regard to the realisation of health rights in the international community, the 
Independent Expert on SOGI argues that: 
“[T]he need to ensure access to comprehensive care for all, including gender affirming care, 
“without reporting to labels that give rise to stigma” and has reinforced the call for States 
“to provide equal access to healthcare and access to gender affirming treatment to those 
who seek it.””399 
South Africa is the only State Party to the Maputo Protocol with legislation that 
specifically facilitates the legal recognition of transgender women.400 Consequently, 
South Africa is the only State Party to the Maputo Protocol where gender affirming 
procedures are available and performed. However, there are only two hospitals where 
such services are provided and surgeries actually occur: the Steve Biko Academic 
Hospital in Pretoria and Groote Schuur in Cape Town.401 It is estimated that these 
hospitals provide four gender-affirming surgeries per year and that the waiting period 
is up to 25 years.402 As explained by Müller: 
“The waiting list is very long (…) As a result, some transgender people seek surgical care 
overseas if they can afford it. Gender Dynamix’s recent study on access to healthcare has 
shown that gender-affirming surgery is not a concern for most transgender people living in 
South Africa [as] the realities of limited access, as well as other ways to perform the 
identified gender, make it a lesser priority than access to hormone treatment”.403   
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that gender-affirming treatment is a possibility in 
South Africa, it is an exclusive occurrence due to administrative and financial obstacles 
which often prioritise transgender women with private healthcare and/or greater 
financial means. Furthermore, even if that financial threshold is overcome, issues of 
stigma and discrimination can violate these women’s dignity and ability to access 
healthcare equally and on a non-discriminatory basis. Therefore, even in states like 
South Africa where provision is made for these specific health needs, there are 
substantial accessibility and affordability issues which manifest as violations of the 
rights of transgender women to receive affirming procedures, to have their gender 
physically recognised, i.e. to have their rights to dignity and health realised. With 
regard to South Africa, Bateman argues that:  
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“Attempts to access care in the public sector where facilities, staff and protocols exist, often 
result in humiliation, up to 6 years waiting on surgical lists and sometimes being routed via 
the private sector at major expense, with no guarantee of an outcome. [Thereafter] the 
bigger barrier (…) (to surgery for transgender persons) is that many surgeons have 
internalised the general stigma and prejudice that exists towards transgenderism”.404 
Thereafter, in the rest of the African states where there are no explicit provisions for 
transgender women, they are forced to seek hormones on the black-market which put 
them at risk for infection and/or incorrect administration.405 Often, a desire for gender 
affirming procedures will require transgender women to travel outside of the African 
continent.  
5 3 Health and Reproductive Rights in the Maputo Protocol  
Article 14 of the Maputo Protocol sets out a duty on all State Parties to ensure, respect 
and promote the right to health of all African women. Article 14(1) emphasises the 
inclusion of sexual and reproductive health within this right. This is in line with the 
international position as expressed in the CESCR’s General Comment No 22 that “the 
right to sexual and reproductive health is an integral part of the right to health”.406  
However, in the same General Comment, it was conceded that certain individuals, 
including transgender women, are often restricted the full enjoyment of the right to 
sexual and reproductive health because of “multiple and intersecting forms of 
discrimination that exacerbate [their] exclusion in both law and practice”.407  
As set out under 1 5, reproductive rights are not part of the discussion which ensues 
in this subsection. To teleologically interpret the relevant provisions of article 14, it is 
read alongside articles 2, 3, 4 and 5, as well as to the preamble to provide a holistic 
view of the obligations in which the principles of equality, universality and non-
discrimination are enshrined. As argued by Cohen et al, state obligations require that:  
“Governments be proactive in removing systematic barriers that marginalise discrete 
groups from social benefits, in particular, where those groups are distinguished by personal 
characteristics such as race, gender and ethnic origin. It is not enough for governments to 
adopt sound medical and equitable social criteria for treatment eligibility; they must go the 
extra step of ensuring that people ultimately are able to access treatment on a non-
discriminatory basis”.408 
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406 CESCR ‘General Comment No 22’ on ‘the right to sexual and reproductive health (art 12)’ 
E/C.12/GC/22 para 1. 
407 Para 2. 
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Thus, as argued under 2 5 1, as non-discrimination operates on non-exhaustive 
grounds, the following discussion begins with the supposition that in order for State 
Parties to fully realise the right to health of all women as protected by the Maputo 
Protocol, any exclusion on the basis of gender identity is a violation of the object and 
purpose of the Protocol itself.   
5 3 1 The provision of health services  
Article 14(2)(a) of the Maputo Protocol sets out the right to access to healthcare and 
health services and that: 
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to: provide adequate, affordable and 
accessible health services, including information, education and communication 
programmes to women especially those in rural areas”.  
As discussed earlier under 5 2 1, access to healthcare is a crucial aspect of the 
realisation of the right to health and this incorporates the provision of health goods and 
services, essential drugs as well as access to health facilities.  
The African Commission analyses article 14(2)(a) in its General Comment No 2.409 
It emphasises that the accessible nature of healthcare must be financial and 
geographical and that the availability as well as quality of the services must be 
provided on the basis of non-discrimination.410 The African Commission argues that 
State Parties have the obligation to provide services that are “comprehensive, 
integrated and rights-based”.411 Further, it concludes that these obligations require 
State Parties to develop their public health plans within their respective states to meet 
the international standards for health and keep in line with the standards set out in the 
relevant treaties including the ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW. Article 14(2)(a) 
describes that healthcare must be adequate, affordable and accessible and this 
echoes the four key elements described by the CESCR as discussed under 5 2 1.412 
These terms read together promote the notion of a progressive and reasonable 
realisation of the right. This indicates that State Parties are required to fulfil their 
positive obligations and ensure that their national legislation prioritise the promotion, 
protection and realisation of the right to health.  
 
409 African Commission ‘General Comments on art 14(1)(a), (b), (c) and (f) and art 12(2)(a) and (c) of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ (28 April – 12 
May 2014) 55th Ordinary Session.  
410 Para 29. 
411 Para 53.  
412 Available, accessible, acceptable and of quality. 
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A key obstacle to this realisation is the issue of limited resources as mentioned 
under 5 2 1. In General Comment No 14 the CESCR concedes that states may have 
constraints in realising the right to health due to limited resources but that they 
nonetheless have obligations of immediate effect. What progressive realisation 
implicates is both meaningful short-term as well long-term obligations. A short-term, 
or immediate, obligation set out by the CESCR is that the right be exercised on the 
basis of non-discrimination. The CESCR emphasises that states must take deliberate, 
concrete and targeted steps towards the full realisation of the right noting that even if 
the full realisation occurs over a period of time, the goal must still be to achieve the 
right as “expeditiously and effectively as possible”.413 
In evaluating what ‘appropriate measures’ looks like in application for African 
transgender women, the theoretical framework set out in chapters 2 and 3 is useful. 
As argued throughout this research, transgender women, alongside all other 
individuals, are beneficiaries of the human rights framework, regardless of their gender 
identity. Accordingly, they are guaranteed equal provision of their right to health. 
Moreover, the fulfilment of the principles of universality (namely: universal access), as 
well as their rights to equality and non-discrimination require healthcare workers to 
provide equal healthcare services regardless of their gender identity. This must be 
done in a manner in which their dignity is respected and they are not discriminated 
against. The ‘appropriate measures’ of State Parties to provide healthcare which is 
adequate, affordable and accessible requires two actions. Firstly, for them to ensure 
that the protection against discrimination is guaranteed to all women on all grounds, 
including gender identity. Secondly, that they integrate this protection into their 
respective national healthcare schemes.  
As discussed under 5 2 2, many healthcare workers only have a basic education 
and training which does not provide information regarding individuals with non-
normative gender identities and their specific healthcare concerns.414 Furthermore, as 
discussed in chapter 4, these service providers may hold certain cultural beliefs and/or 
convictions which affect their ability to do their work on a non-discriminatory basis.  
Notwithstanding, General Comment No 22 sets out that: 
 
413 CESCR ‘General Comment No 14’ on ‘the right to the highest attainable standard of health (art 12)’ 
22nd Session (11 August 2000) E/C.12/200/4 para 31.  
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“Unavailability of goods or services due to ideologically based policies or practices, such 
as the refusal to provide services based on conscience, must not be a barrier to accessing 
[health] services”.415  
Thus, in order for State Parties to ensure the full realisation of the right to health in line 
with international standards, there can be no justification for discrimination within 
and/or refusal of healthcare services on any grounds.  
5 3 2 The right to self-protection against HIV/AIDS  
As mentioned under 1 5, articles 14(1)(d) and 14(1)(e) are the focus of this discussion 
as they are crucial in the ensuing analysis of the Maputo Protocol and its approach to 
HIV/AIDS. As declared by the African Union: 
“[T]he Maputo Protocol remains one of the most progressive and radical human rights 
instruments relating to the sexual and reproductive health and rights of women. It explicitly 
recognises women’s rights to be protected in the context of HIV”.416 
Accordingly, as it has been stated throughout this thesis that African transgender 
women are a particularly high-risk minority group for HIV infection. Applying the 
theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 to incorporate African transgender women 
into the scope of article 14 can link the “progressive” provisions to them as a vulnerable 
group. The HIV/AIDS endemic is noted to be one of the major threats to the health of 
individuals worldwide.417 On the African continent, this is exacerbated for individuals 
with non-normative gender identities, including transgender women. It is crucial, 
therefore, that the interpretation of a human rights instrument such as the Maputo 
Protocol be implemented as effectively as possible to mitigate this threat, which, as 
argued throughout this research, is through a purposeful interpretation.  
As argued under 5 2 1, HIV/AIDS prevention is an aspect of ensuring the highest 
attainable standard of health for all individuals and although treatment is crucial in 
addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it is argued that prevention is equally, if not more, 
important.418 As suggested by Cohen et al, a conceptualisation of the highest 
attainable standard of health as a right undoubtedly includes an obligation to provide 
 
415 CESCR ‘General Comment No 22’ on ‘the right to sexual and reproductive health (art 12)’ 
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access to the best HIV prevention strategies available.419 As set out previously - 
education, prevention and treatment are the key focus areas in order to curb the 
HIV/AIDS crisis. This is reflected in the Maputo Protocol as article 14(1)(d) specifically 
sets out that:  
“States Parties shall ensure that the right to health of women, including sexual and 
reproductive health is respected and promoted. This includes: the right to self-protection 
and to be protected against sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS”. 
Although article 14(1)(d) refers in general to self-protection against STIs, as stated 
under 1 5, this subsection specifically focuses on HIV/AIDS to provide analysis on the 
wide-spread and life-threatening infection.  
HIV/AIDS was not always considered a human rights concern. Initially, due to the 
misconception of how the infection was spread, it was framed as a sexual health issue 
which affected only certain minority groups, in particular: homosexual men and 
transgender women.420 Historically, the high frequency of HIV/AIDS in the queer 
community was seen as a result of unprotected intercourse where individuals believed 
condoms were only used to prevent pregnancy. With the spread of the infection 
amongst the gay community specifically (with many transgender women being 
subsumed into that category) other individuals believed they could not contract it as it 
was a “gay” problem and not a risk for them.421 It was only later correctly framed as a 
threat to the enjoyment of the fundamental human rights of all individuals.  
Although any individual can contract HIV/AIDS, certain groups are more vulnerable 
to infection and individuals with non-normative gender identities make up a 
considerable part of this infected population, including transgender women. The 
relevant literature defines such groups as “key populations”. These key populations 
are described as:  
“[D]efined groups who, due to specific higher-risk behaviours, are at increased risk of HIV 
irrespective of the epidemic type or local context. Also, they often have legal and social 
issues related to their behaviours that increase their vulnerability to HIV”.422 
The WHO identifies five main key populations groups, including: men who have sex 
with men, individuals who inject drugs, individuals who are in in prison, sex workers 
 
419 Cohen et al “Human Rights and Public Health Ethics” in Public Health & Human Rights Evidence 
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422 WHO Consolidated Guidelines on HIV Prevention, Diagnosis, Treatment and Care for Key 
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as well as transgender individuals.423 The recognition of key populations is crucial to 
understand the dynamics of HIV transmission as these groups are described as 
“essential partners” in effective responses to the epidemic. Shisana et al argue that 
key population groups are at a high risk of contracting HIV because they are 
individuals who are stigmatised and less likely to be reached by interventions 
compared to that of other individuals.424 Factors that have been recorded to 
exacerbate transgender women’s vulnerability to HIV specifically include high-
frequency of engaging in sex work, lack of adequate sexual education, lack of tertiary 
education as well as access to housing and other social services.425  
The obligation set out in article 14(1)(d) requires State Parties to ensure African 
women are able to be protected and to self-protect against HIV/AIDS. The point of 
departure for protective measures against HIV/AIDS are barrier contraceptive 
methods, specifically condoms (both ‘male’ and ‘female’) as they are the most effective 
preventive tool against the spread of HIV/AIDS. UNAIDS describes them as a “key 
prevention service”426 and the WHO includes condoms in its model list of essential 
medicines.427 This discussion on condoms as a mechanism of sexual self-protection 
is neither with regard to the prevention of general STIs nor pregnancy, but is rather in 
application to transgender women specifically, whether they or their sexual partner 
use them. The intricacy and diversity of transgender women’s bodies makes this 
discussion complex and accordingly this subsection only focuses on the role of 
condoms as a key self-protection mechanism against HIV/AIDS. UNAIDS argues that: 
“Condoms are at the centre of a combination HIV prevention approach (…) An estimated 
45 million HIV infections have been averted through condom use globally since 1990. 
Achieving the global condom target for 2020 would avert 3.4 million new infections”.428  
Notwithstanding that condom provision is a crucial aspect of realising the right to 
sexual health and the right to health overall; with regard to access of condoms, data 
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in the African region shows inconsistencies in state provision.429 Of specific concern 
is the fact that it is often the individuals who don’t have access to condoms that are 
the most susceptible to the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, which includes individuals 
with non-normative gender identities such as transgender women, as well as sex 
workers (who are often an overlapping group as discussed earlier). Sex workers are 
a key population, their high risk of infection is often as a result of the refusal and/or 
compulsion from their clients to not use a condom.430 The WHO notes that the 
combination of stigma and discrimination they experience pose barriers to them 
receiving effective HIV/AIDS care.431 As described by UNAIDS: 
“Sex work (or aspects of sex work) is criminalised in a great majority of countries across 
Africa. Even in countries where sex work is not criminalised, law enforcement practices 
such as arbitrary detention and arrests based on condom possession deter sex workers 
from accessing condoms and place them at risk of HIV infection. Sex workers have also 
been charged with spreading STIs and forced to undergo mandatory HIV testing”.432 
The prevalence of African transgender women in sex work, as discussed under 3 4 2, 
is relevant in this context to illustrate the double discrimination they face when 
attempting to self-protect from HIV/AIDS. Because access to barrier contraceptives 
are a crucial aspect of essential public healthcare services and ensuring self-
protection against transmission, the provision of condoms without stigma or 
discrimination is decisive in preventing the further spread of HIV/AIDS. Consequently, 
State Parties should ensure the free distribution of condoms within their public health 
facilities, alongside the guarantee that all individuals, regardless of their gender 
identity, will be able to obtain and safely use this key protective measure.  
5 3 3 The right to be informed of one’s health status 
The final consideration for the right to health in article 14 is the provision for women to 
be informed of their health status. Article 14(1)(e) stipulates that: 
“States Parties shall ensure that the right to health of women, including sexual and 
reproductive health is respected and promoted. This includes: the right to be informed of 
one’s health status and on the health status of one’s partner, particularly if affected with 
sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, in accordance with internationally 
recognised standards and best practices”. 
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A crucial aspect of realising the right to sexual health, as part of the overall right to 
health, is the guarantee of mental and physical integrity and autonomy.433 As set out 
by the CESCR in General Comment No 22, the freedoms as part of this right include 
the ability of all women to make free and responsible decisions regarding their sexual 
health.434 Accordingly, an individual being aware of their HIV status is an integral 
aspect of making responsible health decisions because the risk of an individual not 
knowing is that they can easily infect others, which violates the other individual’s right 
to self-protection. There is not yet a cure for HIV/AIDS. Accordingly, the most effective 
treatment is preventative rather than reactive treatment. However, because HIV/AIDS 
is a preventable virus, if it is dealt with correctly, its spread can be controlled. Easily 
accessible and affordable HIV/AIDS testing is a crucial aspect of this. As described by 
Cohen et al:  
“A core piece of many of these prevention efforts [is] HIV testing. An assumption is that HIV 
testing, when conducted well, both informs individuals about risks for HIV (whether or not 
they are infected), allows people who are found to be infected to take special precautions 
to prevent the further spread of the disease, and serves as a gateway to diagnosis and 
treatment”.435 
A key reason why many individuals around the world do not know their HIV status is 
due to misconceptions and stigma held against being infected with HIV/AIDS. UNAIDS 
noted in a recent study that in the western and central African region, 40 per cent of 
adults said they wouldn’t buy vegetables from a shopkeeper who was HIV positive.436 
As already noted, transgender women are ostracised in society; moreover, if they also 
have HIV/AIDS, the repercussion of double discrimination is detrimental to the 
protection of their human rights and ensuring that they are treated with dignity in 
society.  
HIV/AIDS testing is a crucial part of general healthcare services and it is vital that 
all individuals make use of such services and know their HIV/AIDS status. However, 
for many individuals, they are too scared to know their status as many do not realise 
that it is a treatable infection and/or because they fear the consequences of being 
identified to have the infection.437 As explained by the WHO and OHCHR, “fear of 
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being identified with HIV/AIDS may stop people who suffer discrimination (…) from 
voluntarily seeking counselling, testing or treatment”.438 In line with the enshrined 
object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol, protecting the rights of all women requires 
State Parties to ensure HIV testing is a common, accepted practice that all women 
have access to as this is a key aspect of ensuring an inclusive right to health; which is 
an inherent right in order to protect the enjoyment of all interrelated rights. As 
described by Cohen et al:   
“From a human right perspective, any approach to HIV testing should recognise that 
people have a right of access to HIV testing as part of the broader right to health care as 
enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Considerations such as informed consent, confidentiality of test results, protections 
against violence and discrimination and measures to combat stigma are not intended to 
be barriers to HIV testing. On the contrary, they are human rights imperatives”.439 
A teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol requires State Parties to fulfil these 
‘human rights imperatives’ during the fulfilment of their obligations. Addressing the 
HIV/AIDS crisis and protecting the human rights of African transgender women cannot 
be seen as separate endeavours. Similarly, recognising and protecting African 
transgender women and fully realising their rights in the Maputo Protocol are not 
separate tasks, due to the fact that the rights of these women continue to be violated 
because of a denial of their identities; which is a violation of the object and purpose of 
the Maputo Protocol to ensure the rights of all women are protected and promoted. In 
consideration of this, certain illustrations of violations to health rights are discussed 
below.  
5 4 Violations of African transgender women’s right to health  
Similar to the structure of chapter 4, this final subsection provides an illustration of 
violations of African transgender women’s right to health. As set out under 1 4, this 
thesis is based on secondary sources only and as such, it is not able to directly account 
for the lived experiences of all African transgender women. Instead, based on the 
relevant, available sources, it aims to provide a general discussion of the hurdles that 
African transgender women are faced with when attempting to access general 
healthcare, gender affirming services as well as HIV/AIDS preventive services and/or 
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treatment. The same approach used under 4 4 is applied in this section in order to 
assess the utility of the respective rights discussed under 5 3.  
5 4 1 Stigma and discrimination within healthcare services  
As set out earlier, ensuring available, affordable, acceptable and quality healthcare 
services is a key aspect of realising the right to health. This is established through 
article 14(2)(a) of the Maputo Protocol and is echoed throughout conceptualisations 
of the right to health under international human rights law.440 As mentioned under 5 2 
1, the right to health within this research includes a key focus on access to primary 
healthcare.  
Social and economic exclusion are the two main challenges which create barriers 
for individuals when attempting to access healthcare. The focus of this subsection is 
how this social and economic exclusion bars universal access to healthcare which, as 
a result, particularly disadvantages African transgender women. Throughout this 
research, causes of stigma and discrimination against African transgender women 
have been discussed, including: heteronormativity, cultural conservatism, religious 
persecution, lack of exposure as well as fear. These, in the context of access to 
healthcare are direct infringements of the underlying notions of universal and equitable 
access as well as access to healthcare on a non-discriminatory basis. In General 
Comment No 22 the CESCR noted that:  
“Non-discrimination in the context of the right to sexual and reproductive health also 
encompasses the right of all persons, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and 
intersex persons, to be fully respected for their sexual orientation, gender identity and 
intersex status”. [emphasis added]441 
As discussed under 2 4, queer legal theory sets out that individuals’ human rights are 
protected by the law regardless of how they present themselves or perform their 
identities. A binary heteronormative denial of the realisation of human rights is 
contradictory to the principle of universality. The right to health in combination with the 
right to dignity, equality and non-discrimination implies that transgender women’s right 
to health should be realised notwithstanding their gender identity.  
Furthermore, the WHO and OHCHR argue that the rights to equality and non-
discrimination for all individuals indicate that states have to recognise and provide for 
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the different specific needs of groups in the face of particular health challenges.442 
Accordingly, even as individuals may experience many of the same health conditions, 
certain minorities may experience exacerbated health conditions because of their 
positioning in society. This is true for African transgender women and their position is 
exacerbated due to a number of factors including when they are financially insecure, 
homeless, operating as sex workers and/or without formal employment.443 The 
combination of intersectional factors like these make African transgender women more 
likely to not be able to have their right to health fully realised.444  
The CESCR sets out that states have an obligation to ensure the elimination of 
systemic discrimination regarding socio-economic rights. This includes healthcare 
professionals and providers upholding the principles of equality and non-
discrimination.445 Yet this is not an experience nor guarantee for a majority of African 
transgender patients. As explained by the OHCHR, “healthcare professionals are 
often insensitive to the needs of transgender persons and [they] lack the necessary 
professional training”.446 This affects many transgender women’s ability to realise this 
right compared to the rest of the global population. Thomas et al argues that: 
“[T]ransgender people often experience a disproportionately high burden of disease, 
including in the domains of mental, sexual and reproductive health. Exposure to violence, 
victimization, stigma and discrimination are also higher in this population. In addition, they 
experience barriers to accessing health care and health-determining resources, such as 
education, employment and housing. These barriers are largely attributable to legal, 
economic and social deprivation, marginalization, stigmatization and discrimination, 
including non-recognition of a gender identity that is different from the sex assigned at 
birth”.447 
Accordingly, the stigma and discrimination which affect transgender women’s access 
to healthcare are violations of their right to health and are noted to exacerbate, as well 
as cause, ill-health.448 Thomas et al argue that there are three key challenges to the 
realisation of the right to health of the transgender population. Firstly, they argue that 
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there is a lack of significant data (which relates to the discussion under 1 5 and 4 4 1) 
which is able to assess and engage with the status of the health of transgender women 
worldwide. With a focus on the heightened risk of HIV/AIDS, they argue that the poor 
understanding of the burden of HIV/AIDS amongst transgender women is because of 
their limited inclusion within national HIV/AIDS monitoring systems.449 Secondly, they 
argue that the gap of knowledge regarding transgender specific healthcare is a barrier 
to their right to access and reinforces them as an invisible social group. They define 
these two factors as “social and legal drivers of ill-health”. Finally, they argue that the 
underlying mechanisms of social exclusion systematise how healthcare operates 
worldwide and that these mechanisms are inherently biased and discriminatory 
against transgender women.450 Notwithstanding the conceptualisation that all human 
rights, including the right to health, are bestowed on all individuals on the basis of 
universality (due to the inherent dignity of all individuals); worldwide, individuals with 
non-normative gender identities are often denied healthcare services and/or have a 
negative experience at the hand of health care providers because of stigma and 
discrimination. This is a constant reality for many African transgender women and 
affects their trust in healthcare systems and willingness to seek out healthcare 
services.451 De Santis argues that:  
“Healthcare is an issue for [transgender women] for a multiple of reasons including verbal 
abuse, discrimination, insensitivity and a lack of trust in [healthcare providers], lack of 
knowledge or education on the part of the [healthcare providers] and an overemphasis of 
HIV infection in the context of transgender healthcare”.452 
In most African states resources to support public healthcare facilities are scarce.453 
Moreover, a lack of exposure to non-normative individuals has been linked to 
unprofessional and ill-treatment of them.454 An illustration of this can be seen in 
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occurrences where an individual who comes in for care or a check-up will be initially 
well-received by the staff, until the staff realise that they are transgender and that their 
gender expressed does not correlate to their biological sex.455 In such instances often 
fear, confusion, personal stigma and/or beliefs implicate their ability to be non-
judgmental and professional.456 As discussed under 5 4 1, unequal and stigmatised 
treatment of non-normative individuals, such as transgender women, is exacerbated 
within highly religious or conservative societies. However, in consideration of the fact 
that the right to health is a key right in the pursuit of a dignified existence; relativist 
approaches determining who may be regarded as worthy of healthcare services and 
who is not is an infringement of international human rights law.  
5 4 2  Pathologisation of transgender individuals   
A key contributing factor to the stigmatisation and discrimination against transgender 
women stems from their pathologisation which brands them as mentally disordered 
and/or ill. Pathologisation, as described by Suess et al, is the “psycho-medical, legal 
and cultural practice of identifying a feature, an individual or a population as 
intrinsically disordered”.457 Tarver argues that throughout history, individuals have 
been classified as mentally disordered based on a “socially influenced psychiatric 
condition” in order to justify poor treatment of them.458  
Kara submits that the pathologisation of transgender individuals causes several 
human rights concerns.459 She begins by highlighting that the restrictive norms from 
which pathologisation operates is a result of outdated colonial influence which 
imposes a cisnormative gender binary and which erases the plurality of gender 
diversity. Furthermore, she submits that the treatment of transgender individuals as 
mentally ill often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and tends to exacerbate their 
experiences with mental illness. Because transgender individuals have become 
dependent on a pathologised diagnosis in many states in order to access legal 
recognition as well as gender affirming services and procedures; this creates a burden 
 
455 Müller Sexual and Reproductive health for Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming People (2013) 
4.  
456 Paradiso & Lally (2018) Transgender Health 52. 
457 A Suess, K Espineria & P Crego Walters, as quoted in Kara Gender is not an illness (2017) 4. 
458 DE Tarver “Transgender Mental Health: The intersection of race, sexual orientation, and gender 
identity” in BE Jones & MJ Hill (eds) Mental Health Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Communities (2002) 94. 
459 Kara Gender is not an illness (2017) 6. 
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on them to accept a diagnosis of being mentally ill in order to access basic socio-
economic services. Kara further argues that:   
“[A]busive practices and policies that are justified by these medical classifications, such as 
so-called corrective or reparative therapies, and forced or coerced sterilization and 
surgeries, including as pre-requisites to legal gender recognition, have been recognised as 
tantamount to torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by [the] United Nations and 
regional human rights mechanisms”.460  
The International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (“ICD”) acts 
as the manual for the classification of health conditions worldwide. The ICD is 
sponsored by the UN and published by the WHO to provide an organising system for 
health conditions, diseases, as well as potential related signs and symptoms. 
Ghebreyesus argues that the ICD enables society to better understand causes of 
illness and death and provides tools to prevent suffering and save individuals’ lives.461  
Moreover, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) is 
published by the American Psychiatric Association to offer common language and 
standardised criteria for the classification of mental disorders. Although American, it is 
relevant to this research due to its influence on the mental health industry 
worldwide.462 Both the DSM and ICD have in different ways and through different 
terminology, pathologised transgender individuals. The DSM III in 1980 first included 
the diagnosis of “Transsexualism”.463 Thereafter, the DSM IV, in 1994, included 
“Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents and Adults” as a replacement for the 
transsexualism diagnosis. Trans-feminists criticise the fact that gender identity 
disorder was added to the DSM III when homosexuality was removed. They stipulate 
that this addition was an attempt by the international community to continue to police 
atypical gender expressions.464 Most recently, in the DSM V, the condition of gender 
identity disorder in adolescents and adults was removed and replaced with “Gender 
Dysphoria”.465 Gender dysphoria is described as the distress individuals experience 
due to the incongruence between their sex and gender. The term ‘gender dysphoria’ 
emphasises the state of distress because of the incongruence.  
 
460 Kara Gender is not an illness (2017) 7. 
461 C Lindmeier “WHO releases new International Classification of Diseases (ICD 11)” (18-06-2018) 
World Health Organisation <https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/18-06-2018-who-releases-new-
international-classification-of-diseases-(icd-11)> (accessed 10-04-2019).  
462 SL Sennott “Gender Disorder as Gender Oppression: A Transfeminist Approach to Rethinking the 
Pathologisation of Gender Non-Conformity” (2011) 34 Women & Therapy 94. 
463 Sennott (2011) Women & Therapy 95. 
464 95.  
465 American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 ed (2013) 
451. 
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Comparatively, the ICD 10 in 1994, moved “Transsexualism” from the “Mental 
Disorders” under “Neurotic Disorders, Personality Disorders and Other Nonpsychotic 
Mental Disorders” within “Sexual Deviations and Disorders” to a specific section 
created entitled “Gender Identity Disorders” under the chapter titled “Mental and 
Behavioural Disorders”. The most recent version of the ICD, the ICD 11, was 
completed in 2018. It is planned to come into effect on 1 January 2022 and to 
thereafter be implemented internationally.466 The ICD 11 is noteworthy as it has 
removed the disorder of “Transsexualism” and replaced it with “Gender 
Incongruence”, defined as “a marked and persistent incongruence between an 
individual's experienced gender and the assigned sex”.467 Notably, this diagnosis has 
no presence of distress nor impairment, and instead provides only an 
acknowledgement of the divergence between an individual’s sex and gender. Another 
significant change within the ICD 11 is the abolishment of the section of “Gender 
Identity Disorders” and the fact that “Gender Incongruence” is not situated within 
“Mental and Behavioural Disorders” but rather in the chapter titled “Conditions Related 
to Sexual Health”. 468 The WHO argues that this was because:  
"[E]vidence is now clear that [being transgender] is not a mental disorder, and indeed 
classifying it in this can cause enormous stigma for people who are transgender, there 
remain significant health care needs that can best be met if the condition is coded under 
the ICD”.469 
The ICD 11 diagnosis is praised to better encapsulate the experiences of being 
transgender with focus on the experience of having a non-normative gender identify 
rather than implying that this non-normativity is an indicator of mental illness. Queer 
legal theory is illuminating in this regard to expose that pathologisation enforces a 
heteronormative lens punishing individuals for not complying with the gender binary. 
De-pathologisation is crucial because, as noted earlier under 4 3 2, there is a clear 
link between branding transgender people as ill and transphobic violence.  
 
466 C Lindmeier “WHO releases new International Classification of Diseases (ICD 11)” World Health 
Organisation (18-06-201) <https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/18-06-2018-who-releases-new-
international-classification-of-diseases-(icd-11)> (accessed 10-04-2019).  
467 World Health Organisation International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 11 
ed (2018); see <https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#/http://id.who.int/icd/entity/411470068> (accessed 
10-07-2019).  
468 Kara Gender is not an illness (2017) 5-6. 
469 T Fitzsimons “’Transsexualism’ removed from World Health Organisation’s disease manual” NBC 
News (20-06-2018) <https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/transsexualism-removed-world-
health-organization-s-disease-manual-n885141> (accessed 12-04-2019).  
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On the 17th of May 2016 several UN Committees, regional Commissions including 
the African Commission, as well as international human rights experts published a 
statement calling for an end to pathologisation entitled: "Pathologization – Being 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or trans is not an illness".470 This joint statement reflects a 
shift in the international community where individuals are unequivocally protected and 
regarded as equal legal subjects regardless of their gender identities. This statement 
can be seen as an embodiment of queer legal theory, where biases in the law (such 
as binary gender categorisation) are identified as harmful and called to be erased. The 
CESCR noted in a Concluding Observation on Germany that regarding transgender 
individuals as mentally ill because of their gender identities leads to discrimination 
which violates their health rights.471  
Theilan argues that there is a right to de-pathologisation.472 She continues that this 
is in light of a holistic and interrelated realisation of the right to health, equality as well 
as non-discrimination.473 As stated:   
“Due to the detrimental effects of pathologisation on trans persons’ well-being, the right to 
health is implicated and may be violated in any number of scenarios (…) the fact that only 
transsexual and transgender persons are pathologised, but not the large majority of 
cisgender persons, constitutes unequal treatment. If no justification for such treatment can 
be found – as indeed it cannot – the right to non-discrimination is likewise violated”.474  
Moreover, Theilan argues that the fundamental notions of human dignity and personal 
autonomy within international human rights law (as the basis of the right to gender 
recognition) cannot be reconciled with the pathologisation of transgender 
individuals.475 Accordingly, the promotion of the right to gender recognition as an 
inherent aspect of the right to dignity as discussed under 3 2 2 coincides with the right 
to de-pathologisation as an inherent aspect of the right to health. In light of the main 
research aim, de-pathologisation within the African human rights system would both 
confirm the inherent dignity and equality of African transgender women within the 
 
470 OHCHR “Pathologization – Being lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or trans is not an illness” For 
International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia – Tuesday 17 May 2016” OHCHR 
27-05-2016) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19956&LangID=E> 
(accessed 02-03-2019). 
471 CESCR ‘Concluding Observations on the fifth report of Germany on the implementation of the 
ICESCR’ (20 May 2011) E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 para 26 as quoted in Theilan (2014) Human Rights Law 
Review 330.   
472 Theilan (2014) Human Rights Law Review 330. 
473 342. 
474 332. 
475 332. 
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protective scope of the Maputo Protocol as well as contribute to a fulfilment of the 
obligations set out in articles 3(1), 3(2) and 14(2)(a).   
5 4 3 Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS 
The spread of HIV/AIDS worldwide is a pandemic and has been noted as the “most 
important infectious disease threat to human health of our time”.476 Moreover, the 
African continent is the “epicentre” of this HIV/AIDS pandemic.477 In 2018, UNAIDS 
stated that 53 per cent of individuals who have HIV/AIDS live on the African continent 
and that the majority of HIV/AIDS infections are found in the sub-Saharan African 
region specifically.478 UNAIDS has further estimated that 19 per cent of transgender 
women worldwide have HIV/AIDS and that they are 49 times more likely to acquire 
HIV/AIDS than any other individuals of reproductive age.479 Thus, for African 
transgender women, the intersection of geography and status as a minority with non-
normative gender identities defines their risk of infection as an urgent human rights 
concern. Beyrer argues that:  
While LGBT rights issues include many social concerns in their own rights, they have also 
been prominent areas of effort and contention in the era of HIV. This is true everywhere 
the pandemic has affected communities and countries, but perhaps most especially so in 
Africa, the hardest hit region of the world by HIV/AIDS”.480 
It has been noted throughout this thesis that African transgender women are a key 
population group vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection.481 This is often attributed to the 
high frequency of African transgender women occupied as sex workers, to risky sexual 
behaviour as well as to a lack of education and information regarding the virus, which 
is often a consequence of social and economic marginalisation. Moreover, another 
key risk factor is the sharing of needles between individuals during the administering 
of hormones.482 Furthermore, the social stigma related to being HIV positive as well 
 
476 Cohen et al “Human Rights and Public Health Ethics” in Public Health & Human Rights Evidence 
Based Approaches (2007) 362. 
477 African Union Report HIV, the Law and Human Rights in the African Human Rights System: Key 
Challenges and Opportunities for Rights-Based Responses to HIV (2016) 13.  
478 UNAIDS (2018) 5. 
479 UNAIDS The Gap Report 2014: Transgender People (2014) 3.  
480 C Beyrer “LGBT Africa: A social justice movement emerges in the era of HIV” (2012) 9 SAHARJ 
177. 
481 JM Fogel, T Sandfort, Y Zhang, X Guo, W Clarke, A Breaud, V Cummings, EL Hamilton, A Ogendo, 
N Kayange, R Panchia, K Dominguez, YQ Chen & SH Eshleman “Accuracy of Self-Reported HIV Status 
Among African Men and Transgender Women Who Have Sex with Men Who were Screened for 
Participation in a Research Study: HPTN 075” (2018) AIDS and Behavior 2. 
482 Müller Sexual and Reproductive health for Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming People (2013) 
10.  
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as the discrimination experienced by transgender women during attempting access to 
healthcare services often discourages them to get tested and actively know their 
status. This puts them, their partners and their families at risk. Sibidé argues that:  
“Stigma and discrimination still [have] terrible consequences. The very people who are 
meant to be protecting, supporting and healing people living with HIV often discriminate 
against the people who should be in their care, denying access to critical HIV services, 
resulting in more HIV infections and more deaths. It is the responsibility of the state to 
protect everyone. Human rights are universal—no one is excluded, not sex workers, gay 
men and other men who have sex with men, people who inject drugs, transgender people, 
prisoners or migrants. Bad laws that criminalize HIV transmission, sex work, personal drug 
use and sexual orientation or hinder access to services must go, and go now”.483 
Because African transgender women are identifiable as a key population, a 
teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol shows that the exclusion of them 
from the protective scope of the Protocol is a violation of their rights to dignity, health 
and life as set out in the Protocol. This violation is in consideration of the object and 
purpose of the Maputo Protocol. Moreover, as the discrimination which occurs against 
these women is a reaction to their non-normative gender identities and informed by 
culturally relativist, heteronormative perspectives; it is contrary to the object and 
purpose of the Maputo Protocol. Accordingly, African transgender women’s high 
likelihood of contracting HIV/AIDS and not being correctly treated thereafter because 
they are transgender is an arbitrary and life-threatening consequence, contrary to the 
values and objects of the Maputo Protocol and therefore a violation of the obligations 
contained in article 14(2)(d).   
5 5 Conclusion 
The right to health, as contained in article 14 of the Maputo Protocol, affects the ability 
of individuals to fully enjoy and realise all of their other human rights. Excluding African 
transgender women from this provision (particularly through barriers of access to 
healthcare) on the basis of stigma and discrimination is a violation of international 
human rights law in general as well as the Maputo Protocol specifically. In this chapter, 
a teleological interpretation of articles 14(2)(a), 14(1)(d) and 14(1)(e) illustrated that 
access to primary healthcare for African transgender women should include gender 
affirming services and procedures as well as HIV/AIDS preventative services and 
treatment. Thus withholding any related services, procedures and/or treatments, as is 
the case in most State Parties, is a violation of international human rights law. 
 
483 UNAIDS DATA 2018 (2018) 2-3. 
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Moreover, the pathologisation of African transgender women impairs their ability to 
realise their rights as set out in the Maputo Protocol, including their rights to dignity 
and health. A full realisation of the right to health, through a teleological interpretation 
which ensures that women are able to “fully enjoy all their human rights” as set out in 
the preamble, requires State Parties to de-pathologise them and to integrate them into 
their national health schemes, ensuring that they receive access to adequate primary 
healthcare services, including gender affirming procedures and treatment.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
6 1 Introduction   
This thesis set out to assess whether African transgender women are recognised and 
protected through a teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol. This 
assessment was undertaken in consideration of a few factors; firstly, that the definition 
provided for ‘women’ in article 1(k) of the Maputo Protocol defines them as persons of 
female gender and transgender women, as argued in this research, are of female 
gender because of their gender identities. Secondly, as the object and purpose of the 
Maputo Protocol is to “ensure that the rights of women are promoted, realised and 
protected” and because transgender women are women, this thesis undertook to 
identify the causes and consequences of their unlawful exclusion from the protective 
scope of the Maputo Protocol. Thirdly, because the Maputo Protocol is a human rights 
treaty, the principle of universality and rights to equality and non-discrimination are 
enshrined within it. Thus, it was supposed that any discriminatory exclusion of African 
transgender women on the basis of their gender identities is a violation of the Maputo 
Protocol as well as the fundamental principles of international human rights law.  
6 2 Findings  
The key to the conceptualisation of individual human rights protection is the 
acknowledgment of the inherent dignity and equality of all individuals. This confirms 
the notion that all individuals are born ‘free and equal’ and are guaranteed the 
realisation and protection of all of their fundamental human rights, because they are 
human. This is enshrined in all treaties under purview, such as the UDHR, ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CEDAW, African Charter and Maputo Protocol. Moreover, the rights to 
equality and non-discrimination indicate that this acknowledgement, realisation and 
protection is ensured notwithstanding any personal characteristics present in any 
individuals, including their gender identity.  
The principle of universality together with the rights to equality and non-
discrimination in this way establish the foundation of how international human rights 
law interacts with individuals. Therefore, international human rights law envisions that 
all human rights, including the rights to dignity, life, integrity, security and health, are 
inalienable and bestowed on all individuals. As set out under 3 2 1, a key concern 
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regarding the enjoyment of human rights is the acknowledgement of an individual’s 
inherent humanity, dignity, ‘personhood’ as well as identity.  Notwithstanding the 
conceptualisation of human rights, this thesis has shown that within many African 
states, there is a disregard for the inherent dignity and legal personality of African 
transgender women. This consequently positions them as legally and socially invisible.  
Accordingly, under 2 2, it was confirmed that there is no essential nor universal 
experience of being a woman; and accordingly that transgender women are women 
on the basis of their gender identity. The narrative where biological reproductive 
abilities define women are long-outdated. Moreover, in order to establish an 
individual’s gender, it was shown that gender identity, rather than biological sex, is 
decisive. This is because gender is inherently psycho-social and a manner in which 
individuals self-identify within society. Under 2 3 post-modern intersectional feminist 
legal theory was applied which affirmed this. It was shown that intersectionality and 
post-modernism aid women to transcend previous harmful and discriminatory feminist 
mechanisms so to better advocate for all women and their multitude of experiences, 
including different forms of discrimination faced. Moreover, as argued by Banda, 
intersectionality is particularly useful in the African context to inform states on how to 
better protect African women, due to the multiple discriminations they face. 
Colonialism introduced gender essentialism as well as social and legal bias regarding 
the value and function of women into Africa. Mikell argued that in acknowledgement 
of this, a ‘social reimagination’ is required for African women. Thus, it was presented 
that such a reimagination offers an opportunity for the implementation of theories such 
as ‘transfeminism’ as a mechanism for African transgender to incorporate themselves 
into the theory.  
The discussion on queer legal theory, under 2 4, advocated for unequivocal legal 
recognition and protection of all individuals regardless of their gender identity. 
Arguments such as Currah’s advocacy of gender pluralism were shown to inherently 
embody the principles of universality, equality and non-discrimination. Furthermore, 
queer legal theory helped to delineate transgender women and homosexual men, 
which is important when considering the ‘homophobia’ (as described by Mukasa) that 
many transgender women in Africa experience. Therefore, the operation of queer legal 
theory was shown to be an inherent tool of decolonisation to liberate African 
individuals, including transgender women, from harmful heteronormative legal 
limitations. This again was shown to be an embodiment and confirmation of the 
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fundamental principles of universality, equality and non-discrimination. Accordingly, 
post-modern intersectional feminist legal theory and queer legal theory read together 
presented that a binary and heteronormative perception of gender identity required for 
legal recognition and protection is contrary to universal human rights protection. 
Moreover, it is the consequence of outdated, narrow, heteronormative, religious and/or 
culturally relativist interpretations of the law which continue to exclude transgender 
women from unequivocal legal recognition and protection. This was shown to be 
inherently discriminatory. It was furthermore illustrated that the fluidity of identities 
need to be considered for comprehensive human rights protection, especially as 
violations are often as a result of discrimination and violence against these women 
because of their non-normative gender identities.  
The principle of universality was discussed under 2 5 1 and it defined as an 
universally accepted notion that human rights are bestowed onto all humans because 
they are human. In consideration of this, together with the inherent rights to equality 
and non-discrimination, it was established that gender identity cannot justify 
discrimination nor the denial of human rights protection. Furthermore, an inclusive 
interpretation of ‘other status’ presented another manner in which gender identity 
could alternatively be read in as a ground of non-discrimination. Because the 
understanding of ‘universality’ has developed since the historically narrow protection 
of ‘man’, further developments away from normative and binary understandings of 
individuals, such as transgender women, were presented as essential when ensuring 
that the rights to equality and non-discrimination are fully and universally enforced.  
 In order to assess the justifications presented against protecting non-normative 
individuals, relativism was discussed under 2 5 2. In light of the fundamental principles 
and purpose of international human rights law, it was established that relativism is 
fundamentally flawed. Moreover, it was shown that the international community’s 
values vis-à-via SOGI rights are changing to become more inclusive and universal. 
This was reflected through the implementation of the mandate for Human Rights 
Council’s Resolution 32/2 and its recent renewal.484 It was noteworthy that during the 
 
484 HRC ‘Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity’ 
33rd session (15 July 2016) A/HRC/RES/32/2; HRC ‘Mandate of the Independent Expert on protection 
against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity’ 41st session (10 
July 2019) A/HRC/41/L.10/Rev/1. 
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second vote, more states voted ‘yes’ to the resolution than previously and less states 
voted ‘no’.485 
Under 2 6, the operation and interpretation of treaties were shown to be a key 
feature in ensuring consistent human rights protection within the international 
community. Even though this research did not focus on the domestication process of 
the Maputo Protocol, because international treaties supersede conflicting national law 
in most domestic systems, their effective interpretation was shown to be crucial in 
guiding states in their obligations to create domestic law. The teleological approach to 
treaty interpretation was shown to most effectively provide an interpretation of a 
human rights instrument that best fulfils its object and purpose. Accordingly, a 
teleological interpretation of the Maputo Protocol, protecting the human rights of 
African women, established that an exclusion of transgender women (based on their 
non-normative gender identities) is discriminatory as the Protocol is founded on the 
prohibition of discrimination as well as ensuring the rights of African women are 
provided for and protected. Therefore, it was concluded that it is only through viewing 
the Maputo Protocol through a culturally relativist and heteronormative lens that 
transgender women are excluded from its protective scope. 
Thereafter, under 3 2 1, human dignity was recognised as a key guiding value as 
well as substantive right within international human rights law. It was illustrated to be 
bestowed to all individuals because they are human. However, it was simultaneously 
acknowledged that notwithstanding its value, it is not defined in any human rights 
instrument. Accordingly, aspects of violations were rather identified to show that when 
violated, the inherent dignity and humanity of individuals (their ‘personhood’) is 
stripped. This identification was done so to inform the positive state obligations 
required for adequate human rights protection for marginalised and vulnerable 
individuals such as African transgender women.  
Under 3 2 2 it was established that it is only transgender individuals who are denied 
their gender recognition and that the consequences of this include a denial of legal 
recognition and social visibility. This furthermore affects their ability to access basic 
socio-economic rights, be recognised as legal subjects as well as have adequate 
recourse when their rights have been violated. Moreover, this denial of gender 
 
485 HRC ‘Mandate of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity’ 41st session (10 July 2019) A/HRC/41/L.10/Rev/1. Adopted 
by a recorded vote of 27 to 12 with 7 abstentions.  
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recognition was shown to be a result of the denial of their inherent dignity, which further 
impacts their ability to have other human rights protected.   
Under 3 3 1, the ideological struggle on the African continent was illustrated to 
explain the continuous conflation between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. 
Heteronormative cultural relativism embodied within the legal cultures of many State 
Parties to the Maputo Protocol was identified as a key contributor to this. Under 3 4 1, 
the undignified experiences of African transgender women were illustrated to contrast 
the protections set out within international and African regional human rights law, to 
their lived experiences. 
Because the African human rights system operates to ensure the full enforcement 
of the principles and rights enshrined within international human rights law, African 
Commission Resolution 275 was used as an example to reveal the growing awareness 
and condemnation of violence and persecution against African individuals on the basis 
of their SOGI. The renewal of the mandate for the UN Independent Expert on SOGI, 
as discussed under 2 5 2, was again shown as a confirmation of the growing 
acceptance for recognising and protecting SOGI rights worldwide; as illustrated in the 
increase of states who voted ‘yes’ (from 23 to 27)486 and a decrease in the states who 
voted ‘no’ (from 18 to 12).487 Moreover, the Ghanaian representative in their statement 
referred to Resolution 275 and noted the “evolution of thinking”.  
The essential right to life, was discussed under 4 1 to show how when it is violated 
there can be no enjoyment of any other human rights. Under 4 2 it was emphasised 
how the rights life, integrity, security, dignity, equality and non-discrimination are all 
intrinsically linked. This was an important consideration due to the multitude of 
violations against the human rights of African transgender women and the implications 
for their other human rights. Due to the fact that the right to life is a jus cogens norm, 
the due diligence, as well as positive State Party obligations to protect all individuals’ 
right, was highlighted and contrasted with the persecution of African transgender 
women. Moreover, in interpreting the right to life, it was illustrated that a narrow 
 
486 The states that voted ‘yes’ for the renewal are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nepal, 
Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom and 
Uruguay. As noted, Rwanda and South Africa are the only State Parties to the Maputo Protocol who 
voted for the renewal. 
487 The states that voted ‘no’ for the renewal are: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. It is noteworthy that Eritrea, Nigeria 
and Somalia are all State Parties to the Maputo Protocol.  
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consideration is inadequate to fully encompass and protect the right and that the 
avoidance of death is an insufficient realisation. 
The teleological interpretation of the rights to dignity, life, integrity and security were 
shown to provide a wide mandate to protect all individuals from poverty, abuse and 
violence as well as their bodily autonomy, economic rights, social and health rights. In 
this sense it was revealed that violations are linked and that so long as the gender 
recognition and identities of African transgender women are denied; their ability to 
realise their right to dignity and life, as well as several other human rights, will be 
threatened. Interrelated to this is the consequence that many African transgender 
women are frequently victim of human rights abuses without any effective legal 
recourse. Accordingly, a teleological interpretation of article 4(1) confirmed the 
simultaneous obligation to promote and protect many other rights set out in the Maputo 
Protocol.  
During the discussion on gender-based violence, both the status of being a woman 
and being transgender was pinpointed as overlapping causes of violence. This 
displayed how gender-based violence against African transgender women, which is 
explicitly prohibited under the Maputo Protocol, puts them at a state of intersectional 
vulnerability. Moreover, the lack of data on African transgender women and violations 
against them was presented as an impediment to efficient human rights protection and 
prevention against violations. It also illustrated the continuation of negation; which 
denies their existence and subsequently continues the cycle of violations to go 
undocumented. The issue of conflating transgender women and homosexual men was 
again acknowledged as a contributing factor to discrimination and violence. Thus, it 
was shown that if gender recognition is provided, their existence acknowledged and 
violations against them properly documented; State Parties would be able to 
adequately address said violations as well as establish mechanisms so to prevent 
further occurrences.  
Under 4 4 2, the practical tension between universality and relativism was illustrated 
to address the need for specific legal protection of African transgender women and 
their rights notwithstanding harmful cultural and traditional beliefs and/or practices. 
Although it is imperative that State Parties retain their positive cultural and traditional 
beliefs and practices, they cannot be used as justifications for human rights violations. 
Finally, 4 4 3 presented that the continuous deprivation of dignified existences for 
African transgender women is a violation of their right to life and a failure of State 
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Partie’s obligations in this regard. This was shown to be exacerbated for transgender 
sex workers, who are a considerable part of the transgender African population and 
often transgender women.  
The discussion on the right to health showed that the realisation of the right to health 
also affects the ability of individuals to enjoy their other human rights. 5 2 1 illustrated 
that the right to health is not equivalent to a guarantee to be healthy but rather a 
conceptualisation to achieve the highest attainable standard of health for all 
individuals. For transgender women specifically, it was established that this includes 
the provision of gender affirming hormones and treatment as well as confirmation of 
gender recognition as a key aspect of realising the right to dignity. Notwithstanding 
this, stigma, discrimination, economic and social exclusion were identified as constant 
barriers for African transgender women. These were shown to be perpetuated by a 
lack of adequate information and funds as well as willing and trained healthcare 
professionals. As South Africa is the only State Party with legislation to facilitate 
gender recognition and procedures on the continent so far, the experiences in the 
state were briefly assessed. Through this assessment, however, it was conceded that 
provision is limited and issues of accessibility and affordability continue.   
Cohen’s emphasis on removing systematic barriers, as set out under 5 3 3, 
informed the effects of harmful heteronormativity within the provision of socio-
economic services in State Parties. This confirmed how the right to health cannot be 
realised as long as discrimination against individuals with non-normative gender 
identities persists. Furthermore, notwithstanding the acknowledged issue of available 
resources within states in order to fully realise this right, it was shown that State Parties 
unequivocally have a responsibility to focus on their short-term obligations of 
immediate effect. This includes ensuring access to healthcare on a non-discriminatory 
basis to all individuals. Linked to this, it was shown that the “appropriate measures” 
required of State Parties as per their obligations in the Maputo Protocol requires 
explicit protection of all individuals, including those with non-normative gender 
identities, as well as an integration of this into their national legislation.  
Because African transgender women are a key population group vulnerable to 
HIV/AIDS infections, it was found that preventive mechanisms are a priority in terms 
of ensuring the highest attainable standard for their right to health. Under 5 3 3, it was 
illustrated that HIV testing and knowing their status is equally important and that a 
contributing factor as to why many individuals are unaware is due to the stigma 
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attached to having HIV/AIDS. Therefore, due to the discrimination African transgender 
women already experience because of their non-normative gender identities, it was 
noted that they will experience heightened vulnerability if they also contract HIV. 
Accordingly, adequate testing and prevention was shown to be not just a health 
concern, but rather a human rights imperative.  
Three key challenges, as argued by Thomas et al, were highlighted to be decisive 
for the realisation and protection of African transgender women’s rights to health.  
Namely, the lack of data, as similarly discussed in chapter 4, the continuous invisibility 
and negation of African transgender women and their specific health concerns as well 
as the perpetuated underlying mechanisms of social exclusion within healthcare 
systems. Moreover, these systems were argued to be inherently biased and 
discriminatory against them. Under 5 4 2 pathologisation was highlighted as a key 
factor of stigma and discrimination against African transgender women. It was shown 
to be an import of harmful heteronormative colonial beliefs and to exacerbate the ill 
health of transgender women as well as to impose a barrier for them in order to access 
basic socio-economic services. Whilst the ICD and DSM were shown to have been 
contributors to this pathologisation, the current ICD 11 revealed a positive change in 
how the diagnosis is dealt with in the international community, as gender incongruence 
is now listed as a sexual condition rather than a mental one. This emphasised that the 
divergence between gender identity and biological sex within individuals without 
proposing that that automatically indicates an illness. Moreover, statements from 
WHO advocating that being transgender is not a mental disorder, infer a positive shift 
in the way the international community is evolving to view transgender women. As 
argued by Theilan, there is a right to de-pathologisation to ensure a full realisation of 
the rights to health, dignity, equality as well as non-discrimination for transgender 
individuals.  
Overall, the violations against the rights to dignity, life, integrity, security and health 
of African transgender women, illustrated in this research, highlight the impact of 
harmful traditional and cultural beliefs and practices which continue to directly threaten 
their dignity and lives. Moreover, their continuous pathologisation (which 
fundamentally ignores their identities and gender recognition) impairs their ability to 
access healthcare without stigma or discrimination. The significance of articles 2, 3, 4, 
5 and 14 of the Maputo Protocol show how the progressive mandate of the Maputo 
Protocol is under-utilised in protecting African transgender women in light of their 
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specific socio-economic challenges, vulnerability to violence, marginalisation and 
exposure to HIV/AIDS. Moreover, because African transgender women are human 
beings, they are entitled to the realisation and protection of their fundamental human 
rights. Accordingly, any violations of their rights on the basis of their non-normative 
gender identities is argued to be in direct contravention of the Maputo Protocol.  
6 3 Recommendations    
In light of these findings, it is recommended that the State Parties to the Maputo 
Protocol fulfil their obligation contained in article 26 of the Maputo Protocol and submit 
reports to the African Commission regarding their progress with regard to a full 
realisation of the respective articles and the effective fulfilment of their state 
obligations. In consideration of a full realisation of article 3, State Parties should fulfil 
their obligations as contained in articles 3(3) and 3(4) and 1(j) taking note of the 
particular vulnerable position of African transgender women. These articles read 
together with article 2(2) could include interaction with the African Commission to 
ensure the creation and adoption of a General Comment which explicitly recognises 
transgender women as per article 1(k) and accordingly denounces the harmful 
heteronormativity which continues to generate and justify violence, degradation and 
discrimination against these women. This is important because such violence, 
degradation and discrimination continuously threatens their dignity and ability to fully 
realise their right to life. In light of this, State Parties should be encouraged in line with 
articles 3(1) and 3(2) to adopt legislation which ensures gender recognition for 
transgender individuals within their respective states.  
Furthermore, as suggested by Holtmaat and Post, it is reiterated and recommended 
that the CEDAW Committee create a General Recommendation on article 5(a) of 
CEDAW which focuses on the relationship between gender stereotypes, traditional 
gender roles and the oppression of non-normative individuals. Because of the similar 
content of article 5(a) and article 2(2) of the Maputo Protocol, this Recommendation 
could be instructive for the State Parties and African Commission.  
In consideration of the State Party obligations contained in article 4, State Parties 
should work together with the African Commission to update General Comment No 3 
and develop the protections afforded by specifically guarding against discrimination 
and/or deprivation of the right to life on the basis of gender identity and acknowledging 
the due diligence they have in light of the particular risk transgender women live with. 
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Within General Comment No 3, whilst the death penalty is condemned, the specific 
threat against African transgender women (on the basis of their non-normativity, 
conflation with homosexual men and vulnerability under Sharia law) should be 
highlighted.  
State Parties should implement national measures in line with their obligations 
contained in articles 3(3), 3(4), 4(2)(c), 4(2)(d) and 5 to guard against violence 
committed against African transgender women, acknowledging the specific causes 
and justifications as presented within this research. Engagement with theories such 
as queer legal theory and post-modern intersectional legal feminist theory as well as 
first-hand accounts from grass-roots organisations would enlighten the State Parties 
to the main causes and consequences of violence continuously perpetuated against 
African transgender women. Thereafter, State Parties would be able to implement 
appropriate measures nationally to prevent and eliminate the violence as well as to 
eradicate the harmful beliefs which cause the violations to continue. This could include 
the introduction of protective legislation ensuring the principles of universality, equality 
and non-discrimination to protect all individuals regardless of their gender identities.  
Thereafter, in consideration of Resolution 275, the CCPR’s General Comment 35, 
the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No 35 as well as both reports 
published by the HRC on the findings of the Independent Expert on SOGI; State 
Parties should, together with the African Commission, create a General Comment 
acknowledging and denouncing harmful cultural and traditional beliefs and/or 
practices which threaten the human rights of non-normative individuals such as 
African transgender women. This should call to erase the harmful aspects which 
invalidate the values of international human rights law as well as the object and 
purpose of the Maputo Protocol which they are bound to. In this they could also confirm 
their due diligence to ensure that all state actors furthermore comply and embody 
these values in their occupations. The decriminalisation of non-normativity, including 
homosexuality, is also a crucial step, due to the detrimental consequences 
criminalisation has on the human rights, and lives, of both African homosexual men 
and transgender women. 
Moreover, in order to aid their ability to fulfil the obligations contained in article 4, 
State Parties should implement systems to collect and monitor data specifically 
regarding violence and violations against African transgender women. For statistical 
accuracy, this would require State Parties to firstly recognise the gender identities of 
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African transgender women, and secondly to distinguish them from homosexual men. 
This would also require public assurance that such data would not be used to 
persecute or prosecute any individuals based on their gender identities.  
In consideration of article 14, State Parties should develop national legislation to 
include and confirm transgender women’s ability to access gender recognition and 
gender affirming hormones and procedures in line with the obligations contained in 
articles 3(2) and 14(1). This includes an active effort to remove systematic barriers 
which hinder their access to healthcare, including providing sensitivity training to 
healthcare providers. Whilst it is acknowledged that lack of resources can impair State 
Partie’s ability to fully realise the right to healthcare, State Parties must nonetheless 
be urged to focus on their short-term obligations, which are described to be 
immediately achievable, namely ensuring access to healthcare on a non-
discriminatory basis as per article 14(2)(a). Furthermore, the African Commission’s 
General Comment No 2 should be updated to explicitly condemn discrimination 
against transgender women and should include gender identity as a ground for non-
discrimination. 
Furthermore, in light of the specific vulnerability of HIV infection, State Parties must 
acknowledge and include African transgender women as key populations in their 
respective national HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment plans. They need to implement 
mechanisms to ensure the provision and education regarding condoms as a key 
prevention service. Moreover, it is suggested that the decriminalisation of consensual 
adult sex work would improve the ability of key population groups to prevent the 
transmission of HIV/AIDS. Finally, State Parties should implement national legislation 
to de-pathologise transgender individuals; this could be a part of the legislation as 
recommended above which would provide for legal gender recognition.   
In light of these recommendations; the African Commission should seek specific 
state reports in light of the particular position of African transgender women under the 
auspices of the Maputo Protocol and keep the State Parties accountable to their 
obligations.  
In order to fully achieve the object and purpose of the Maputo Protocol and 
maximise its potential to protect all African women, it is submitted that the State Parties 
to the Maputo Protocol need to explicitly recognise transgender women as women as 
set out in article 1(k). 
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